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Abstract 
 
 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are expected to be one of the key enabling technologies in the near future. 
Ubiquitous intelligent sensing environments have a promising potential to enhance the everyday life of the 
citizens, bringing important social benefits for each person and for the society as a whole. Example application 
space of this new technology is the pervasive health and elderly care. Successful integration of pervasive health 
care systems in the everyday life of elderly, patients, their relatives and their carers - in terms of selection of 
appropriate means for security and privacy protection - may only be achieved if the systems offer tools for 
flexible, adaptable and individualised services which at the same time leave the end-user to be in control of taking 
the decision for revealing sensitive information according to a specific situation and context. This touches both 
technological aspects such as ensuring confidentiality, data integrity and freshness, trust establishment in 
pervasive healthcare environments, as well as privacy of communication, data and location. 
Substantial research has contributed to progress in this field. However, before the wide acceptance of such 
services and systems, the integration of wireless sensor networks with different network systems gives rise to 
many research challenges to ensure security, privacy and trust in the overall architecture. Part of the challenges to 
overcome are due to requirements for reliable services, low network latency, low packet loss, robust data and 
image transmission, and the great need for safe, secure, and dependable operation. For pervasive health care 
services using wireless sensor networks and body sensor networks, ensuring security and privacy is a quite 
complex task because of the need for power efficiency, the need for solutions which fit in very low memory, 
solutions for heterogeneous devices, need for unobtrusive operation, and last but not least - the need for solutions 
which are adaptable and flexible enough in order to be applicable to many services. Moreover, there is a need of 
empowering end-users with flexible personalised controls for their personal data collected, processed and 
communicated via the sensors.  
The security and privacy protecting mechanisms must be non-obtrusive and context-aware to support the daily 
private and professional life of the persons. Since the devices/nodes used by patients and medical professionals 
will have diverse capabilities, many of them with very limited resources, an important question is the implication 
of the security and privacy solutions on the overall system performance and the costs of integrating the protocols 
and mechanisms.  
The goal is to design an adaptive security and privacy framework that provides the respective services under the 
constraints of code size, CPU, and memory size. The solution adopted in this PhD thesis to provide privacy 
protection for WSNs is based on application-aware adaptive security management and context-aware controlled 
information disclosure, capable of providing three different security levels that best match with the actual needs of 
the scenarios, without overloading the constrained devices. Starting point of the work is thorough analysis of 
security threats and vulnerabilities to which such systems could be exposed to. Based on the specific security, 
privacy, user and service requirements, valid for the pervasive health care applications, threat model is defined 
(including threats coming from context provision), security risk assessment is performed and overall mitigation 
plan to countermeasure the threats is proposed. Further in the thesis, suitable countermeasure solutions for a 
subset of the threats are proposed – namely, threats to unauthorised access, revealing confidential data and 
revealing user’s identity and location.  
The privacy protection framework is integrated within the generic security framework. Suitable protocols and 
mechanisms are identified, which when combined according to the framework form a complete toolbox solution 
which fits the architecture of Beyond 3G environments. 
This thesis proposes novel flexible privacy protection framework suitable for diverse set of pervasive health and 
elderly care applications; describes evaluation frames for it and investigates the cost of privacy protection. 
Evaluation of the influence of the context complexity and policy-based management is also presented. 
Performance evaluation results demonstrate the feasibility and estimate the benefits of the adaptive security and 
context-aware privacy for pervasive health care scenarios. The evaluation should aid the designers of pervasive 
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systems with integrated wireless sensor networks in understanding how to exploit context, policies and profiling 
in order to protect privacy; how to find the most relevant design; how to access the performance of the solution. 
More precisely, the major contributions of this thesis are: 
 
 Analysis of the security and privacy requirements of the scenarios of tele-health and tele-care, including 
also the requirements for the relevant context   
 Full threat analysis of pervasive health care scenarios with definition of threat model and mitigation plan 
for WSNs for pervasive health and elderly care application spaces 
 Definition of generic adaptive security management framework for WSNs in pervasive health care 
scenarios 
 Definition of context-aware privacy protection framework for WSNs in pervasive health care scenarios, 
integrated within adaptive security management framework  
 Proposal of context-enhanced controlled information disclosure mechanism  
 Proposal of adaptive security protocol suit for confidentiality for WSNs in pervasive health care scenarios 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1.1 General Framework 
 
As the average age of the population is increasing in most of the European countries, the percentage of many 
chronic diseases is increasing too. WHO has predicted that in 2030, the reasons for highest death rate will due to 
cancer, ischemic heart disease and cerebrovascular disease. The number of cases will be increasing with time. [1] 
At the same time, the shortage of qualified personnel to take care of patients and elderly posses many challenges 
for the health and social systems in many European countries.  
 
Health and primary care providers must use the resources most effectively and save costs, and at the same time 
keeping the same living standard as of today and even improving the quality of healthcare services. Therefore it is 
in many cases an option to treat/monitor as many patients as possible at their home and to prolong the time which 
an elderly person lives independently at home. Hence, many governments are now focusing to find technological 
systems for supporting the chronically ill and the elderly to live as independently as possible and to help elderly 
and patients to be treated and/or after cared safely at their own homes.  
In this respect the application of pervasive computing in telemedicine and tele-care and development of an 
ambient intelligence for healthcare and wellness management in the patient’s home is the appropriate choice [2] 
[3]. In parallel, the use of pervasive systems for patients at hospital provides many opportunities for cheaper and 
effective treatment.  
Pervasive healthcare is in this respect an emerging cross-disciplinary domain, focusing on the research and 
developments of pervasive and ubiquitous wireless technologies in order to improve the quality of health-care, 
care for elderly and wellness. We are currently witnessing first trials of pilots of services integrating wireless 
communications in patients and elderly care by the evolution of new generations of embedded wireless devices, 
which facilitates reliable, comprehensive, and high-standard health and elderly care. Particularly, developments in 
wireless infrastructure, such as wireless sensor networks and body-area networks or pervasive health-monitoring 
systems, have proved beneficial to deliver telemedicine services regardless of a patient or elderly physical location 
[4][5].  
However, before the wide acceptance of such services and systems, there still exist many challenges to overcome 
due to requirements for reliable services, low network latency, low packet loss, robust data and image 
transmission, and the great need for safe, secure, and dependable operation [6]. In all these applications and 
services, the data which will be monitored, communicated, stored, requested, will be of very sensitive and private 
value for the end –user [7]. In order to avoid dehumanising and stigmatising the user, the privacy and ethical 
aspects and the end-user values must be paid great attention to and incorporated in the design approach [8]. This is 
especially true for designing pervasive healthcare applications, where the 'complexity of users' is increasingly 
sensitive. The end-users must be also aware and informed that certain pieces of sensitive information must be 
revealed, collected and accessed by others. By considering measures for privacy protection of the human values in 
the design process, designers and developers can create pervasive health applications that better fit the end-user 
needs and desires. This will further reduce the risk of resistance to this new technology.  
 
Designing of such systems with privacy and ethical care in mind must solve security, privacy and social issues of 
ubiquitous systems; issues for data integrity and privacy protection; security auditing; authentication and identity 
management; access controls, etc.  
 
Additionally, successful integration of Pervasive Health and Social Care Systems in the everyday life of elderly, 
patients, their relatives and their carers - in terms of selection of appropriate means for security and privacy 
protection - may only be achieved if the systems offer tools for flexible, adaptable and individualised services 
which at the same time leave the end-user to be in control of taking the decision for revealing sensitive 
information according to a specific situation and context. This touches both technological aspects such as ensuring 
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confidentiality, data integrity and freshness, trust establishment in pervasive healthcare environments, as well as 
privacy of communication, data and location.  
 
Looking at possible network architectures which could support pervasive health care services, the focus is on 
Beyond 3G environments. Their characteristics are heterogeneous devices, inter-working of different 
communication paradigms, heterogeneous wireless interfaces, hierarchical network organisation and data 
aggregation [9]. They are potentially highly dynamic, with frequent changes of topology, with mobility at all 
levels of hierarchy in the forms of node and network mobility. In some of the levels of these environments, the 
devices are power, energy and memory constraint. The applications are user and service oriented and to provide 
unobtrusive end-user services, they rely heavily on context data from the surroundings. These specifics call for 
flexible and context-aware solutions.   
 
 
1.2 Reference network and system architecture  
 
Addressing the requirements of ubiquitous sensing and networking, the EU-funded project CRUISE [10] proposed 
the Hybrid Hierarchical Architecture (HHA) [11], see Figure 1 as a common framework for the research towards 
integrating WSNs with existing networks. HHA has been proposed as a reference network architecture which can 
support the vision for the development of ubiquitous sensorised environments. This type of architecture is a 
response to the need of integrating WSNs with existing communication technologies in many emerging 
application spaces. It integrates devices with heterogeneous capabilities and constraints, in particular concerning 
energy, memory, processing power, programmability, deployment, mobility, and wireless interfaces [12] [13]. In 
this novel architecture, the network edge must migrate towards the objects of the physical world and sensors and 
actuators which access it and provide data for the users. This includes simple devices such as passive RFIDs and 
active sensors which can organise within ad hoc networks and deploy mechanisms to exploit density and locality 
of the data. The data aggregated within WSN patches are accessed by wireless stationary or mobile devices which 
in order to communicate themselves may either use ad hoc communication or cellular network. Short description 
of HHA is presented later in Section 2.1 of this thesis.  
 
As a result of the joint work, CRUISE project identified related open issues concerning energy efficiency, 
scalability, mobility, security, privacy and trust, middleware design, and fundamental theoretical constraints and 
integrated research efforts to make a progress in these areas. One of the open research issues was the need for 
system architecture, that could be context capturing framework that enables the convergence of many input 
modalities, mainly focussing on energy efficient WSNs that are multisensory in their composition, heterogeneous 
in their networking, either mobile (e.g. Body Sensor Network) or integrated in the environment e.g. from single 
sensors to a big number of sensors collecting information about the environment, a person or an object. This has 
been investigated in the EU-funded project e-SENSE [14] – Capturing Ambient Intelligence for Mobile 
Communications through Wireless Sensor Networks. The aim of e-SENSE was to enable context rich information 
availability (for user, social and environment) by means of multi-sensory intelligent wireless sensor networks that 
have hybrid mobile and fixed characteristics and thus provide the enabling technology to develop Ambient 
Intelligent Mobile Systems beyond 3G. Key research issues were energy efficiency; ultra low power and 
bandwidth efficient air-interfaces; security, privacy and trust; distributed resource management for wireless 
sensors; self growing, robust, and scalable wireless sensor networks. 
In e-SENSE, flexible protocol stack architecture for WSNs was designed, which allows the incorporation of novel 
connectivity, management, and middleware concepts into the e-SENSE system including flexible security 
management. This architecture provides the advanced support functionality and high adaptability required for a 
wide range of application and deployment scenarios. The flexible protocol stack comprises of application, 
middleware, management and connectivity subsystems (Figure 1) which are presented in more details later in 
Section 4.5.  
 
These two concepts are complementary to each other - CRUISE HHA is a network architecture that can be built 
using the e-SENSE system architecture. As this thesis has been carried out as a part of work done in these two 
projects and in relation to these two points of gravity, the work presented in this thesis will be put into the 
perspective of HHA and the flexible protocol stack with a general objective of the work to define how context-
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aware security and privacy services could be provided within the overall network architecture, in a way that 
covers the security needs of WSNs medical scenarios and the dynamic nature of context changes. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Hybrid Hierarchical Architecture introduced by CRUISE project and flexible protocol stack 
introduced by e-SENSE project 
 
Legend: APP: Application Subsystem, MI: Middleware Subsystem, MA: Management Subsystem, CO: Connectivity Subsystem, 
B3G: Beyond 3G Component, DB: Data Base, AP: Access Point, BS: Base Station, M: Mote, R-M: Reader + Mote, S: Smart Tag 
 
1.3 Thesis Motivation  
 
However, for pervasive health care services using WSNs and body sensor networks (BSNs), ensuring security and 
privacy is a quite complex task for several reasons: 
 Power efficiency – both the WSN and BSNs have very scarce power sources. The mobile terminals are 
also power limited.  
 Heterogeneous devices – the pervasive systems will rely on integration of heterogeneous devices such as 
end-sensor nodes, aggregators, mobile terminals, smart phones, laptop and desktop computers with very 
diverse memory, power, and computation capabilities. 
 The question of trust - There will be different services and different service providers. How the user will 
know which provider to trust? 
 Unobtrusive operation – in order to be more user-friendly and intuitive and not to require a lot of 
interaction, the applications become more complex. However, this complexity must be hidden for the 
end-user. One way to achieve this is for the system to use available context information and take certain 
decisions on behalf of the user.   
 User’s control over disclosure of own sensitive data - Once released and (maybe) stored in different 
places, it is very difficult for the users to have control over to whom this data might be released at a later 
time or linked with their data from other services.  
 The solutions must be adaptable and flexible enough in order to be applicable to many services. 
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Not much work has been done in most of the listed above points. These facts lead to the rationale to this thesis, 
namely proposing enhancing privacy protection with context-awareness for WSNs in pervasive health care, which 
focal points are to enable the systems to provide 
 the best privacy protection for the end-users and their sensitive data, and the conditions in which they use 
a service unobtrusively and with minimum user interaction 
 privacy protection services strictly necessary for what is needed for the healthcare service, the 
application, the groups of the end-users 
 the most optimal level of security and privacy vs energy efficiency and memory usage  
 
The following paragraphs present examples of scenarios for pervasive health and elderly care and highlight the 
above mentioned challenges.  
 
1.4 Example scenarios for pervasive health and elderly 
care using WSN and BSN 
 
The idea with the use of WSN and BSNs for pervasive health and elderly care is to support the medical, 
emergency or elderly care teams in the care for the patients in the hospital or in the after-care when they are 
recovering at home, to help the elderly persons to perform their daily activities independently and safely at home, 
to support the care-givers more efficiently to take care for their clients and last but not least to help the relatives to 
be informed all the time what is happening with their loved ones. All that diversity of services is linked to 
different types of end-user groups, each of them with a set of requirements for privacy protection, which in most 
of the cases are diverse. These will be exemplified in the following three examples: 
 
 
16 of 173 
Kopi af PhD-Anelia-v1.6D-06Apr09   
 
Figure 2: Overall picture for pervasive health and elderly care scenarios 
 
Scenario for monitoring of patients at hospital  
 
This is a “trivial” health care scenario - involves the use of sensors to capture the physiological status of patients 
with BSN, additional information from the sensors in the environment (locating patients, equipment, staff). The 
types of data taken into account are patients’ related information, hospital administrative information, knowledge 
based information. The patients’ related information includes pieces of data such as medical history, current 
medications, diagnosis, allergies, food plan, administrative data such as names, address, the closest relatives to be 
contacted in case some important and life-saving decisions must be taken on behalf of the patient, insurance 
scheme, social security number, etc. In case of emergency, if special equipment is necessary, the doctor must be 
informed by the system where this equipment at the moment is; or in case help of a specialised doctor is needed, 
the system must check where the back-up doctor is, is he available at the moment, and is it the needed specialist. 
All these different pieces of information must be accessible to strictly defined medical groups. In case the 
information is very sensitive for the patient, it might be required that, the access to some parts of it happens only 
with the user involvement. If not, the system must self react based on pre-defined access rules and taking the 
current context into account. 
 
For this to happen, the system must be configured to: 
 Transmit confidentially the measured vital health status of the patient   
 Define for each part of the patient’s data which is the medical group authorised to access it 
 Map a requesting party to a list of groups authorised to see a certain piece of information 
 Check for the position of equipment and send notification or show the shortest path to get this equipment  
 Check for a name of a specialised doctor in the hospital database, find the position of this doctor, check 
for his availability in the administrative system of the hospital 
 
Scenario for elderly care - monitoring of behaviour and activities of daily living 
 
Another scenario where the use of sensors helps in the care for elderly is behaviour and activities monitoring. It is 
about individual behaviour monitoring and the autonomous detection of critical long-term deviations. Here the 
home of the elderly is equipped with sensors in the floor, in the walls, in the kitchen equipment, in the bed which 
help to detect if any anomaly of person’s behaviour occurs or the person is fallen down. Such system substitutes 
direct monitoring of persons with cameras, which in many cases is seen as going too far in protecting the privacy 
and dignity of elderly.  
In this situation, if it is considered that one group of social-care personnel receives and sees collective information 
for all clients, the anonymity of the persons’ identities and even addresses must be protected. If alarming event 
occurs and a care person must be sent to the home, only this person must know the exact address of the client in 
need. 
Apart from this basic privacy protection, the clients must be sure that information for their patterns of behaviour 
will not be released to somebody who wants to use the time period when they are not at home to make robbery.  
 
Here the system must use  
 Suitable approaches for modelling context knowledge (user-/environment-oriented) 
 Mechanism for data anonymity   
 Mechanism to check if the party requesting address information is only the one authorised to access it 
 
Scenario of integration of medical and social care (doctors and care-givers 
interaction)  
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In this scenario the elderly patients is at home under continuous care. They have a chronic disease and visit 
periodically the hospital or their general practitioner (GP) but in their daily life they are cared by social services. 
Here health related data are captured via BSN and the sensors from the home in the patient’s home. The collected 
and interpreted patient’s data can be used to give feedback about and to support medication intake, exercise 
regime, visits to the hospital or to the GP.  
The user-groups here are the patients, health professionals, social-care staff and secondary users (e.g. relatives, 
friends). In order to be most efficient, the hospital, medical and social-care systems must communicate with each 
other sharing the information for the patient.  
For the elderly persons themselves would not be possible to manage all coming requests for different pieces of 
their private information from different parties. The system must do it on their behalf once they or their relatives 
or the administrator of the service have specified it in the setup phase.   
 
From a system point of view a number of things must be considered in order to protect the users as they want: 
 The measured vital health status of the patient must be transmitted confidentially   
 The medical and social staff must be able to coordinate their actions for a certain person only based on 
the minimum necessary data without knowing the rest of the privacy information for the user 
 On request, the systems must provide exactly this piece of sensitive data which the requesting party is 
authorised to see – for example medications and latest medical results can be accessible to the GP, while 
the schedule of visits to GP must be accessible to the primary care-giver too. And this without 
intervention by the users. However they or their relatives must be able to see who and when has accessed 
the data. 
 Security level of the BSN must be managed to save energy – for example lowest level when the user is at 
home and highest level when the user is in a public place. The system must “detect” where the user is and 
to have mechanisms to change the security level. 
 
1.5 Goal of the Thesis and Problems Defined  
 
Achieving a wireless pervasive system using heterogeneous devices (WSN, BSN, mobile terminals, smart phones, 
etc), which protects against all possible security and privacy threats and risks and at the same time does not use a 
lot of resources, is a very challenging task, even almost impossible to achieve. Therefore the work discussed in 
this thesis provides solutions to only a certain aspects of privacy. 
 
The thesis proposes a framework that is capable of protecting all information which is considered private and 
sensible for the users who live surrounded by ubiquitous sensorised environments, by adapting to the changing 
context and using the minimum possible resources, and at the same time being unobtrusive in supporting their 
daily tasks.  
 
The privacy objectives are defined as follows:  
 Maintaining information confidentiality, i.e. to prevent any disclosure or manipulation of the message 
content to any other party  
 Maintaining information privacy, i.e. to prevent any disclosure of personal data or information directly 
related to the individual to a medical service or application without the user’s prior approval or 
knowledge.  
 Maintaining context privacy, i.e. to prevent any disclosure of identifiable information related to the 
context in which the user is using the medical service and from which indirect information for the user 
could be extracted.  
 
There are four main questions that this thesis seeks to answer, namely: 
 
1. How to define a security and privacy framework which protect against the security threats and attacks 
most likely to happen and easiest to perform for the scenarios in question and does not waist system 
resources to protect against all possible threats and vulnerabilities at the highest level? That means – what 
is the threat model for pervasive heath carer system using WSNs? 
 Who are the main user groups which will be using this system, what are their assets 
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 What security and privacy requirements are valid for the reference medical-care scenarios 
 What type of context information for the users’ devices, users’ environment could be used to 
threaten their privacy 
 Which could be the access points to the system to materialise an attack and via which threat 
scenarios this could be materialised  
 
2. How to define a security and privacy framework which provides exactly the necessary level of protection 
for a specific scenario and how flexibility and adaptivity could prevent waist of system resources  
 How could flexibility and adaptivity be achieved in the framework  
 Which privacy services and mechanisms could be made flexible  
 How to define deferent security levels which satisfy the diversity of the cases in which the 
pervasive healthcare systems will be used  
 
3. How can privacy protection framework be extended so that it may use knowledge about the context to 
work autonomously without putting the burden to the user and be adaptive to the dynamic change of the 
context? 
 What type of context could be considered relevant to be fed into the system 
 What is the most efficient rule model to be used to combine context, conditions, decisions, 
actions  
 What number of rules and context attributes could be considered for the different categories of 
devices  
 What security protocols and mechanisms could form suitable security protocol suit having 
adaptivity and flexibility features for potential power savings  
 
4. What is the cost of adding desirable features such as context-awareness and adaptivity to the privacy 
protection mechanisms for WSNs? In particular with respect to 
 Time to find the most appropriate privacy protection rule which is valid to the current context  
 Introduced delay from the privacy protection  
 Gain in efficiency if a proactive approach is used in reply to the dynamic nature of context 
changes 
 Power savings coming from the use of different security levels via suitable security protocol suit 
 
Throughout the presented work these four questions remain the focal points of the thesis. These questions are 
divided into three main topics addressed in the thesis: 
 
Threat model for WSNs in pervasive health care scenarios and overall mitigation plan: 
Providing full security and privacy protection is costly for any system, because it introduces additional 
computations, communications and delays and makes the systems more complex. One standard solution ensuring 
the highest levels of security for all possible scenarios would be very costly. The challenge here is to define the 
threat model and based on risk management analysis, to draw up the overall mitigation plan to protect against 
most possible threats: 
 Analysing threats and vulnerabilities for the discussed scenarios  
 Analysing the specific security and privacy requirements derived from the scenarios  
 Defining detailed threat model for the pervasive health care systems which considers the main 
actors, assets, their values, vulnerabilities, etc  
 Proposal of a mitigation plan for the identified security and privacy threats and risks with 
mechanisms which fit into the system restrictions   
 
Adaptive and context-aware privacy protection framework:  
The development of a generic security management framework and security and privacy mechanisms capable to 
react on change of the context and at the same time achieving the best trade off between the security and privacy 
requirements and the optimal system performance. The challenges that are being addressed on this topic are:  
 Introducing flexibility and adaptivity features in the generic security management framework 
 Analysing and mapping different security levels to everyday situations in the discussed scenarios  
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 Proposing the building blocks of the generic security management framework and their 
interactions with the other entities of the system  
 Defining the context attributes to be used to enhance the work of the security management and 
proposing context monitoring algorithm   
 Defining suitable security protocol suit and privacy mechanisms for the different levels of 
security and privacy protection as a recommendation to the system designers  
 Proposing generic context-ware privacy protection framework which fulfils the scenario 
requirements and is flexible enough in order to fit the requirements of the scenarios  
 Proposing context-enhanced controlled information disclosure mechanism and adaptive security 
protocol suit  
 
Performance evaluation:  
A proof of concept test bed used for performance evaluation of different metrics related to the cost of the context-
aware privacy protection and investigation of possible energy savings from the adaptive security concept. The 
main purpose of the evaluation through a practical implementation is 
 To validate that the proposed concept for adaptive security and enhanced privacy protection 
holds promise for pervasive care scenarios  
 To get estimation of gained energy savings when applying different security levels in typical 
everyday settings  
 To obtain idea of how the applied context-awareness and adaptivity to the privacy protection 
impacts the performance parameters in terms of delay and complexity  
 To provide the system designers with some practical directions for applying the proposed 
framework and mechanisms 
 
1.6 Original contributions  
 
Several original contributions have been studied and are presented in this thesis - solutions applicable for WSNs 
to countermeasure a subset of privacy threats to which pervasive health care systems could be exposed. In 
particular:  
 
 Analysis of the security and privacy requirements of the scenarios of tele-health and tele-care, including 
also the requirements for relevant context   
 Full threat analysis of pervasive health care scenarios with definition of threat model and mitigation plan 
for WSNs for pervasive health and elderly care application spaces 
 Definition of generic adaptive security management framework for WSNs in pervasive health care 
scenarios which allows for the optimal energy and memory trade-off between the requirements and 
system restrictions and allows for personalisation and user friendliness   
 Definition of context-aware privacy protection framework for WSNs in pervasive health care scenarios, 
integrated within adaptive security management framework  
 Proposal of context-enhanced controlled information disclosure mechanism which can be tailored 
according the needs of all user groups and diverse set of scenarios   
 Proposal of adaptive security protocol suit for confidentiality for WSNs in pervasive health care scenarios 
to provide different security levels and to comply with the heavy restrictions for power and memory of 
the end-sensor nodes without compromising the security   
 
1.7 Thesis Outline  
 
The rest of the thesis is divided in six chapters:  
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Chapter 2 presents the vision for the development of ubiquitous sensorised environments and introduces wireless 
sensor networks (WSNs) as the enablers of this vision. Further it presents the reference network architecture 
which can support such a vision – The Hybrid Hierarchical Architecture (HHA) and some related applications. It 
continues with overview of the major security and privacy threats and risks for WSNs. It further identifies the 
security, trust and privacy issues for WSNs coming from the specifics of HHA and it discusses the open research 
issues to be solved before the wide acceptance of WSNs. It further explains the implications which security, 
privacy and trust have on HHA. It finishes with review of the current approaches for solving these open issues and 
identification of research gaps.  
 
Chapter 3 begins with short description of the main pervasive health care services using WSNs or BSNs and 
selects one reference scenario which will be investigated throughout this thesis, namely – the pervasive health and 
elderly care application space. Further the security, privacy and trust requirements derived from the scenarios are 
presented. The main aspects of Chapter 3 are the security threats analysis for health care applications with WSNs 
and definition of threat model which are one of the original contributions in this thesis. Risk management and 
overall mitigation plan are further presented.  
 
Chapter 4 is one of the most important focal points of this thesis where other contribution is presented in details – 
The Adaptive Context-Aware Privacy Protection (ACAPP) Framework for WSNs as part of a generic adaptive 
security management framework. It starts with motivation for such a framework and presentation of the privacy 
objectives in this thesis. It presents the key features of this framework and how it is integrated in an overall 
Adaptive Security Framework. The main functionality and building blocks of the ACAPP Framework are further 
explained. Furthermore it is explained, how the security management and the context monitoring could be applied.  
 
Chapter 5 presents the proposed context-aware and adaptive privacy protection mechanisms – for controlled 
information disclosure and security protocol suit providing adaptive confidentiality. Further, the applicability of 
ACAPP Framework to the reference scenarios is presented. In the end, the discussed mechanisms are compared 
with existing solutions. 
 
Chapter 6 is the analysis and evaluation chapter. The proposed ACAPP Framework and mechanisms are first 
theoretically analysed. After that they are evaluated - starting with presentation of the evaluation goals and 
continuing with the results of the performed evaluation. It presents the costs of the privacy protection having 
features such as adaptivity, context-awareness and security management. It further evaluates the security 
management and the power savings from applying the adaptive security protocol suit.  
 
The last Chapter 7 gives the overall conclusions and directions for future work. 
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Chapter 2 – Background and State of the Art for Security and 
Privacy in WSNs 
 
The aim of Chapter 2 is to set the scene for the discussions which will follow in this report. Namely, to present the 
vision for the development of ubiquitous sensorised environments and to introduce wireless sensor networks 
(WSNs) as enablers of this vision. Further it presents the reference network architecture which can support such a 
vision – The Hybrid Hierarchical Architecture (HHA) and some applications which could be supported by it. The 
other focus in this part is to provide short overview of the major security and privacy threats and risks for WSNs. 
It further identifies the security, trust and privacy issues for WSNs coming from the specifics of HHA and it 
discusses the open research issues to be solved before the wide acceptance of WSNs. It explains the implications 
which security, privacy and trust services have on HHA. It finishes with review of the current approaches for 
solving these open issues and identification of research gaps.  
 
2.1. Introduction for WSNs 
In this section it will be presented the vision for development of ubiquitous sensor networks and a reference 
network architecture by which the vision can be implemented, together with a short overview of the applications 
which can be supported by this architecture.  
Vision for the development of ubiquitous sensor networks 
The vision of the ubiquitous networks which integrates people and things [1] [2] is steadily coming into 
realisation within the maturing environment characterised on the one hand with the technological advances in 
wireless technology, hardware platforms, software architectures, networking concepts and data processing 
methods, and on the other hand, with attractive application opportunities.  
In this global picture, the WSNs enhanced with the actuator capabilities materialise the interface between the 
people and the environment and establish a context for assisted living and emergency measures, intelligent 
production and transport, and environmental monitoring. In the long run, with the growing number of new 
applications, the ubiquitous networks will have to integrate the unprecedented amount of different types of 
communicating, sensing and actuating devices imposing significant constraints on the scalability of the 
mechanisms for network organisation, and data handling. European and International research communities have 
realised that this long term vision requires a novel hierarchical network architecture to integrate devices with 
heterogeneous capabilities and constraints, in particular concerning energy, memory, processing power, 
programmability, deployment, mobility, and wireless interfaces [3] [4]. In this novel architecture, the network 
edge must migrate towards the objects of the physical world and sensors and actuators which access it and provide 
data for the users. This includes simple devices such as passive RFIDs and active sensors which can organise 
within ad hoc networks and deploy mechanisms to exploit density and locality of the data. The data aggregated 
within WSN patches are accessed by wireless stationary or mobile devices which in order to communicate 
themselves may either use ad hoc communication or cellular network.  
It is obvious that the research issues related to WSN self-organisation and data-centric operation needs partial 
refocusing with the inclusion of WSNs in this holistic hierarchical network architecture. The simple model of a 
single sink network must be replaced with already studied multi-sink model, however with a novel set of energy 
and topology optimisation requirements stemming from the fact that network control and information aggregation, 
storage and retrieval can span different levels of architecture and detached geographic locations. In particular 
mobility, which is immanent to almost all WSN applications, including mobility of objects and events, sensor 
nodes, relay nodes, data harvesters, and end-users, provides a fertile ground for novel approaches towards network 
self-organisation and data processing. Addressing the requirements of ubiquitous sensing and networking, the EU 
Project CRUISE [5] [7] proposed the Hybrid Hierarchical Architecture [6] [10] as a common framework for the 
research, and identified related open issues concerning energy efficiency, scalability, mobility, security, privacy 
and trust, middleware design, and fundamental theoretical constraints. This Hybrid Hierarchical Architecture will 
be the reference architecture for the proposed in this PhD report solutions for security and privacy for WSNs. 
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Overview of Hybrid Hierarchical Architecture 
Hybrid Hierarchical Architecture is composed of four levels (Figure 2) [6] [10]. At level 0, referred to as access 
level, radio access points, for example fixed stations covering the area through Radio Access Networks – RANs - 
using air interface standards like e.g. GPRS or UMTS or WiFi, provide access to mobile terminals, denoted here 
as gateways carried by people (level 1 - people). These mobile devices can connect through a different air 
interface, e.g. ZigBee, or Bluetooth, to wireless nodes (level 2 - environment), with limited energy and processing 
capabilities, which are distributed in the environment and provide information taken from it. These wireless nodes, 
which may be sensor nodes (SNs), or beacons (providing localisation data) access the fixed network only through 
the gateways. Moreover they interact through possibly different air interfaces with tiny devices, e.g. smart tags, or 
very-low-cost sensors, which are part of movable objects such as books and tickets (level 3 - objects). 
 
 
Figure 3: Hybrid Hierarchical Architecture [6], [8] 
 
The proposed architecture is:   
 Hierarchical, in terms of network organisation and data aggregation. Data will follow the hierarchy from 
the SNs to the mobile gateway and then to the access points (called as base stations in the cellular 
systems). Sensor nodes (level two – environment) can also be organised in hierarchical structures (i.e. 
tree-based topologies) including even lower level of radio nodes, like smart tags remotely read by the 
SNs. 
 Hybrid, in terms of inter-working of different communication paradigms, routing domains, and 
addressing realms in different parts of the network. The mobile gateways link air interfaces based on 
different technologies: while WSN use self-organising infrastructure-less short-range low-cost types of 
radio standards, the transport networks are often based on complex centralised infrastructure-based 
standards like UMTS. The gateway should therefore be able to bridge very different types of networks. 
 Heterogeneous, in terms of supported wireless interfaces. Different radio interface technologies are used 
in the different sub-parts of the network: low-power short-range standards in the WSN, such as e.g. IEEE 
802.15.4 or Bluetooth, and cellular systems like GPRS or UMTS to connect the mobile gateways to the 
wired networks. 
HHA applies to potentially highly dynamic networks with frequent changes of topology owing to the mobility at 
all levels of hierarchy in the forms of node mobility and network mobility. For example, mobile nodes in the role 
of sink nodes at level 1 may move with respect to the access points in the fixed network at level 0 – either 
individually or as members of a mobile network (e.g., MANET or MONET). Simultaneously, they may also move 
with respect to a network of sensors at level 2. Mobility may appear across levels and administrative domains, or 
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within a single domain among nodes that run a common routing or data dissemination protocol (e.g., in a MANET 
or among sensors in a WSN).  
 
Short overview of the application spaces for WSNs in HHA  
HHA can support a certain type of applications such as smart homes, healthcare and elderly care, environment and 
habitat monitoring, asset tracking, etc. In these applications spaces, WSNs will lead to more effectiveness, cost 
reduction and increased quality of life. These applications are briefly describe below:  
Environmental Monitoring 
WSNs in environment and habitat monitoring are expected to find wide applicability since they can be easily 
deployed in large areas and capture the spatial and temporal state of the monitored environment. Of relevance here 
is event detection and localisation where an event can be the outbreak of a forest fire, a release of a toxic 
substance in the drinking water reservoir  [3], etc. A sensor field is deployed over a large area and nodes measure 
various signals (e.g. temperature or pollutant concentration). The main problem is to use the measurements to 
decide the existence of an event and locate its source.    
Logistics Management  
Atomisation of goods, new value chains, just-in-time production, globalisation and further developments in 
logistics require new technical solutions. WSNs and advanced communication will allow better surveillance of 
goods and even enable decentralised decision taking at the transport good, as for example investigated in the 
framework of the Collaborative Research Center 637 funded by the German Research Foundation. Sensors and 
RFID tags can be placed in the transport vehicles, as well as on the goods. 
Emergency Management 
In Emergency Management, e.g. fire-fighting and emergency aid after disasters, emergency forces cannot assume 
the presence of any communication infrastructure, but sensor information from different locations could improve 
their work. In a disaster scenario, the same technology would enable medics to more effectively care for large 
number of casualties. An integration of WSNs with fire-fighters is demonstrated in  [4] - the focus is on the use of 
WSNs to directly support the fire-fighter when entering a building under fire. 
Health and Elderly Care 
In the medical and elderly care, outfitting care subjects or clients with tiny, wearable wireless sensors forming a 
Body Sensor Network (BSN) would allow medical or care teams to monitor the status of their patients or clients 
(either at hospital or at home). In this case, the BSN transmits the current readings of vital signs (heart beat rate, 
body temperature, blood glucose, etc) to the hospital or care-giver database. Medical staffs, emergency teams, 
general practitioners can then access the data when needed. In addition to that, with the ageing population in 
Europe, the costs for the health and elderly care will increase significantly [9] and in order the current living 
standard to be maintained, ICT integrated with WSNs will find very broad applicability. At the same time, in all 
these applications and scenarios in discussion, providing secure systems which preserve the privacy of the 
individuals, is of a major concern for acceptance of this technology. Solving the security and privacy issues in 
these applications is very challenging and posses a number of not solved for the time being research issues.  
As it can be seen from the short overview, these applications are very diverse - have different needs in terms of: 
large/small scale deployment; interference-free / interference-prone environment; velocity required for the 
information; passive nodes /actuators, also diverse security and privacy requirements which in many of the cases 
are just opposite to each other. It is obvious that the security and privacy solutions for them must be customised 
and application-dependent. One standard solution will not be as effective and cost-appropriate as more tailor-
made solutions applicable to a certain category of applications. This tailor-made approach was the motivation to 
investigate more closely the specific security and privacy requirements and the security threats for a set of 
reference applications using WSNs and for the different levels of HHA. This investigation is presented in Section 
3.2. But before that, in the following paragraph security threats and attacks for WSNs are briefly summarised. 
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Summary of Section 2.1 
In this chapter the vision for development of ubiquitous sensor networks was presented and the Hybrid 
Hierarchical Architecture with four levels as the reference architecture which can support this vision. Among the 
different types of applications which can be accommodated within HHA, the ones for health and elderly care will 
be investigated throughout this thesis. The motivation to select these reference applications was threefold – the 
prognosis for ageing population in Europe; the prospect for cost savings and increased quality of life when using 
WSNs for health and elderly care and numerous business opportunities; the number of un-solved security and 
privacy issues related to the use of this technology. 
 
2.2. Major security threats and attacks for WSNs 
 
In this chapter major security threats and attacks for WSNs will be presented. The focus will be on the threats to 
communication links, to routing protocols, to data aggregation, attacks on traffic analysis, threats to localisation, 
time synchronisation, reprogramming and information sharing. All these threats and attacks are considered to be 
major ones for WSNs [11].  
 
Very schematic, the general architecture for WSN can be depicted in the following Figure 4. This architecture will 
be kept in mind when the major security threats and attacks will be presented in the rest of the chapter.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Hierarchical topology of a sensor network 
 
All the sensor nodes are able to collect data and transmit it to the sink which sends information to the task 
manager node via Internet or satellite. Sensors are able to transmit and send data to all others. Of course, 
depending on the applications, there are modifications of this general architecture.  
2.2.1. Threats to communication links 
These threats could affect the confidentiality, integrity or availability of information by manipulating 
communications between WSN nodes. 
Passive eavesdropping on communications between the WSN components to learn sensitive information is one of 
the simplest forms of attack. In WSNs communications, an adversary can gain access to private information by 
monitoring transmissions between nodes.  
Masquerade or impersonation of a node can be used by an adversary to fool a node by sending sensitive 
information to an adversary's node that is pretending to be a legitimate node. Such an attack can also be used by 
an adversary to send illegitimate information by pretending to be a legitimate sending node.  
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Compromise of a node by an adversary can be used in the same ways as masquerade or impersonation. However, 
this attack eliminates encryption effectiveness for any communications directed through the compromised node.  
With a man-in-the-middle attack, an adversary seeking (unauthorised) access to a node belonging to the SN 
inserts himself "in between" two authorised devices. Communications between the two devices are intercepted 
and manipulated. In a sensor network, sensors monitor the changes of specific parameters or values and report to 
the sink according to the requirement.  
Interference from deliberate jamming due to malicious nodes using the same frequency band can be used by an 
adversary to affect the availability of information. Jammers interfere with the radio frequencies the network nodes 
are using. Even sporadic jamming can be enough to cause disruption.  
Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks can be used by an adversary to prevent nodes communicating, and thus affect the 
availability of information. Examples include flooding attacks and, in particular, battery exhaustion attacks (also 
called “sleep deprivation torture” attacks). DoS is produced by the unintentional failure of nodes or malicious 
action.  
2.2.2. Threats to routing protocols 
Attacks on routing protocols in WSNs can be particularly effective with relatively modest required effort. The 
general aim is either to completely disrupt routing like a DoS attack or to route traffic via a so-called "sinkhole" 
for eavesdropping, selective forwarding etc… Current WSN routing protocols do not consider security, and even 
though many have been designed for fault-tolerance, they do provide protection against random faults rather then 
against an active attacker. Security for routing in ad-hoc networks has been well studied, however, solutions here 
cannot be applied directly to WSNs. This is because they are too expensive (in terms of computation or 
communication) and solve a typical problem for ad-hoc networks - that ad-hoc network routing requires complete 
routing tables, not just routes from multiple sources to a sink as it is the case in WSNs. 
Spoofing or altering routing messages can be used to divert traffic via an adversary's node. A special type of 
such attacks is the so-called "Black hole" attack. This is a type of DoS attack where the routing messages are 
disrupted in order to cause traffic to be diverted to a non-existent node or into infinite loops.  
Routing can be diverted using so-called "wormholes" between two compromised nodes in order to capture traffic 
from widely dispersed areas. The idea is that the two compromised nodes can be linked with high-powered 
antennas and thus create a very attractive route compared to using the ordinary WSN links. 
“Sybil" attacks are where a compromised node is able to assume multiple identities in order to compromise fault-
tolerance mechanisms or to create sinkholes in geographic routing protocols. 
2.2.3. Threats to data aggregation 
In order to minimise communications in a WSN, data is normally aggregated at nodes along the path to the sink 
from the source nodes. Because of this, by compromising a node near to the sink, a large amount of the data being 
generated in the WSN can be affected, and therefore, this is particularly attractive for an adversary. 
Attacks on data aggregation rely on an adversary compromising a node. This compromised node can then be used 
to eavesdrop on aggregated data, or to add to, delete, replay or modify aggregated data.  
2.2.4. Traffic analysis attacks 
Traffic analysis in WSNs can reveal sensitive information due to the unusual patterns of traffic in that kind of 
networks. This can work even if encryption is used to make communications unreadable. In addition, several 
applications of WSNs involve monitoring and tracking of people. In this case, traffic analysis can compromise the 
privacy of these people. 
In WSNs where traffic flows between one or more sources and a single sink, an attacker can identify these by 
either observing the information directly, or simply following or backtracking the route. It may be possible to 
infer events. For example, just the existence of traffic in a WSN at a particular time could be used to infer the 
occurrence of a particular event (e.g. a particular condition has been observed by a sensor node causing it to relay 
this information to the sink). It may also be possible to link events, even if their precise details cannot be inferred. 
For example, the existence of traffic from multiple nodes at the same time could be used to infer that these nodes 
are monitoring the same conditions. A special case of this is linking identities through matching pseudonyms, 
which can be used to identify a person and defeat pseudonymity. 
2.2.5. Threats to localisation 
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There are four aspects to location security: 
 
 Securely reporting a location. This is mainly a data communications security issue which has been covered 
above.  
 Location privacy. This is preventing observers from learning the position of nodes, which has also been 
covered above. 
 Secure localisation. This is allowing a node to correctly identify its location. 
 Location verification. This is allowing other nodes to correctly identify the position of a node (or more 
correctly, to verify it).  
 
Attacks on localisation and location verification can be achieved through a malicious node disrupting position 
identification and/or reporting. The aim of the adversary is to give the nodes in the WSN a false indication of 
its, or their, position, which, for example, may lead to incorrect information being sent to the sink (e.g. an event 
reported with an incorrect location) or could be used to disrupt routing protocols. 
2.2.6. Threats to time synchronisation 
Time synchronisation is a fundamental requirement for WSNs to enable them to communicate effectively and 
efficiently. By disrupting time synchronisation, an adversary could cause denial of service, or incorrect timings of 
events to be reported to the sink. 
The main means of defending against attacks on time synchronisation is the use of cryptographic communications 
security protocols. However, jamming communications and/or relaying packets (with an additional delay) can 
be an effective means of disrupting current time synchronisation protocols even with this protection.  
2.2.7. Threats to reprogramming 
WSNs may need to be reprogrammed periodically, perhaps to re-purpose the sensor, to send code patches or to 
update entire modules. The amount of data which needs to be sent to achieve this can range from quite small, for 
patches for example, up to very large, for entire modules or libraries. Being able to disrupt reprogramming of 
sensor nodes could be particularly attractive to an adversary. In the worst-case, this could allow the attacker to 
take complete control of all nodes, and this can even be done in such way as to be undetectable (except, perhaps, 
through inconsistencies with external data and observations). 
Reprogramming could be disrupted by an adversary in several ways. The adversary could attack the WSN directly 
by a man-in-the-middle attack (i.e. adding to, deleting, replying or modifying communications), 
masquerading/impersonating the sender of the code update or compromising the sending node. The adversary 
could also try to impersonate the source of the code update, through either masquerade/impersonation of the 
WSN manager or even masquerade/impersonation of the writer of the code.  
 
2.2.8. Threats to information sharing 
In almost all of the literature on WSN security, security is considered from the point of view of one identified 
individual or organisation controlling the whole of the WSN and all of its information. This is the individual or 
organisation which controls the sink, or sinks, and receives all the information from the WSN. From this point of 
view, all information within the WSN has the same security ‘classification’ and all nodes have the same 
‘clearance’ or permissions. Therefore, no access control for data is required within the WSN other than to ensure 
that only legitimate nodes can see it. In more sophisticated applications of WSNs, including those considered in 
this PhD report, multiple WSNs may need to share information to achieve a particular goal. These WSNs may be 
controlled by different individuals and organisations with different policies regarding their information, and 
therefore controlled release of information between these networks becomes an issue. Inappropriate release of 
information to adversaries (or equivalently un-trusted or partially trusted WSNs) may occur, allowing the 
adversary access to sensitive information. Other potential attacks include eavesdropping, 
masquerading/impersonating legitimate WSN gateways or nodes or compromising gateways or nodes. These 
are the same as the equivalent attacks on communication links, however, in this case the links are between WSNs 
rather than within them. Therefore, the analysis of these threats will be almost identical, but solutions to any 
resulting security requirements may need to be different. 
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The following Figure 5 summarises the security threats and attacks for WSNs and depicts where in the 
architecture these threats or attacks can appear. 
 
 
Figure 5: Security threats and attacks for WSNs 
 
For a more detailed investigation on the security threats and attacks for the discussed in this report reference 
scenario, please refer to Section 3.3. 
 
2.2.9. Summary of Section 2.2 
The briefly presented in this chapter security threats and attacks show the scale of the problem. Proposing 
effective and appropriate solutions to all of them takes a serious amount of efforts. Therefore, in this thesis, the 
focus will be on solving part of the security and privacy issues - mainly on proposing solutions for protecting 
privacy. This will be countermeasures against threats to information sharing and communication links. From the 
depicted on Figure 5 security threats and attacks – reveal user identity, location; reveal confidential data; steal user 
profile data; unauthorised access. However, the knowledge about the presented in this section major security and 
privacy threats will be used to build up the threat model for WSN in medical scenario and to draw up a mitigation 
plan (Section 3.3.2).  
 
2.3. Identification of security, trust and privacy issues for WSN in HHA 
 
This section starts with discussion of security, privacy and trust problems for the reference architecture 
[10][11][12]. Further, open research issues for security, privacy and trust for the reference architecture are 
investigated. The implications which security, privacy and trust mechanisms have on the systems design of HHA 
are discussed too. The last focus of this section is the current approaches for solving security and privacy 
problems in WSN. In the end, the presented current approaches for solving the major security and privacy 
problems in WSNs are summarised and their pros and cons presented. 
 
Security is a very important issue that needs to be considered in all HHA scenarios and applications. The nature of 
the wireless nodes in level 2 and the smart objects in level 3 poses additional challenges when looking at security, 
privacy and trust solutions. Therefore authentication, encryption, key establishment, secure routing, intrusion 
detection, secure data aggregation and secure service discovery, privacy and trust establishment are the main 
security features that are addressed in this section. They are viewed through aspects like network architecture, 
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threats and attacks, number of supported nodes, sink/gateway functionalities, and limitations posed by battery-
operated wireless devices.  
The main constraint for the security services for the battery-operated wireless devices in level 2 and 3 is the need 
for low power consumption. Since it is difficult to achieve low power by using SSL or similar technologies on 
devices like sensors and tags, low-level security protocols are considered. The latter exposes also the need for 
gateway security. The primary goal is to provide an infrastructure, where important data can travel through any 
medium that may not be secure, either this is a wireless node or a telecom network. For HHA, the goal is to 
provide security services to inter-connecting wireless networks and especially their inter-working with various 
access networks. 
In the next paragraph list of the major security threats for WSNs in HHA are provided. Much more detailed threat 
analysis and mitigation plan for the referenced category is presented in Section 3.3.  
 
2.3.1. Security Threat and Attacks in HHA 
Threats and Attacks relevant for all levels 
The goals of an attacker may be to prevent a network from functioning, to make it function incorrectly, or to 
acquire confidential information from the network. In the HHA, the following basic types of attacks [13] are 
relevant to all levels having wireless nodes, but the probability, nature, and impact of the attacks vary between 
levels. Even though the major security threats and attacks were presented in Section  2.2, here they are revisited 
again but from the point of view of HHA. 
 Passive and active attacks on confidentiality and authentication. Examples of such attacks are listed below: 
o eavesdropping, 
o packet replay attacks, and 
o modification or spoofing of packets (e.g. through man-in-the-middle attacks). 
 Attacks on network availability (DoS attacks) at different layers of the protocol stack (see also [14]) 
o physical layer: jamming, tampering 
o link layer: collision, exhaustion called “sleep deprivation torture”, unfairness (misbehaviour) 
o network layer: some of the possible attacks are spoofed, altered or replayed routing information, 
selective forwarding, hello flood attacks. 
o transport layer: flooding, de-synchronisation 
 Stealthy attacks against service integrity 
o making the network accept false data 
In the following paragraphs, the factors that affect on how the threats may materialise at levels 1 and 2 in the 
HHA are elaborated. 
Security Threats and Attacks in Level 1 (people) 
The nodes at layer 1 are carried by people. So, the security measures are largely at the user’s discretion, which 
exposes the risks of false configurations or even intentional intrusion. Preservation of privacy is of great concern, 
especially when identity is needed for authentication or service personalisation. In MANETs, the problems with 
the broadcast nature of the medium are exacerbated by the distribution of control. Further, in multi-hop 
topologies, it is easy to eavesdrop and change routing. The mobility of nodes and networks sets challenges to 
seamless operation and thus blurs the boundary between the normal and anomalous function of the network. 
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Security Threats and Attacks in Level 2 (environment)  
The threats and the forms of attacks that are specific to sensor nodes residing at level 2 are partially the same as 
those for level 1. However, in many application scenarios, WSNs have peculiar characteristics, which have an 
influence on the vulnerabilities and on the feasible counter measures: 
 Sensor nodes are severely resource-constrained (in terms of computing power, memory, bandwidth, and 
available energy). 
o the network topology may frequently change due to node failure (possibly also due to mobility) 
o strong cryptographic protection with long keys or with using asymmetric algorithms is not 
feasible 
o an attacker may be much more powerful (e.g. a laptop) than the sensors nodes 
 The nodes are vulnerable to physical attack and easy to capture 
o it is difficult to distinguish between a stolen node and a node that has run out of batteries 
o tamper resistance is difficult to achieve 
o losing a node might be recoverable through redundancy 
 The nodes are supported by sink or relay nodes that reside at level 1 (people). This means that – 
o the data mostly originates from the sensors and traverses towards the sinks 
o nodes typically need to process the data along the route, e.g. for aggregation purposes (instead of 
simply forwarding it) 
o a sink may become a single point of failure (and thus also an attractive target of attacks) 
o due to the nature of communications, jamming (DoS) is a more likely attack than misbehaviour 
(attempt to obtain performance benefits) 
Level 2 (environment) nodes may communicate with low-cost RFID systems (at level 3-objects), which may lack 
all security features. 
 
2.3.2. Open research issues for security, privacy and trust in HHA 
When examining the open security, privacy and trust issues, it is worth mentioning that the most important 
characteristics of HHA which cause the research challenges are: 
 hybrid nature of the architecture due to interaction between different networks with different security 
services and trust establishment policies, 
 large number of nodes in level 2 (environment) and objects in level 3 which might themselves be 
hierarchically organised,  
 the nodes in the levels 2 (environment) and 3 (objects), even though with different resource constraints, 
are still very limited in computation capabilities,  
 the sinks in level 1 (people) are mobile terminals. 
In the following paragraphs the most important open issues coming from the specifics of HHA are discussed. The 
focus is first on issues which reside at level 2 (environment) and 3 (objects). 
 
Data Origin Authentication and Encryption   
Scalability issues due to large number of nodes 
When level 2 (environment) has large number of nodes, it is a vital question how the authentication is done when 
not every node will have a unique ID. Open issues are how to select suitable cryptographic functions and 
protocols and how the keys are distributed in an efficient manner.  
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In [15] a localised algorithm for key establishment between a sensor node and a sink node suitable for sensor 
network deployment is proposed. The protocol provides security against a large number of attacks and guarantees 
that data securely reaches the sink node in an energy efficient manner. However, this method could be not very 
safe when the number of nodes is very large because if the authentication process is too long an adversary can 
compromise a sensor node during this process. So, it is important to investigate a faster authentication process.  
Another approach is taken in [16] - the security architecture for medium and large scale WSNs proposed by the 
authors follows the probabilistic security paradigm for authentication and re-recognition; key pre-distribution - in 
a toolbox of security-aware components. The proposed Zero Common Knowledge (ZCK) protocol is an 
authentication protocol that establishes well-defined pair-wise security associations between entities in the 
absence of a common security infrastructure or pre-shared secrets. For key pre-distribution they suggest Topology 
Aware Group Keying (TAGK). 
 
Variety of security mechanism due to different resource constraints 
The mechanisms used for encryption differ according to the security needs and computational capabilities of the 
nodes. Due to the seriously limited system resources in level 2 (environment), security solutions applied in 
traditional networks cannot be directly applied. The goal of designing security mechanisms for level 2 
(environment) is to provide energy-saving encryption function, supporting more suitable network security 
protocol and secure routing algorithm.  
Few encryption algorithms are suitable for sensor networks with harsh resource constraints. Comparison of four 
different encryption functions (SEAL, RC4, RC5, and TEA) is done in [17] to evaluate their suitability for sensor 
nodes. Energy comparison and suitability for WSNs of TEA and RC5 is done in [18]. The authors observed that 
TEA uses less memory (static and automatic) than RC5 does because RC5 uses an expanded key table while TEA 
does not. The conclusion is that TEA uses lower amount of energy compared RC5 and Schneier’s implementation 
of RC5. 
 
Key Management and (Re-)authentication 
In Section 2.1 it is described that the movement in HHA may consist of host mobility, network mobility, or node 
mobility within a sensor network. In a scenario with mobile nodes, there is the need for secure mobility because 
the distributed nature of a mobile and wireless environment makes it vulnerable to adversary malicious attacks. 
Especially, mobility puts stress on the distribution of key material that the nodes need for security functions (e.g. 
for message authentication). That basically means reiterating the authorisation, authentication and accounting 
procedures. This becomes problematic when high terminal number and density lead to longer paths. In this 
scenario a research issue is investigating the possibility of using decentralised re-authentication techniques based 
on symmetric key encryption that are secure, fast and energy-aware and to speed up the authentication phase when 
in presence of mobile nodes. In the presence of mobility, links are constantly falling and rising, a procedure or 
renegotiation of keys must be developed in a time and energy sensitive way. 
Distributed authentication protocols and threshold cryptography algorithms must be evaluated to reach support for 
re-authentication in mobile WSNs. At the edge of an access network re-authentication can be accelerated with 
context transfer between access points (e.g. by using [19]). Within MANETs and WSNs, one approach is to 
distribute the authentication protocol by using threshold cryptography (e.g. [20]). 
On other side, having mobile objects to track with the sensors introduces some different kind of impact over the 
security of the network. While the key agreement and access control of the network is unchanged, some higher 
level problems arise. As an example, in [21] the problem of the panda-hunter is described, in which the sensor 
network should be able to trace the movement of a moving source (the panda), without revealing it to some 
unauthorized attacker (the hunter). It can be seen that source-location privacy and other forms of anonymity are 
considered higher level problems, but they can be helped bringing them down to lower levels with a correct 
protocol choice or design. 
Security is affected also by the kind of mobility the roaming object has. While [22] is based on the possibility of 
having a highly controllable mobility, this is not always possible. If the path of the moving object is predictable, 
this can help re-authentication, as described in [23] for wireless mesh networks. If the node moves on a 
predictable pattern, even if it is not always the same (in that case key caching can be used) the nodes on the path 
can proactively move credentials one to the other in order to proceed the arrival of the roaming node. This is 
particularly useful for moving sinks that might move in fixed directions (roads). If the movement pattern is 
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random, then such a prediction cannot be done and moving credentials will have as a consequence, the increased 
risk of delivering some sensitive keying material to some insider attacker.  
Secure Routing 
In level 2 (environment), the challenges to make the routing secure come from the fact that the communication is 
wireless, the nodes have limited capabilities, but the attackers can use powerful laptops. Another aspect of sensor 
networks that complicates the design of a secure routing protocol is in-network aggregation. Here to guarantee 
message availability is not enough. In-network processing makes end-to-end security mechanisms harder to 
deploy because intermediate nodes need direct access to the content of the messages. The secure routing protocols 
have to be robust against many attacks, also node-capture attacks; to prevent injection of incorrect routing 
information, selective forwarding, etc [24]. Some approach proposed for large scale WSN does not need public 
key. Tokens are proposed to be sent to sensor nodes and they are pre-loaded. Those Tokens are used to substitute 
the public key and different events use different tokens. 
 
Intrusion Detection 
In the sensor networks from level 2 (environment), many potential sources of faulty packets exist. The source may 
be benign, such as a malfunctioning sensor reporting impossible data, or the source may be malicious - an outside 
attacker performing a denial-of-service by injecting garbage data, or a compromised node triggering false alarms 
or misleading data. A challenge here is how to remove or isolate the nodes which are possible sources of faulty 
packets. As a possible solution, Sensor Node Traceback Scheme (SNTS) to trace malicious packets into the 
network is proposed in [25]. 
At the same time reliable and timely detection of deviation from legitimate protocol operation is recognised as a 
prerequisite for ensuring efficient use of resources and minimising performance losses [26]. The basic feature of 
attack and misbehaviour strategies is that they are entirely unpredictable. The random nature of protocol operation 
together with the inherent difficulty of monitoring in the open and highly volatile wireless medium poses 
significant challenges.  
Secure Data Aggregation 
As mentioned in Section 2.1 for hierarchical data processing, data regarding context from lower levels (level 2-
environment and level – objects) in the network will be produced in huge quantities in the future, posing gigantic 
problems in network scalability. By increasing the number of sensor nodes, the amount of information gathered at 
the sink becomes excessive with respect to its communication capacity either towards the transport network if it is 
a gateway or towards the WSN. A security encryption scheme requests the transmission of extra bits that means 
additional processing, memory and battery power consumption. This might require the use of relevant in-network 
data processing techniques such as data aggregation or distributed and collaborative signal processing, which 
increase the need for large computing capabilities at the sensor nodes. In [27] a series of techniques to support a 
large number of senders broadcast authentication capabilities from compromised senders using the µTESLA 
broadcast authentication protocol as a building block are developed. These techniques use multiple µTESLA 
instances with different parameters to provide additional capabilities related to broadcast authentication.  
In addition, more heterogeneous data is being collected. A challenge here is the data aggregation and reduction of 
context data within sensor networks from level 2 (environment) which also influences the secure data aggregation. 
It is an open question how to efficiently store the past data and authenticator, as well as the challenge that the 
verifier either needs to compute many one-way functions for deriving the current key of a node or that the verifier 
needs to store one key per node. 
 
Secure Context and Service Discovery  
Some applications and services in HHA will heavily rely on collecting information from the context provided by 
level 2 (environment) and 3 (objects) and analysing it in order to intelligently support the end-users in their daily 
interactions with context-aware applications. However, the provision and the aggregation of context information 
from motes and objects introduce some security threats and vulnerabilities which have to be carefully analysed. 
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For example how one can be sure that the information for some physical parameters of the environment has not 
been intentionally altered by an attacker. Trustworthiness of the context and service providers has to be evaluated 
[28]. One approach is comparison of the data from other sources using redundancy. Suitable models for threats 
coming from context delivery and methodology for threat analysis have to be designed in parallel with the 
advances in the HHA context-aware systems. There is a need for a general secure context management 
architecture framework which can successfully prevent attacks coming from context. 
 
Privacy and Anonymity 
In the application areas with heavy user involvement, like smart house and health and elderly-care (Section 1.4), 
the subjects of the collected data from the level 2 (environment) nodes are directly real persons as the end-users. 
The communication within and out of the WSNs, possibly contains sensitive data related to them. It is a privacy 
requirement to keep this data confidential and privacy of other information, related to the communications like the 
identities of the commutating parties, the frequency of the communications and the size of the messages, the time 
and the location, etc, is not to be revealed. Even revealing context information for the user’s handheld device from 
level 1 (people) such as CPU usage, battery power, free memory, etc can also be used to derive information of 
where and how a user is using a device [29].  
For maintaining the privacy of the users themselves, their anonymity has to be ensured – the users should be able 
to use resources or services without being distinguished from other users and without disclosing the user’s identity 
and/or location to third parties but at the same time the means of accountability should be provided.  
The proposed solutions should ensure privacy in a way that:  
 Information privacy is maintained, i.e. to prevent the disclosure of personal information to attackers by giving 
away information only to trusted entities.  
 Anonymity of the users for distinct scenarios is preserved, i.e. preserving their “state of being not identifiable 
within a set of subjects” Fejl! Henvisningskilde ikke fundet.. Anonymity affects also location privacy, 
because as long as a user or a node is anonymous, location privacy is provided.  
 Location privacy of a node is maintained, i.e. to deny an attacker the knowledge of a node’s current and past 
location.  
 Trust is established with respect to the confidential treatment of private information by a peer, as a basis for 
controlled disclosure of information.  
 
Trust Establishment 
While HHA has an advantage to solve partially the scalability issues of the traditional large WSNs, it imposes 
more challenges on the trust establishment concepts. From the open issues which come from the interplay 
between different levels, it can be mentioned more specifically, transitivity of trust – e.g. how a level 1 (people) 
node that authenticates with level 0 (access) gets authorised to communicate to level 2 mote (environment). 
Another important question here is how the policy negotiation will be done when different policies meet from 
level 0-access, level 1-people, and level 2-environment. 
 
2.3.3. Security, Privacy and Trust Implications on HHA 
The solutions to be proposed for the briefly summarised security, privacy and trust open questions listed in the 
above paragraph, will influence the overall design of frameworks, protocols and mechanism for HHA. Security, 
privacy and trust services will have implications on a number of aspects of the HHA, the major listed below:  
 topologies – if level 2 (environment) itself has multi-hop topology, the security services will lead to 
additional node to node simple authentication and authorisation mechanisms in the communication 
process. Mobility capabilities in level 1- people and level 2 (environment) will lead to the necessity of 
additional mechanisms for fast authentication and key management. For applications with multiple sinks, 
this will lead to more complex models for the point of trust. In the applications where level 2 
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(environment) and 3 nodes (objects) are very large number, scalable and power-efficient solutions for 
key establishment and authentication are required.  
 protocol architecture – in general the incorporation of the security services will increase the overhead, 
delay and complexity of all layers the security requirements. It will also increase the complexity of the 
routing protocols with embedded security functionality. 
 middleware – the need to protect privacy of user data, user identity, location, presence will lead to 
introduction of mechanisms for privacy, trust, pseudonimity and anonymity which of course will have 
their costs. 
 trust establishment - need of strong trust establishment mechanisms which take into account the fact that 
any mobile terminal from level 1 (people) might play the role of data fusion centre and process the data 
gathered from the SNs from level 2 (environment) and objects from level 3 
 
2.3.4. Current approaches for solving security and privacy problems in 
WSNs 
Following the short summary of the major threats and attacks for WSNs, presented in Section 2.2, this section 
deals with the recent developments for security and privacy in WSN and the current approaches to counteract the 
threats with focus on the health and care scenarios. It is assessed how suitable these approaches are for the 
pervasive health scenarios and identify where gaps exist in the current state-of-the-art.   
Solutions for Security of the Communication links – confidentiality, authentication, key establishment, etc 
Key establishment 
Cryptographic keys are usually required in WSNs in order to provide some of the basic security functionality. In 
particular, they are needed in order to provide confidentiality and integrity protection to the communications 
within WSNs, the threats to which have been identified as high risk for the pervasive health scenarios. 
Depending on the application scenario, shared keys may need to be established between all neighbouring nodes, 
any pair of neighbouring nodes, nodes and ‘cluster heads’, nodes and the sink (or sinks), or other configurations. 
However, a typical requirement is for any pair of neighbouring nodes to be able to establish a shared key. The 
desirable features for such key establishment are: 
 Sensor nodes should be able to establish keys with other nodes using only preconfigured information. 
 It may not be possible to know beforehand which sensors will be located where, and therefore the key 
establishment should be possible regardless of which nodes end up being neighbours. 
 The preconfigured information in each node should be as different as possible from other nodes, 
otherwise compromising one node could lead to compromise of the entire WSN. 
 Key establishment should require minimal storage, memory and processing power as well as minimal 
communication. 
 It should be possible for sensors to establish keys with new nodes introduced anytime time after the 
initial deployment. 
The traditional way of meeting these requirements would be to use public key cryptography, however, the use of 
symmetric keys may also be possible. Some methods are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Key establishment using preconfigured public/private keys 
The traditional way of solving the key establishment problem would be each sensor node to be set up with a 
unique private key before deployment. The associated public key would be signed by a recognised authority (e.g. 
the owner of the WSN), and the obtained certificate, together with the authority's trusted public key, would also be 
preconfigured into the node. After deployment, nodes wishing to establish keys between each other would simply 
swap their certificates, verify the validity of the certificates with the authority's trusted public key, and then 
exchange symmetric keys with each other using one of the available protocols (e.g. Diffie-Hellman). 
The main problem with this approach is the amount of processing power required for the algorithms used, which 
generally makes it infeasible. However, as noted previously, it can be possible to do this in some cases. In 
addition, various optimisations have been worked on which make use of the likely, or imposed, structure of the 
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WSN after deployment. For example, protocols can be designed so that more powerful ‘cluster-head’ nodes have 
to do the bulk of the processing.  
Therefore, depending on the application scenario, the use of public key cryptography in this way may be possible. 
However, it is also true that if its use can possibly be avoided, then it should be.  
Key establishment using preconfigured symmetric keys 
If neighbouring nodes already share a common symmetric key, then the use of computationally expensive public 
key cryptography can be avoided. However, this is complicated by the fact that when reconfiguring keys into 
sensor nodes, the topology may not be known i.e. which nodes will be neighbours after deployment. A naive 
approach would be to give every node the same symmetric key, which would guarantee that neighbours would 
share the same key. However, in this case the compromise of one node will reveal the keys for the entire WSN. As 
compromise of the nodes is a high risk in WSNs, this situation should be avoided. 
The main approach described in the literature to this problem is the use of ‘random key pre-distribution schemes’. 
The idea is that each node is preconfigured with a randomly chosen set of keys from some larger key space. The 
aim is that two neighbouring nodes will then share at least one of these keys after deployment with a certain 
probability. The theory for this has been worked out, and practical schemes are available. However, the main 
problem with them is that they do not scale to very large sensor networks. 
In summary, many methods are available for key establishment and this is a well studied area. Therefore, it should 
be possible to provide keys for pervasive health scenarios in a suitable way with existing techniques.  
Nodes Compromise  
As said before it is very easy to gain access to a node and to control it because usually they are in accessible areas. 
A compromised node may exist in the form of a subverted sensor node or it can be a more powerful device with 
more capabilities. When a node is compromised, the adversary is already inside the WSN and has access to the 
node key, which means it is very important to detect this intrusion as quickly as possible because he has all the 
means to a disrupt or paralyse the network or even to steal secrets. The most common attack is the flooding of 
messages to the base station which will cause a DoS due to large amount of data to process. Of course this is 
related with the hacker intentions, if he wants to steal secrets or to mislead the network he should not paralyse it. 
 
There are several proposed solutions to face this problem. Some of them are the following: 
 The use of redundancy [31]– redundancy means the use of several nodes in order to obtain redundant 
information. With this “extra” data it is possible to check if a node is sending misleading information 
which would cause its immediate detection. This technique works very well if it is adjusted with a good 
comparison algorithm. The drawback of redundancy is related with economic issues. It is in the best 
interest of all parties to have the cheapest sensor network possible, so by adding more sensors than it is 
actually needed, it will compromise the budget. Another objection for this solution is that when one of the 
main parts of the pervasive health care systems is BSN, it is not possible to keep adding many sensors to 
the person’s body - this solution is not very suitable. 
 Code attestation [32] – the use of code attestation enables the possibility to validate the code running on 
each sensor because the code running on a malicious node must be different from that on a legitimate 
node. By verifying their memory content compromised nodes can be detected. Code attestation can be 
achieved through software or hardware. This technique needs more research, the direction will be the 
design of software or hardware capable of verifying the codes within the sensors without consuming 
much resources. 
 A Voting System [32] – since it is desirable to detect and revoke compromised nodes as quickly as 
possible, a proposed solution is the use of a distributed voting system. The strategy of this system is to 
have the nodes which are working well to vote against those who are misbehaving. If a sufficient number 
of votes against a node which is giving misleading data (either by malfunction or compromised) all the 
others nodes will refuse to communicate with it. This technique has an obvious flaw, the malicious nodes 
can also vote which of course will try to deceive the network by voting on the nodes that are behaving 
properly. A solution to this situation is to limit the number of votes which node can make. By doing so 
the hacker will not have sufficient votes to misinform the network. However, here the same comment as 
for the use of the redundancy applies.  
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 Secure Localisation [32] – this technique is an important base in sensor networks. A sensor node can 
accurately determine its geographic coordinates in any environment, therefore if a malicious node tries to 
claim a false position it will be immediately detected. This method will also be very useful against the 
wormhole attack or the Sybil attack. 
 Tamper-resistant [32] – using this kind of technology on the sensor nodes is very expensive and it 
should not be forgotten that the goal is to have a network as cheap as possible; therefore this solution is 
not very suitable. 
Eavesdrop on the networks radio frequency 
As mentioned before the use of a wireless communication system has its natural weakness. The network 
communicates through radio waves which can be captured by foreign antennas. Once the attacker has caught the 
network’s signal he may try to read it. The best solution against this problem is the use of cryptographic primitives 
[32]. The use of more robust cryptographic techniques is limited by the sensor nodes processing capabilities and 
energy consumption. However, more research in the asymmetric cryptography or the elliptic curve cryptography 
[31] may bring new solutions more resistant to these kinds of attacks. It must be kept in mind that if the attacker is 
allowed to listen to the network’s communication for a long period of time, he may be able to collect enough data 
to decipher the code. The cryptographic code (keys) should be changed between short periods of time (depending 
on the level of security desired). 
Jamming 
Basically the attacker sends an impulse with enough power to overcome the network’s signal. The results of a 
successful jamming attack will cause temporally breakdown of the system. The usual defence against this 
situation is frequency hopping and spread spectrum communication [32]. Although they are not 100% effective, 
they will force the attacker to use much more energy to cause temporary malfunction of the discussed system 
(DoS). 
Packet injection 
The name of this attack already explains by itself, the hacker will insert in the network several streams of bits in 
order to overload the system causing temporally DoS. The solution for this problem resides on the use of 
authentication [32]. Trough this technique a node will be able to verify the origin of a packet and ensure its data 
integrity. This method works perfectly unless a node is captured, i.e. the attacker has access to the key used by the 
node and so he is able to use it for transmitting authenticated messages.   
DoS - Disabled sensor nodes / node failures/energy depletion  
All electronic devices have a certain probability of failure or malfunction. This is especially valid for the 
pervasive health and care applications, since in BSNs the sensors must be small and will be attached to the body 
of a person, meaning that they will be under constant risk of falling or folding. Or they are just out of battery. If it 
is WSN with many nodes, according to the level of security wanted for the network and the accessibility of nodes, 
it may be useful to use redundancy, i.e., the use of more than one sensor to collect the same or approximately 
equal data. However, this is totally not applicable for applications with BSNs placed on the person’s body where 
there are just a few sensors. So, this threat is very realistic for the reference scenario but extra nodes could not be 
used. The only way to reduce somehow the impact of it, is to have a good monitoring and notification mechanism 
for lower battery level or for node malfunctioning. 
Solutions for Data Aggregation 
From the threat analysis which will be presented in Section 3.3, it could be seen that attacks on data aggregation in 
WSN have been identified as a high risk for the health and care scenarios. 
Proposed mechanisms to protect against data aggregation threats are mainly against node compromise. In 
summary, this is an area that has received little research attention to date, and is particularly important for the 
reference scenarios. 
37 of 173 
Kopi af PhD-Anelia-v1.6D-06Apr09   
Solutions for Traffic analysis 
From the threat analysis which will be presented in Section 3.3, it could be seen that traffic analysis attacks in 
WSN have been identified as a moderate risk for the health care scenarios. 
Where such attacks affect privacy, potential countermeasures are covered in the next paragraphs. Some other 
options are discussed below. 
In WSNs where traffic flows between one or more sources and a single sink, an attacker can identify them by 
simply following or back-tracking the route. In [33], several ideas for how to protect against this are given. These 
include: 
 Multi-Parent Routing. Here, a packet is randomly sent to a node closer to the sink. 
 Random Walk. With this technique, packets are usually sent to a node closer to the sink using Multi-
Parent Routing, however, they are also occasionally sent to any random neighbour. 
 Fractal Propagation. This is an enhancement of Random Walk where fake packets are created and 
forwarded in random directions to further hide the true direction of real traffic. 
Further enhancements of the above methods are also possible, such as in [34]where Random Walks from the 
sources are combined with partial routing trees from the sink to provide similar protection but with improved 
routing efficiency. 
In summary, some techniques to prevent traffic analysis are known, and it is not a major consideration for the 
scenario considered in this report. Therefore, further research here is not a pressing requirement for us. 
Solutions for Localisation 
Attacks on localisation in WSN have been identified as a moderate risk for the discussed scenarios. 
Methods for secure localisation and location verification are mainly physical in their nature, relying on 
measurements about received radio signals. "Verifiable Multilateration" [35] is such a technique, which uses 
measurements on ‘time of flight’ of RF signals to determine distance to other nodes. This is combined with 
triangulation to determine position. To prevent malicious nodes from disrupting the protocol, a cryptographic 
'blind commitment' protocol is used to ensure that nodes can only increase their claimed distances. These 
increases can then be detected through distance measurements with legitimate nodes. The technique can work 
with locator beacons, whose positions are fixed and known, or in a completely decentralised WSN. However, it 
does require accurate timing on the sensor nodes (at a nanosecond level). 
A slightly different technique is used by SeRLoc [36]. This makes use of directional antennas on sensor nodes to 
enable them to determine a rough direction for locator beacons, whose positions are fixed and known. A "centre of 
gravity" technique is then used by each node to estimate their position. This is much simpler than Verifiable 
Multilateration as accurate timing is not required. However, locator beacons must be used and the technique 
cannot be used in completely decentralised WSNs. In addition, there is a relatively complex security model, which 
is needed to protect the broadcasts from the locator beacons. 
In summary, some techniques to prevent attacks on localisation are known, and, like traffic analysis, it is not a 
major consideration for the health care scenarios. Therefore, further research here is not a pressing requirement. 
Solutions for Time Synchronisation 
Attacks on time synchronisation in WSNs have been identified as a high risk for the health care scenarios. 
In [37] these issues are addressed with modifications to existing protocols and the definition of new ones that can 
protect against these attacks. The coverage seems fairly comprehensive, but there might be scope to provide some 
improvements. 
Solutions for Reprogramming 
Attacks on reprogramming in WSN have been identified as a high risk for the pervasive health care scenarios. 
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Secure reprogramming is only really a problem for large and geographically dispersed WSNs, where the sensor 
network itself has to be used to distribute the updates. This causes significant problems for authentication in the 
presence of compromised nodes. There are some proposed solutions to this problem, such as [38] and [39] which 
make use of so-called "stream signatures", and use one or both of hash chains or hash trees. Approaches based on 
hash chains require packets to be received in the correct order, which can be hard to achieve in unreliable WSNs. 
Hash trees relax this requirement, but introduce their own problems due to a relatively complex setup stage. 
Therefore, finding a good solution for large code downloads appears to be an open problem. 
In summary, secure reprogramming is highly important for the discussed scenarios, and although some proposals 
have been made for how to do this, these are in general only partial solutions. Therefore, further research is 
required here. 
Solutions for Trust Establishment 
The trust establishment frameworks which have been proposed for ad hoc and sensor networks can be classified 
into two categories, namely certificate-based and behaviour-based. This is done according to their scope, purpose 
and type of evidence that trust evaluation is based on [40]. Certificate-based frameworks aim at defining 
mechanisms for pre-deployment knowledge on the trust relationships within the network, usually represented by 
certificates, to be spread, maintained and managed either independently or cooperatively by the nodes. Trust 
decisions are mainly based on the provision of a valid certificate, which proves that the target node is considered 
as trusted either by a certification authority or by other nodes that the issuer trusts. In behaviour-based 
frameworks, each node performs trust evaluation based on continuous monitoring of the behaviour of its 
neighbours, in order to evaluate how cooperative they are. Trust is evaluated both independently by each node, 
based on using the statistical data that is being continuously accumulated, and cooperatively through sharing 
recommendations and spreading reputation. 
The main challenge confronted by certificate-based frameworks for ad hoc networks is the lack of pre-established 
infrastructure, which hinders the use of on-line certification authorities. In the framework proposed in [41], trust is 
represented by certificates signed by off-line certification authorities, whose public keys the trustors maintain 
locally in order to verify the signatures. Hubaux et al. [42] propose a distributed public key management scheme, 
where trust is evaluated using certificate chains similarly to the ”web of trust” approach of the PGP model, with 
the difference that each node maintains locally a subset of the trust graph. In the mobile certification authority 
framework, presented by Yi and Kravets [43], secret sharing mechanisms are used to distribute trust to an 
aggregation of nodes that can collaboratively provide certification authority services. The distributed trust 
establishment framework proposed by Eschenauer et al. [44] takes a broader view on the inputs required for trust 
decisions by accepting as trust evidence not only certificates and public keys, but also information like identities, 
locations, or independent security assessments.  
Trust in behaviour-based frameworks is formulated as a combination of the direct trust value to the target node, 
which is evaluated independently by the trust issuer based on previous interactions and network traffic monitoring 
metrics, and the indirect trust value derived from the recommendations of neighbouring nodes. In the reputation-
based framework for sensor networks [45], a watchdog mechanism is used for monitoring the behaviour of 
neighbouring nodes in terms of data forwarding and raw sensing data consistency, and a Bayesian formulation is 
proposed for representing node reputation and trust evolution. Huang et al. [46] developed a trust evaluation 
model targeted for sensor networks, where the Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence is proposed for combining 
recommendations. Confidence values are assigned along with the recommendations in [47] where trust and 
confidence values are mapped in a trustworthiness composite metric, and [48] where the trust inference problem is 
formulated as a shortest path problem on a weighted directed graph and theory of semirings is being used. 
However, both the behaviour-based and the certificate-based frameworks that have been proposed are better 
targeted for ad hoc than for sensor networks. The main reasons are that they do not exploit the pre-deployment 
knowledge that will usually be available in sensor network deployments, and they do not allow for pre-
established, stable trust relationships. None of the behaviour-based frameworks includes any bias with respect to 
the identity of the node under evaluation. From the certificate-based frameworks, this requirement could be 
satisfied by the framework proposed in [44] through introducing identity related bias in the trust metrics and 
policies of the nodes, and [42] through appropriate selection of the locally stored subsets of the trust graph. 
Moreover, the computational complexity of the certificate-based and the energy requirements of the behaviour-
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based trust evaluation frameworks raise concerns related to their applicability on resource constrained sensor 
nodes. The former category uses asymmetric cryptography which is considered as too expensive for sensor nodes. 
The frameworks in the latter category are resource consuming in terms of computation, memory and energy, since 
they require the radio on each node to be continuously on, and the trust values of the neighbouring nodes to be 
stored and continuously updated as interactions occur. 
Solutions for Secure Profile Management 
A success factor for ubiquitous sensorised systems and the services they could offer is their personalisation, i.e. 
the ability to take into account user’s preferences, presence information, location, etc in order to support the users 
and to enhance their experience. Therefore, for a better service, in scenarios like pervasive health care, it might 
happen that the user would have to reveal personal information to basically non-trusted third parties. In order to 
meet these apparently contradictory requirements, the system has to integrate privacy and identity management 
mechanisms while at the same time preserving trust and privacy and offering user-friendly navigation of available 
services and improved user experience. The scenarios discussed in this PhD report are user-privacy sensitive and 
differ at the level of processing and revealing confidential and private data for the persons. In some cases the user 
seeks full anonymity (for identity, location), in others, a certain part of the private information (medical history, 
health status, medications, address, social security number) may be available to specific and strictly defined 
categories of persons specified by the users themselves. Here comes the need of offering the user to have and 
manage several virtual identities and roles supported by profile management mechanisms. End-users or network 
administrator can specify different sets of rules for different identities and/or identity levels and for different 
levels of privacy.  
Therefore, it is of key importance to develop a conceptual structure of user profiles for WSNs, which is flexible, 
scalable, dynamic, supports conditional access control, and can be smoothly integrated with available context 
information. Currently the technical means for the realisation of personalised services and context-aware services 
and applications are the user profiles and context modelling. The working group of IETF, the rich presence 
information RPI, defines a structure and a transport mechanism for presence information. Ideas for distributed 
profiles with a single point of access can be found in the 3GPP generic user profile work. One of the chosen 
approaches is that the policy framework has to be in place to control the exchange of profile and context 
information. Policies advertised by external applications declare the parts of profile and the context needed by that 
service. Only a matching of such a policy with the internal user privacy rules will lead to the exposure of the 
required profile data [49].  
However, even though some proposals for profile management exist, the building of user profiles and context 
profiles requires a standardised and extensible framework. 
Solutions for Privacy Protection  
Controlled disclosure of personal information 
Policy-based approaches with end-user involvement in defining the policies, are another side of access control 
methods that allow a user to specify the policy specifying who is able to access their location information and 
sensitive data and with what accuracy. This is done with the help of an agent responsible for policy enforcement. 
Examples of these approaches have been already described in the beginning of this section. However, more work 
is needed here to design flexible systems by which the end-user or the administrator can easily configure new 
features and add new pieces of personal information depending on the goal of the services. 
Privacy of context information related to persons 
The design of pervasive health services closely relies on information from the context, fed to the management 
subsystem, in order to smartly support the end-users in their daily interactions with the context-aware services and 
applications. However, the provision of context information introduces some security threats and vulnerabilities as 
discussed in Section 2.3.  
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Privacy issues related to the access of user information are becoming increasingly important following the 
movement toward ubiquitous environments and devices acting on behalf of the user. As in the pervasive health 
application scenarios, sensitive private information for the end-user (for example doctor, medical staff, patient, 
social or home care staff, etc), such as names, address, health status, medical history, has to be revealed in order 
the user to take advantage of context-aware services. The key issue here is the development of automated privacy 
protection mechanism to control how, when and to whom a user’s sensitive information has to be disclosed. Such 
mechanism could have predefined user preferences and a policy module. The goal is to give the end-users the 
power to easily manage their own privacy without being an expert in the domain. Main features of such 
mechanism are policy based access control, pessimistic and optimistic approaches for access control, hierarchical 
privacy rules, mixed-initiative interaction as presented in [50]. 
The authors of [50] define a privacy service for protecting context information in context-aware environments that 
grants or denies access to a very limited set of context data based on predefined policies. The approach focuses on 
developing means to define and use tailored policies for their frameworks adapted to their use case – collaborative 
mobile service. Existing approaches rely on the minimisation of the data disclosed and taking decisions with 
policy engine. The user is mainly involved for making final high-level decisions and for giving consent to data 
processing.  
As the context-aware applications and services will use more and more diverse type of context information, 
provided by different parties, suitable threat models coming from context and methodology for threat analysis 
have to be designed in parallel with the advances in the context-aware systems. More work in direction of context 
modelling and security threats resulting from providing the context is necessary. More work is also needed in the 
development of user-friendly and intuitive mechanisms for controlled information disclosure of any context 
information related to the user.  
In addition to that, performance evaluation for the system complexity (for example depending on the number of 
rules and the number of considered context attributed) is a necessity.  
Location Privacy 
Finally, for location privacy for people, techniques can be divided into those that try to hide people's identity or 
any identifiable information, those that try to reduce data precision and policy-based techniques that restrict data 
access. 
Hiding a person's identity is covered by anonymity and pseudonymity techniques. Work such as [51], [52] and 
[53] is aimed at adapting ideas from anonymous communication networks (specifically ‘mixnets’) to location 
privacy. The variable quality approach, where a centralised location server adjusts the accuracy of the given 
location such that the given area holds enough nodes to provide anonymity has been proposed by Gruteser in [52] 
and refined by Beresford in [51]. Here, the idea of a ‘mixzone’ is introduced, which is used to prevent linking 
between movements of a particular person, even if they are using different pseudonyms over time. The basic idea 
is that if many people enter a particular location over a certain time period, and many people leave it over the 
next, then it is difficult to link individuals between those who entered and those who left (as long as their 
pseudonyms change). How these mixzones are created, differs between the different papers, with some opting for 
fixed areas and others allowing the mixzones to be dynamically resized to maintain a consistent level of privacy.  
The concept of a silence period between pseudonym changes for increasing location privacy has been introduced 
by Huang et al in [54] and further examined in the context of vehicular applications sending frequent beacons by 
Sampigetaya et al [55]. The authors state an increase in location privacy using the silence period. They measure 
the privacy in terms of the average anonymity set and the maximum tracking time. 
In [56] Bessler and Jorns propose an extension to the Parley X architecture [57] to let users create own 
pseudonyms. Further they propose a pseudonym creation scheme – PRIVES – that can be used to create similar 
pseudonyms at different locations with only a single key exchange. The chain of pseudonyms is created using a 
combination of HMAC and SHA.  
In [52], privacy is further enhanced by the ability to add noise to location and time information. For example, 
responses to requests can be delayed to give less accurate information about where a person is at a particular time. 
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The following Table 1 summarises the presented current approaches for solving some of the security and privacy 
issues and presents their pros and cons. 
 
Possible Threats Proposed Solutions Pros  Cons 
Compromised Base 
Station 
Complete shutdown   Lost of data and the 
network is offline 
Redundancy (the use of 
several nodes in order to 
obtain redundant 
information); 
 
Extra data to work with. 
More protection against 
node failures and it is easier 
to implement multipath 
routing 
Economic issues; 
In some cases must be 
used a limited number of 
sensors (sensors 
implemented in 
someone’s body to 
monitor health) 
Code Attestation (permits 
to validate the code running 
on each sensor) [32]; 
Can be achieved either by 
software or hardware. 
It must be kept in mind 
the computational 
limitations of sensor 
nodes. 
Needs more research; 
Voting System (allows the 
detection of compromised 
nodes in a timely fashion) 
[32] 
Easy to implement A compromised node can 
also vote (limit the 
number of votes for each 
node);  
Secure Localization (allows 
the detection of a malicious 
sensor node because it 
cannot claim a false 
position to the 
infrastructure) [32] 
Ability to locate sensor 
nodes. 
Very useful for applications 
related to movement. 
Prevents numerous attacks. 
Needs more research; 
Compromised nodes 
Tamper-resistant hardware Ability to store keys. Too expensive and does 
not provide a high level 
of security 
Cryptographic primitives;  
 
Allows confidentially 
during the transmission of 
messages. 
If there is a compromised 
node it has the secret key 
to decipher messages; 
Research the use of 
asymmetric 
cryptography; 
Research elliptic curve 
cryptography 
Authentication (μTESLA) 
[58] 
 
Ability to establish secure 
links. 
μTESLA - especially 
design for WSN and 
doesn’t require much 
energy 
A compromised node 
may have the means to 
authenticate itself. 
The failure of nodes has 
not been considered. 
Eavesdrop on the 
networks radio 
frequency or packet 
injection 
TinySec solution  [31] Incurs only an additional 
5%-10% for performance 
overhead. 
Need a secure and 
efficient key-distribution 
mechanism allowing 
simple key establishment 
for large-scale network; 
Disabled sensor nodes/ 
node failures 
Redundancy Extra data to work with. 
More protection against 
node failures and it is easier 
to implement multipath 
routing 
Economic issues; 
In some cases a limited 
number of sensors must 
be used (sensors 
implemented in 
someone’s body to 
monitor health) 
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Achieve graceful 
degradation using time 
synchronization protocol; 
Very efficient Difficult to implement 
Needs more research; 
 
Jamming – use spread 
spectrum communication;  
Ability to hide the message 
in the channel noise 
The need for a large 
bandwidth;  
Denial of Service (DoS) 
(due to jamming and 
packet injection) 
Secure Routing [31];  The existing protocols 
are not especially made 
for WSN; 
Needs more research; 
The Sybil Attack  To leverage the key 
predistribution process [32] 
Nodes can verify each 
other’s identity 
If there is a compromised 
node the adversary may 
have access to the key. 
If the network has 
numerous nodes the 
number of keys is too 
high. 
Miscellaneous Attacks 
against Routing 
Multipath routing [32] Effective against DoS The need to have 
alternative paths 
Spreading bogus, 
routing information, 
creating sinkholes or 
wormholes and Hello 
flooding 
Geographic routing 
protocols [59]; 
Limit the number of 
neighbours allowed [59]; 
Easy to implement They are not 100% 
effective; 
Needs more research 
Stealthy Attacks against 
Service Integrity 
SIA [60]  Usage of many different 
keys. 
Intrusion The use of secure groups 
[31] 
It is a decentralized 
solution for intrusion 
detection. 
Needs more research, 
and it must be kept  in 
mind that a solution is 
needed that is full 
distributed and 
inexpensive in terms of 
communication, energy 
and memory 
requirements; 
Control the amount of 
data 
Secured data aggregation 
[31] (the sensed values 
must be aggregated to 
avoid overwhelming 
amounts of traffic back to 
the base station) 
Less data is transmitted to 
the base station; 
All aggregation locations 
must be secured; 
Unauthorised access  Access control policies – 
policy -based and role-
based. [50], multi-party and 
heirerchical access control 
[61] 
 
 
They are not 
instantaneously imposed. 
Require profiling and 
definition of parties 
which are authorised to 
access certain data 
Threats to reveal node 
identity  
Use of pseudonyms by 
different pseudonym 
creation schemes [56] 
 Additional computational 
cost to calculate new 
pseudonym. Pseudonyms 
of a group of nodes must 
be changed in the 
“correct” moment and 
this requires 
communication overhead 
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Reprogramming  Use of so-called streamed 
signatures and use of one or 
both hash chains or hash 
trees [38], [39] 
 Require packets to be 
receieved in the correct 
order, which can be hard 
to achieve in unreliable 
WSNs 
Disrupt Time 
Synchronisation  
Use of cryptographic 
communication secirity 
protocols [37] 
 Even with this 
protection, jamming 
communications and/or 
relaying packets could 
disrupt the current time 
synchronisation 
protocols  
Reveal location SeRLoc [36]– use of 
directional antennas on 
sensor nodes to enable 
them to determine a rough 
direction for locator 
beacons, whose positions 
are fixed and known  
Simpler solution - accurate 
timing is not required;  
Locator beacons must be 
used and the technique 
cannot be used in 
completely decentralised 
WSNs 
Threats to Trust 
establishment  
Certificate-based and 
behaviour-based trust 
establishmetn solutions 
[40] 
 Mainly proposed for ad-
hoc networks and do not 
exploit pre-deployment 
knowledge that is 
available for sensor 
networks. Computational 
complexty of Certificate-
based solutions. Energy 
requirements for 
behaviour-based solution 
Table 1: Possible security and privacy threats and comparison of proposed solutions 
 
2.3.5. Summary of Section 2.3 
In this section the discussion was on the identification of the security, privacy and trust issues for WSNs in the 
framework of HHA. The focus was on the security threats and attacks on level 1 (people) and level 2 
(environment) as the ones most relevant for the scope of this PhD report.  
Further, the advantages and disadvantages of current solutions to the listed security, privacy and trust research 
problems were presented.  
In short, considering pervasive healthcare applications, there is a pressing need for more research in a number of 
areas. Suitable for WSNs solutions are needed for services like privacy and anonymity and trust establishment, 
secure context and service discovery, secure data aggregation, trustworthiness of provided context data.  
 
2.4. Summary of Chapter 2 
 
In this chapter the vision for development of ubiquitous sensor networks which integrates people and things was 
presented. In the long run, with the growing number of new applications, the ubiquitous networks will have to 
integrate the unprecedented amount of different types of communicating, sensing and actuating devices imposing 
significant constraints on the scalability of the mechanisms for network organisation, and data handling. this long 
term vision requires a novel hierarchical network architecture to integrate devices with heterogeneous capabilities 
and constraints, in particular concerning energy, memory, processing power, programmability, deployment, 
mobility, and wireless interfaces. In this novel architecture, the network edge must migrate towards the objects of 
the physical world and sensors and actuators which access it and provide data for the users. This includes simple 
devices such as passive RFIDs and active sensors which can organise within ad hoc networks and deploy 
mechanisms to exploit density and locality of the data. The data aggregated within WSN patches are accessed by 
wireless stationary or mobile devices which in order to communicate themselves may either use ad hoc 
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communication or cellular network. The Hybrid Hierarchical Architecture (HHA) with four levels could be the 
reference architecture which can support this vision - level 0 - access, level 1 – people, level 2 – environment, 
level 3 - objects. The WSNs are accommodated in level 2 – environment.  
Among the different types of applications which can be accommodated within HHA, the ones for health and 
elderly care will be investigated throughout this thesis. The motivation to select these reference applications was 
threefold – the prognosis for ageing population in Europe; the prospect for cost savings and increased quality of 
life when using WSNs for health and elderly care and numerous business opportunities; the number of un-solved 
security and privacy issues related to the use of this technology. 
 
The briefly presented in this chapter a list of security threats and attacks show the scale of the problem. There are 
a number of issued which have not been yet solved successfully. In short, considering pervasive healthcare 
applications, there is a pressing need for more research and suitable for WSNs solutions are needed for secure 
context and service discovery; secure data aggregation; privacy and anonymity and tryst establishment.  
Proposing effective and appropriate solutions to all of the security threats and attacks takes a serious amount of 
efforts. Therefore, in this thesis, the focus will be on solving part of the security and privacy issues on level 1 
(people) and level 2 (environment) as the ones most relevant - mainly on proposing solutions for protecting 
privacy. This will be countermeasures against threats to information sharing and communication links – reveal 
user identity, reveal user or user’s device location; reveal confidential data; steal user profile data; unauthorised 
access. Solutions to these threats will be some of the main contributions in this PhD thesis. 
Further, the advantages and disadvantages of current solutions to the listed security, privacy and trust research 
problems were presented.  
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Chapter 3  
3. Health Care Applications for WSNs - their security and 
privacy requirements and threat and vulnerability model 
 
The aim of Chapter 3 is first to shortly describe examples of pervasive health care services using WSNs or BSNs 
and to select one application space which will be investigated throughout this thesis, namely – the pervasive 
health and elderly care application space. The second aim of this chapter is to present the security, privacy and 
trust requirements derived from the scenarios – this analysis is one of the contributions in this thesis. The third 
and main aim of Chapter 3 is to analyse the security threats for health care applications with WSNs. Threat model 
and mitigation plan are further presented. The security threats analysis, definition of threat model and presenting 
mitigation plan are one of the major contributions in this thesis. 
3.1. Description of Pervasive Health Services and Use 
Cases  
 
In this section details for Pervasive Health Services are provided, seen from point of view of user requirements, 
information flow, used devices and technologies and end-user groups (main actors) and relevant context 
attributes. All these points will be revisited in Section 3.3 where they play an important role in the threat analysis. 
In the medical care, outfitting care subjects with tiny, wearable wireless sensors forming a Body Sensor Network 
(BSN) would allow medical teams to monitor the status of their patients (either at hospital or at home). The same 
technology could be used for rehabilitation of a patient at home or to monitor the health status of an early 
discharged patient or just the physical status of an elderly person. In this case, the BSN transmits the current 
readings of vital signs (heart beat rate, body temperature, blood glucose, etc) to the hospital or home-care 
database. Medical staffs, emergency teams, general practitioners, home or social care staff can then access the 
data when needed. Such application space is depicted on Figure 6. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Pervasive Health Care of a patient [1] [2] 
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3.1.1. Use cases for Pervasive Health Care Services  
 
The use cases for the Pervasive Health Care application space could be numerous [3] but the most important ones 
are summarised to: 
 Wireless Hospital. This scenario involves the use of sensors to capture the physiological status of 
patients, physician’s physiological data, medical staff’s physiological data, additional information from 
the sensors in the environment (locating patients, equipment, staff). The types of data taken into account 
are patient related information, administrative information, knowledge based information. The Wireless 
Hospital use case can be split in two scenarios:  
o Night Shift Assistant: a nurse usually spends the night shift at a room in a different part of the 
hospital and is responsible for several wards at a time. Then, the medical status of the patients is 
monitored, together with environment information for the patient’s room. In these scenarios, 
communicating vital patient’s data is very critical regarding privacy and has to be highly reliable 
to infer critical health conditions.  
o Backup Shift Assistant: in this scenario, a young doctor on shift at the hospital, gets support from 
the back-up shift senior doctor who might be out of the hospital, but not so far. Here, wireless 
transmission of vital data over long distances takes place; localisation functionalities, navigation 
and instant messaging are involved. 
 Residential Health Monitoring. In this scenario health related data are captured via BSN and the sensors 
from the environment in the patient’s home. The actors here are patients, health professionals and 
secondary users (e.g. relatives, friends). The collected and interpreted patient’s data can be used to give 
feedback about and to support medication intake and exercise regime. This use case considers two 
scenarios:  
o Acute Patient Monitoring: this scenario depicts a warning system for critical vital data assessed 
at home, featuring online wireless vital data transfer for long distances, localisation 
functionalities and messaging service for relatives. 
o Continuous Care – monitoring the status of the patient at home, when he is in a rehabilitation 
process.  
 Emergency Coordination. This scenario includes communication among rescue staff in case of 
emergency in order to improve the organisation of emergency response. The communication, which is 
mainly between emergency physicians and rescue transports, is mission critical and requires intelligent 
emergency coordination via WSNs. 
 
3.1.2. Selection of a reference scenario  
 
“Backup Shift Assistant” from Wireless Hospital use case  
The proposed adaptive security and privacy protection framework is designed in such a way to be applicable to a 
number of application spaces as mentioned in Section 1.4. However, in order to exemplify its functionality, 
analysis and evaluation, later in this PhD report there will be a reference to only one scenario, namely Backup 
Shift Assistant from the Wireless Hospital use case. This scenario is depicted on Figure 7 and described in the 
paragraph below: 
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Figure 7: Illustration of the “Backup shift assistant” scenario [3] 
 
At any hospital, the physicians differ in their age and work experience. Today Doctor A, a very young doctor, is 
on duty when a severe patient condition comes up. He is yet inexperienced and does not feel comfortable with 
handling the situation by himself. Since the patient’s condition is critical, he decides to contact the next 
experienced colleague available in the hospital or at home. Doctor A sends an instant message to the closest 
available physician Doctor B, who is doing administrative duties in another building of the hospital. The physician 
quickly gives feedback via instant message that he will support Doctor A and receives Doctor A’s location and 
navigation information for the fastest route on his handheld. Doctor A also sends him the vital data of the patient 
to inform him for the patient medical condition. Doctor A is relived when the older physician Doctor B arrives. 
Together they stabilise the patient’s condition. 
 
Characteristics of the reference scenario – Back-up shift assistant  
The characteristics of the reference scenario in terms of user requirements, information flow, user sensitive data, 
communicated context data, are presented below.   
 
3.1.3. User Requirements 
 
The reference scenario described above involves the wireless transmission of vital data over long distances, 
localisation functionalities, navigation and instant messaging, which are integrated and used in an intelligent 
information exchange application. Here, especially the medical personnel, is mobile. Besides patients’ BSN, the 
BSN is applied on the physicians to infer their health status and location (e.g., operating theatre, office, out of the 
hospital). The sensors for both physicians and patients need to be easily accessible and replaceable for 
maintenance. For the sensors from the environment (for example in the hospital rooms, the corridors, the 
operating theatre, etc), maintenance is minimal but should be carried out frequently. Vital patients’ data, their 
identity, medical history as well as physicians’ health data is very critical regarding privacy. The vital patient’s 
data has to be highly reliable because it communicates critical health conditions, whereas the physicians’ location 
data reliability and privacy should be moderate. Both the functionality provided by integrated data transfer as well 
as the functionality provided by the instant messaging is similar to traditional methods and therefore not complex. 
The data integration, however, is complex. The environment in which the sensors are deployed is safe and 
invariable.   
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Figure 8: Information flow diagram of the “Backup shift assistant” scenario [3] 
 
3.1.4. Information Flow 
 
After registering in the database, Doctor A receives and analyses patients’ vital data on a mobile device (1). 
Doctor A localises the back-up colleague (Doctor B) that is available working at his office and triggers a data 
transfer to him for professional support (2). Doctor B receives the information on a PDA-like device which can be 
used for communication and navigation. After logging in the monitoring and diagnosis application Doctor B 
receives vital data from the patient’s BSN (3). 
 
3.1.5. Devices, involved technologies, description of 
the actors 
 
As later in this chapter it will be discussed about threat analysis of the reference scenario, of importance for this is 
the system description from point of view of the used devices, involved technologies, actors, main goals. These 
are summarised in the Table 2 below: 
 
System characteristics   Description  
Reference scenario Back-up shift assistant  
Main Actors  Patient (primer)  
Doctor (primer) 
Other Medical staff (secondary) 
Network administrator (secondary) 
Hospital administration (secondary) 
Service providers (other) 
Main goals of the system Measuring and communicating vital signs of persons;  
Locating and communicating the position of persons, devices 
Communication among the medical staff  
Communicating physical parameters of the environment in the 
hospital room 
Devices to be used A few wireless end-sensors and a coordinator node forming BSN 
Several wireless sensors from the environment (hospital room and 
building)   
Mobile terminal (smart mobile phone) for the medical staff 
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Hospital computers/terminals 
Hospital server  
Communication Technologies  Wireless communication - BT (IEEE802.15.1), IEEE 802.15.3, 
IEEE 802.15.4, IEEE802.11b, IEEE802.11g, IEEE802.11a 
Interconnecting – Internet, WLAN 
Table 2: System characteristics 
 
3.1.6. Context attributes directly provided by the 
sensor networks  
 
In the following Table 3, the context attributes which play role in the functionality of the security and privacy 
framework are presented. They are the context attributes typical for the reference scenario and are provided by the 
body sensor networks of the subjects or by the environmental WSNs.  
 
Context Name Information 
Required 
When 
required 
Number 
of users 
Environment 
Vital Functions (patient) Physiological 
information 
All the time 1-100 Indoor 
Vital Functions (doctor A or B) Physiological 
information 
All the time 1-10 Indoor/Outdoor 
Indoor Location (patient) Location All the time 1-100 Indoor 
Indoor-Outdoor Location (doctor 
A or B) 
Indoor-Outdoor 
Location 
All the time 1-10 Indoor/Outdoor 
Environmental information  Physical 
information 
All the time 1-100 Indoor 
Indoor Location of hospital 
equipment  
Location All the time 1-100 Indoor 
Table 3: Data which is subject to measurement and communication 
 
 
Figure 9 shows the information flow of the reference scenario and the context information that is required by each 
device to decide how each message exchange will be protected and how the privacy of the user will be preserved. 
Table 4 summarises the high-level context information, its type and if it is of a sensitive value for the user. A 
distinction is made between ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’ context data [1]. Static context data changes only infrequently, 
and could be manually configured (e.g. Doctor’s A and B current role). Dynamic context data can change at any 
time, and is usually automatically detected (e.g. the patient’s vital functions, location). 
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Figure 9: Types of communicated context data [4] [5] 
 
The following Table 4 presents the communicated context data and if it needs privacy protection: 
 
Communicated context data Type of communicated 
context data 
Privacy protection 
needed   
1- Patient’s medical data Dynamic  Yes 
2 - Patient’s Indoor Location Static  Yes 
3 - Patient’s ID Static Yes 
4 - Type of service Static no  
5 - Doctor’s A Indoor Location  Static Yes 
6 - Doctor’s A ID Dynamic Yes 
7 - Doctor’s B Indoor Location Dynamic Yes 
8 - Doctor’s B ID Static Yes 
9- Patient’s medical history Static Yes 
10 - Data for the physical environment 
in the room  
Static yes  
11- Indoor Location of hospital 
equipment 
Static No 
Table 4: Communicated context data and its characteristics 
 
3.1.7. Summary of Section 3.1 
 
In this chapter the reference scenario is selected – namely, “Back-up shift assistant” scenario which provides 
support for professional communication. The characteristics of the system with respect to the reference scenario 
were presented, from point of view of user requirements, information flow, main actors, used devices and 
technologies, used context attributes directly provided by the sensor networks. Context attributes directly provided 
by the sensor networks were defined as: vital functions of patient and medical staff, indoor/outdoor location of the 
actors, physical information from the environment. Further, the communicated context data have been defined and 
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if it needs privacy protection or not. The communicated context data is identified as 11 contexts relevant for the 
reference scenario and 9 of these contexts need privacy protection.  
 
3.2. Security, privacy and trust requirements derived from 
the scenarios  
 
The initial focus in this section is the security and privacy objectives for the discussed system. Further the focus is 
on the security, privacy and trust requirements derived from the scenarios presented in the previous chapter. 
Since the context-awareness plays important role in this thesis, in the end of this chapter the security requirements 
for the context data are discussed too. This analysis is one of the contributions in this thesis.  
 
3.2.1. Security and Privacy Objectives for the 
system  
 
The security and privacy system of a certain application can be described to fulfil specific objectives and have 
specific functionality. Similar to the common criteria [10], in this section, it is distinguished between security and 
privacy objectives and security and privacy requirements. Security objectives define what the security system 
must achieve to counter a certain threat. They can be preventive or reactive. A preventive objective prevents a 
threat from occurring; reactive objectives imply that a system shall detect and correct potential threats. Privacy 
objectives define what the system must achieve in order to protect privacy data and all aspects of privacy of a 
person. These objectives summarise what the user and developer expect from the security and privacy system. 
 
Security and privacy requirements define the functionality that is necessary to implement the required security 
and privacy objectives. The security and privacy system can therefore be specified in terms of what functions it 
provides.  
 
Looking at the security objectives more closely, it should be noted that they are also related to trust establishment 
and privacy protection [6]:  
 Security aims at, broadly speaking, ensuring that the data which is communicated is not modified, deleted 
or damaged. In other words, the data which is sent by the sender, must be the same data, received or 
stored at the end point.  
 Trust establishment aims at preventing any false data to be injected into the system by different means or 
to be released to parties which should not be trusted. Trust can be established into nodes, into a piece of 
data, into a service, or any other element that needs to be accessed or used by a sensor node.   
 Privacy protection aims at preventing the disclosure of private or sensitive information, location 
information, and identification data to an attacker. For example, this may be realised using access control 
mechanisms, changing pseudonyms, cloaking of data by reducing its precision.  
 
Trust establishment 
According to Avizienis [7], trust is accepted dependence. Hence, the security system must provide mechanisms 
that make applications accept a certain level of dependence on a piece of data (or a service, or an entity in 
general).  
Trust can be either in the source of data, or in the data itself. Certification, for example, usually certifies that a 
node is sending out valid data. The receiving nodes often do not check if the data is indeed valid but simply trust 
the certificate (if it can be validated). Approaches including trust in the source typically require cryptography to 
ensure the well-known security objectives integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation. In order to be able to bind 
trust to a node, node identification is an important issue for these approaches as well.  
On the other hand, checking the plausibility of data can be independent from the sending node. Independent from 
any knowledge about the sender, the content itself is evaluated and ignored if it is invalid. This requires semantic 
knowledge about the received data, knowledge about the current context, and knowledge about the history of the 
context. 
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Privacy Protection  
Traditionally, privacy protection in general contains protection of the identity of a user and the data of the user. 
While protecting the identity of a user is relatively straightforward, and can be achieved by pseudonymous 
systems, the protection of user and context data is more difficult.  
With the development and implementation of pervasive and ubiquitous systems, some context information must 
be also protected in order the user to be able to use some services anonymously. Social concerns from 
autonomous cooperative objects have been expressed in [8] for privacy, data protection and building trust. This is 
because current developments in computing direct towards the collection and processing of an increasing quantity 
of personal data and, what is more, are in search of new qualities of data (e.g. biometric identifiers extracted from 
the human body or very intimate data displaying emotions and thoughts). In networked ubiquitous computing 
environments data might be collected of even very simple and insignificant incidents that might be never forgotten 
by the hardware memories of huge databases, they could be combined, sorted and reinvented by sophisticated 
algorithms and transferred at a global scale to other entities for further processing for unknown purposes. This 
process is related to data-mining, data surveillance ("dataveillance) and data-profiling. All these electronically 
available pieces of information form the so-called “electronic shadow” [9] of a person and a personal profile could 
be created. This may expose the persons to many security threats and intrude their privacy. It becomes more and 
more difficult for the end-users to protect their privacy and make informed decisions when they need to provide 
some sensitive data.  
Therefore in this thesis the security objectives for privacy protection of a “traditional secure system” is extended 
with privacy protection for context data, directly or indirectly related to the user, based on which sensitive 
information for the subject could be inferred. In the work presented in this report, the privacy protection is further 
extended to preserve the privacy of the context in which the users currently are or the context in which users use a 
service. 
Concerning user data, the distinction must be made between core (system) data and application specific data. The 
first are required by the core system to work, e.g. location data and will be received by all nodes listening to the 
channel. The latter may have specific authorisations and roles that are attached to the network nodes.  
 
In the following Table 5, the security objectives for trust establishment and privacy protection are summarised. 
The threats which can threaten these objectives are also listed.  
 
Security and Privacy 
Objective 
Short Description Countered Threats 
Availability The system provides its services, i.e. correct 
sensor data even in the case of a locally 
mounted DoS attack.  
Disrupt Communication,  
Disable Sensors,  
Disable Processing,  
Impair Transceiver 
Access Control The system provides the means to assign the 
use of resources only to authorised users.  
Unauthorised Access to data 
Non-Repudiation A node can be held responsible for a sent 
message. 
DoS  
Inject False Message  
Freshness Messages must be checked for their freshness, 
i.e. to have recently been sent by the originator. 
Replay Messages 
Ensure time 
synchronisation  
Time synchronisation is a fundamental 
requirement for WSNs to enable them to 
communicate effectively and efficiently. By 
disrupting time synchronisation, an adversary 
could cause denial of service, or incorrect 
timings of events to be reported to the sink or 
the coordinator node. It is especially important 
for the medical applications.  
DoS 
Incorrect timing of events 
Jamming communication 
Relay packets  
Detect Malicious 
Nodes 
Nodes that behave in a malicious way can be 
detected and excluded from the environment.  
DoS  
Inject False Message  
Exclude Malicious 
Nodes 
The environment can exclude nodes that have 
been detected to be malicious.  
Inappropriate release of 
information to adversaries 
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Auditability  It is possible to log and audit security relevant 
data to detect new threats and security 
violations.  
DoS  
Inject False Message  
Maintain 
confidentiality of the 
communication 
(links, data) 
The system must ensure confidentiality of the 
communication links and the communicated 
data. Confidentiality might be easily violated 
with simple and quite cheap equipments. 
Besides, the attacker does not need to be an 
expert hacker to be able to perform it. 
Eavesdropping 
Masquerade/ Impersonation 
Node compromise 
Maintain data 
integrity 
The system must ensure that the data is not 
corrupted, changed or modified. Attacks will 
lead to data corruption that can turn into wrong 
requests and then wrong operations thus likely 
affecting users’ vital functions. 
Man-in-the-middle 
Masquerade/ Impersonation 
Node compromise 
Prevent 
reprogramming  
The system must exclude possibility of 
reprogramming. Such attacks in the healthcare 
application would either be to disrupt 
communications so that the network services 
would appear unreliable or to gain access to 
sensitive information collected for patients 
and/or medical or emergency staff. 
Node compromise  
Man-in-the-middle 
Masquerade/ Impersonation of 
sender in communications 
Masquerade/Impersonation of 
WSN manager 
Masquerade/Impersonation of 
code originator 
Ensure security of the 
aggregated data  
In order to minimise communications in a 
WSN, data is normally aggregated at nodes 
along the path to the sink from the source 
nodes. Because of this, the goal is to prevent 
compromising a node near to the sink, since a 
large amount of the data being generated in the 
WSN can be affected.  
Node compromise 
Eavesdrop on aggregated data 
Add, delete, replay, modify 
aggregated data  
Ensure confidentiality 
of the communication 
traffic  
Confidentiality of the communication traffic in 
WSNs is important in order to prevent 
revealing sensitive information due to the 
unusual patterns of traffic in that kind of 
networks. Traffic analysis is possible even if 
encryption is used to make communications 
unreadable. In addition, several applications of 
WSNs involve monitoring and tracking of 
people. In this case, traffic analysis can 
compromise different aspect of the privacy of 
these people. 
Traffic analysis 
Direct observing the 
information 
Following or backtracking the 
route  
Inferring events 
Linking events 
Linking identities through 
matching pseudonyms  
Inferring location  
Inferring identities  
Controlling release of 
information  
In more sophisticated applications of WSNs, 
including those for pervasive healthcare 
services, multiple WSNs may need to share 
information to achieve a particular goal. These 
WSNs may be controlled by different 
individuals and organisations with different 
policies regarding their information, and 
therefore controlled release of information 
between these networks becomes an issue. The 
goal here is to prevent inappropriate release of 
information to adversaries (or equivalently 
untrusted or partially trusted WSNs) may 
occur, allowing the adversary access to 
sensitive information. 
Inappropriate release of 
information to adversaries (or 
equivalently non-trusted or 
partially trusted WSNs) 
Eavesdropping 
Masquerading/impersonation 
Compromising gateways or 
nodes  
Maintain location The goal is to prevent an observer from Track subjects current location  
57 of 173 
Kopi af PhD-Anelia-v1.6D-06Apr09   
privacy  learning the position of nodes/people.  Track subjects movements   
Maintain user 
anonymity  
If users anonymity is ensured, they can use 
diverse pervasive services while their privacy 
is protected  
Reveal node/user’s identity  
Maintain the privacy 
of the context in 
which the users are  
The current context in which the users are 
using a service, device, system or part of it can 
reveal some private or sensitive information, or 
their behaviour.  
Infer privacy data for the user 
from context information 
Trusted 
Administrator 
The administrator is trusted to correctly assign 
access control rules.  
Inappropriate release of 
information to adversaries (or 
equivalently non-trusted or 
partially trusted WSNs) 
 
Table 5: Security Objectives for Trust Establishment and Privacy Protection 
 
3.2.2. Security, privacy and trust requirements for 
the system 
 
While the security objectives specify the overall objectives of the security system to counter threats, in this section 
it is outlined the functionality to achieve these objectives. The list is based on the Common Criteria [10], which is 
an international standard for the development of secure systems. The Common Criteria define the following 
classes of functionality1 (cites from [10]): 
 
 Security Audit “involves recognising, recording, storing, and analysing information related to security 
relevant activities”. Intrusion detection, for example is security audit functionality.  
 Communication functionality in terms of the common criteria defines two classes of communication: non-
repudiation of sending or non-repudiation of receiving messages. Note that protection of integrity, 
authenticity and confidentiality are subsumed under the user data protection.  
 Cryptography Support is concerned with the management of keys and their use in cryptographic 
operations.  
 User data protection defines a set of functions to protect the unauthorised access to user data, in 
particular the definitions of access control rules. Confidentiality and secrecy of the collected and 
communicated data entails ensuring that information is accessible only to those authorised to have access, 
and providing assurance that the information processed by a system is protected against intentional or 
unintentional unauthorised access by individuals, processes or devices. Integrity of the data that is sensed, 
processed or aggregated is a measure of its reliability. It entails protection against unauthorised data 
modification, insertion, substitution or deletion. It includes providing the means for assuring data 
freshness. Authorisation for accessing data or network resources entails providing the means to control 
access and approve actions by authenticated entities.  
 Identification and authentication contains the set of functions to “establish and verify a claimed user 
identity”. Authentication of the originator and recipient of messages entails providing the means for 
verification of network identities, and is a prerequisite for covering the other security requirements. 
 Security Management defines the attributes, roles and functions of the security system itself. 
 Privacy defines privacy preserving functionality. Note that in terms of the Common Criteria, privacy only 
concerns the protection of the identity of the users (and not their data and the context in which they are 
using a service, as assumed throughout this report).   
 Protection of the [security functions]2 defines functions to protect important data (like key material) and 
functions (like key distribution) of the security system. 
                                                        
1 Note that the Common Criteria also define assurance levels, which is out of scope of this document.  
2 The common criteria call the security functions TSF: Target of Evaluation Security Functions. 
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 Resource Utilisation functions define how the availability of the system can be protected, e.g. by 
prioritising resources and by being fault tolerant.  
 Trusted Path/channels define the function to establish a secure communication channel with an identified 
communication partner.  
 As described in Section 2.1, HHA have diversity of nodes with respect to memory, computation, 
communication capabilities and roles. Depending on the scenario and role of each node in the network, 
the information it communicates has different security requirements. In the wireless hospital use case 
described in Section 3.1.1 for example, information for the current health status and patient’s medical 
history is communicated, while in other use cases, other type of sensitive information (for example the 
current location of the back-up shift assistant) is essential. The first case generates information whose 
correctness and freshness is crucial, thus requiring strong integrity protection. The second case generates 
information with high confidentiality needs, because it is related to the privacy of the medical staff. 
Detailed risk analysis will show further in this chapter that the diversity which exists in the scenarios of 
the application spaces influences the risks and consequently the security needs of the nodes. This will be 
presented in the following subsections.  
 The adaptive security framework must of course cover the general security requirements through security 
protocols and mechanisms. From the above listed requirements, in the following sections will be analysed 
more closely the ones related to privacy, confidentiality and secrecy, data integrity and freshness, 
authentication and authorisation [3].  
 
Scope of the proposed security and privacy solution 
 
In order to identify the set of requirements that the security and privacy framework must cover for secure 
deployments, it is important to define the scope of the security solution. The assumptions here are that data 
handling practices and privacy policies of legitimate deployments are enforced and supervised by some regulatory 
framework. In order for the users to take full advantage of the services that can be offered by legitimate 
deployments, it is necessary to build some level of trust, which can not be accomplished using sorely technical 
means, i. e. the users have to trust that the organisations responsible for the deployments are complying with 
regulations (e.g. for data handling practices) in order to use the services offered. Moreover, it is assumed that the 
security and privacy solution should cover the communications between the nodes of sensor networks and 
between nodes and gateways to other networks.  
The communication scope for which each requirement should be fulfilled to counteract each threat is also 
identified. In order, for example, to counteract threats against data confidentiality, the mechanisms for 
authentication, authorisation and confidentiality need to be applied for both the communications within the nodes 
of the network and the communications with gateway nodes of trusted subscribed networks. The communication 
scopes are: 
 Communication within the nodes of the network (denoted here as IN) 
 Communication with nodes of trusted subscribed networks (denoted here as SUB)  
 Occasional communication with nodes of unknown networks (denoted here as UN) 
 
The following Table 6 presents the scope of the threats and general security requirements. Only the relevant 
threats are listed.  
 
Threats Confidentiality  Integrity Authentication Authorisation 
Threats to 
confidentiality 
IN, SUB  IN, SUB IN, SUB 
Threats to integrity  IN, SUB IN, SUB IN, SUB 
Threats to data 
aggregation 
IN IN IN IN 
Threats to localisation 
and time 
synchronisation 
 IN IN IN 
Threats to 
reprogramming 
 IN, SUB IN, SUB IN, SUB 
Threats to information UN  UN UN 
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sharing 
Table 6: Scope of threats and general security requirements 
 
3.2.3. Trust Requirements for the Pervasive Health 
Care  
 
The requirement for trust management mechanisms is set because within the scope of future ubiquitous systems, 
communications between highly heterogeneous and dynamic networks need to be secured. Moreover, sensor 
networks depend on the distributed cooperation among network nodes, and the evaluation and establishment of 
trust relationships within the network could serve as the basis for decisions on security issues and network 
activities. In general, the problem of formulating evaluation rules and policies, representing trust evidence, and 
evaluating and managing trust relationships is referred to as the trust management problem. 
 
The trust establishment process which needs to be defined as part of the security framework includes the 
specification of valid types of evidence, and its generation, distribution, collection and evaluation. Trust 
evaluation is performed by applying context-specific rules, metrics and policies on the trust evidence. The result 
of the process is the trust relation between the trustor and the trustee, usually represented as a certificate or as a 
numeric value, either discrete or in a continuous range. The trust relation, along with other aspects like the 
associated transaction risk, could be used by the trustor as the basis for decisions on cooperation with the trustee. 
Trust relations can be revoked on the basis of newly obtained evidence. Trust is transitive if it can be extended 
beyond the two parties between whom it was established, allowing for the building-up of trust paths between 
entities that have not directly participated in a process of trust evaluation.  
 
Trust evidence, which forms the basis for establishing trust relations, can be characterised as stable and long-term, 
if the evaluation metrics and mechanisms used for obtaining it do not change without notification. Within the 
scope of discussed medical applications, even trust relationships can be stable and long-term. Some sensor nodes, 
for example the nodes of a BSN, will be clustered by deployment and the trust relationships within the predefined 
cluster do not need to be continuously under evaluation. The characteristics required for the trust establishment 
mechanisms within the security framework are: 
 Support for pre-established and stable trust relationships 
 Provide adaptive and flexible mechanisms for trust evaluation between nodes of heterogeneous 
deployments 
 Support trust revocation in a controlled manner  
 
The following Table 7 presents the scope of the threats and the trust requirements. Only the relevant threats are 
listed. 
 
Threats Pre-
established 
Trust 
evaluation 
Revocation 
Threats to confidentiality IN, SUB IN, SUB IN, SUB 
Threats to integrity IN, SUB IN, SUB IN, SUB 
Threats to data aggregation IN IN IN 
Threats to localisation and time synchronisation IN IN IN 
Threats to reprogramming IN, SUB   
Threats to information sharing  UN UN 
Table 7: Scope of the threats and trust requirements 
 
3.2.4. Privacy Requirements for the Pervasive 
Health Care 
 
Preserving the privacy of the individuals, acting within an information system generally entails keeping their 
personal information confidential and accessible only to authorised parties. Especially for sensor networks, 
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however, ensuring the confidentiality of the data does not suffice. For example, confidentiality of the messages 
content would not protect from tracking the relative location of a BSN and from it – of the real end-users. The 
additional requirements that are set are: 
 
 Provision of mechanisms for controlled data disclosure based on rules and policies. Those mechanisms 
should operate according to the data sensitivity level and the data abstraction level, and protect from 
information induction through sensed data correlation. 
 Protection of the identity of the nodes related to users through anonymity and pseudonymity 
mechanisms. 
 Provision of user’s notice and choice mechanisms to be applied when a user-related device has user 
interaction capabilities. The responsibility of those mechanisms is to provide awareness to the users 
whose data for or the environment surrounding them is being collected. They also have to empower the 
users to control, by making informed decisions, what personal data will be disclosed and which of the 
network pseudonyms representing them should be used. 
 
Anonymity description and requirements  
Anonymity mechanisms can ensure that users may use a resource or a service without being distinguished from 
other users and without disclosing their identity to third parties. Anonymity is defined as “the state of not being 
identifiable within a set of subjects, referred to as the anonymity set” Fejl! Henvisningskilde ikke fundet.. With 
respect to acting entities, the anonymity set consists of the subjects who might cause an action. With respect to 
addressees (subjects being addressed), the anonymity set consists of the subjects who might be addressed. It is 
thus a requirement for anonymity mechanisms to be context-aware. [12]  
As long as the users are anonymous, they could disclose any personal data, such as the location, that can be 
considered as essential in future ubiquitous sensor networks. Considering a user’s location as personal data, as 
long as no identifying information is attached to the location, i.e., the user is anonymous, the privacy of the user is 
protected. As in many network settings the use of identifiers is integral part and often necessary for correct 
operation of most applications, the goal is to make these identifiers temporary and change them to prevent the 
collection of too many information about a node that – in the long run – will help identifying it. In addition, 
changing identifiers in the right situation helps to break the connection to any identifying information that – 
purposefully or not – have been provided to the peer. Like this, the users can maintain control of the information 
that can be associated to them.   
In order for anonymity to be achieved, the data communicated in the sensor network needs either to be 
depersonalised or pseudonymised with respect to the identity of the sender, in cases that a legitimate network 
service requires user identification. Pseudonymity is the use of pseudonyms as IDs Fejl! Henvisningskilde ikke 
fundet.. Pseudonyms with different scopes can be used for each communication, from node pseudonyms to 
transaction pseudonyms, for achieving different levels of long-term unlinkability. In general, anonymity is 
stronger the more often and independently the pseudonyms are selected or produced.  
In addition, the potential impact of the pseudonym change is also important. Situations that allow a direct 
mapping of the pseudonym to the node, for example by restricted space identification, may require a pseudonym 
change shortly before and after this situation, in order to limit the amount of available information about the traces 
for the identified user. Following this, an important question which is investigated in the research literature is for 
the trade-off between how often the pseudonyms are changed and the achieved anonymity level on one side, and 
the application requirements on the other side. Having in mind the resource constrained sensor nodes and the cost 
to compute a new pseudonym, in comparison with the standard approach when the pseudonyms are changed 
periodically, it is of importance the suitable moment when a pseudonym must be changed [12]. Thus the node 
must have mechanism to evaluate the current context in order to decide when the most suitable time to change the 
pseudonym is, in order to avoid energy waste.  
 
The following Table 8 presents the scope of the threats and the privacy requirements. Only the relevant threats are 
listed. 
 
 
Threats Controlled 
data disclosure 
Protection of the 
identity of the nodes 
Notice and 
choice 
Threats to confidentiality IN, SUB IN, SUB SUB 
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Threats to data aggregation IN IN  
Threats to information sharing UN UN UN 
Table 8: Scope of the threats and privacy requirements 
 
 
3.2.5. Security requirements for context data for 
the Pervasive Health Care 
 
For the three scenarios discussed in the previous section, the high-level context elements have been described. 
They are used in order to analyse in more detail the requirements that the proposed in this report security 
framework must cover, because they classify both the diverse characteristics and roles of the devices, and the 
types of information that are captured and communicated. Based on the security needs, the integrity needs and the 
sensitivity of the data, along with the capabilities of the communicating parties, the context elements are used in 
order to identify and characterise the security requirements. 
 
The following two tables include an evaluation of the security requirements for the context elements. The aim 
towards the evaluation of the context elements is twofold. Firstly, it will assist on the understanding of the various 
security requirements that the security framework needs to fulfil. Secondly, it will provide the basis for the 
security framework adaptation and configuration guidelines that will be formulated in Section 5.5.2. These 
guidelines will assist later in the applying the security framework to the scenario, the role of each node in the 
network and the context attribute it belongs to. 
 
The Table 9 contains the security, privacy and trust requirements described in the previous subsections: 
 
Types Requirements  
General security requirements Confidentiality (CO) 
 Integrity – Freshness (IF) 
 Authentication (AT)  
 Authorisation (AS) 
Trust requirements Pre-established trust (PT) 
 Adaptive trust negotiation (AT) 
 Trust revocation (RT) 
Privacy requirements Controlled data disclosure (CP) 
 Identity management (IP) 
 Notice and choice (NC) 
Table 9: Type of security, privacy and trust requirements for context data  
 
For each context element, it is indicated if the security requirement applies (Yes/No), and at what degree (S: 
Strong, M: Medium, W: Weak) the requirement is estimated to be important. For example, when Strong is used 
for the Integrity requirement, it indicates both that the integrity of the information is considered critical and that 
the device capabilities are such so that the requirement can be fulfilled. When used for Identity management, 
“Strong” means that pseudonyms with high degree of un-linkability should be used. 
In Table 10 the security requirements associated to the contexts are presented [3]. Given the high sensitiveness of 
the treated data in the healthcare scenario, only the Movement of a person context is assigned with lower security 
and privacy requirements than the other contexts.  
 
 Comm. 
Scope 
CO IF AT AS PT AT RT CP IP NC 
SUB S S S S S S S S S S 
UN W N W W W W W W W W 
IN S S S S S S S S S N 
Indoor 
Location 
SUB S S S S S S S S S S 
Outdoor SUB S S S S S S S S S S 
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UN W N W W W W W W W W 
IN S S S S S S S S S N 
Location 
SUB S S S S S S S S S S 
IN S S S S S S S S S N 
SUB S S S S S S S S S S 
Vital 
Functions 
UN W N W W W W W W W W 
Table 10: Security, privacy and trust requirements associated to the context attributes 
 
3.2.6. Summary of Section 3.2 
 
This section presented one of the original contributions of this thesis – the security, privacy and trust requirements 
for the reference scenario, including the requirements for the context data. In order to build a pervasive system 
which exactly protects the security, privacy and trust aspects to the most efficiency, the exact requirements for 
security, privacy and trust which are valid for the reference scenario were investigated. To do that, the security, 
privacy and trust objectives were presented in a table form providing short descriptions of the objectives. The 
security and privacy objectives were further mapped to possible threats for which these objectives provide 
countermeasures. Since the security threats are related to different parts of the architecture and to different scopes 
of the communication, the scope of the threats for security, privacy and trust was mapped to the three types of the 
communications which are discussed in this report – namely, communication within the nodes of the network; 
communication with nodes of trusted subscribed networks and occasional communication with nodes of unknown 
networks.  
As explained previously, the context plays an important role in the proposed in this thesis solutions.  
Communication of context data in the reference scenario (indoor/outdoor location, vital signs) also has security, 
privacy and trust requirements. They have been evaluated in the end of the chapter and assigned Strong, Medium 
or Weak classification. 
 
3.3. Threats analysis for WSNs in Pervasive Health Care 
scenarios 
 
This section first describes the threat analysis methodology which will be used in order to analyse the security 
threats, risks and vulnerabilities when pervasive systems with WSNs have been developed. Then eight steps will be 
followed in the detailed analysis – starting from describing the system, then identifying the assets and mapping 
them, defining the threat model, and in the end - determining the risks and proposing mitigation plan. The 
presented in this section material is one of the contributions in this thesis.  
 
The described scenarios for the pervasive health care involve gathering and communicating data related to the 
medical staff physiological conditions, to patients’ physiological conditions, personal information, medical 
history, and patient’s activity, location of hospital equipment and physical parameters of the environment. This 
type of data is sensitive because of privacy concerns, especially when it can be combined with information about 
the actual identities or physical location of patients and medical staff. Attacks against availability, data integrity, 
confidentiality, privacy of patient sensitive information and location anonymity are considered likely and their 
impact would be high, since the services offered in most of the scenarios are considered critical.   
In general, attacks on the pervasive health care scenarios will target specific individuals (patients, medical or 
emergency staff). The aim of the attacks would be the collection of sensitive user information, health status, 
medication list, medical history or location information for large sets of users, which can be used for making harm 
to an individual. The benefits to the attacker would thus be measured in terms of financial gain, even though 
sometimes the assets are abstract and it is difficult to set a value. Attacks against specific individuals could be 
invoked for activities monitoring, blackmail purposes or initiated by insurance companies.  
Another type of attack in the pervasive health care application space and specifically on the emergency 
coordination, could be attacks aiming at disrupting the effective coordination of a rescue activity.  
In order to make detailed analysis on the security threats for the pervasive health care scenarios, in Tables 2 and 3 
it was presented all use cases, the business benefits, the type of information which is subject to communication 
and pieces of information which could be subject to attacks. In this table Electronic Patient Record (EPR) consists 
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of: medical history, diagnose, medications, chronic diseases, allergies, previous treatments and current health 
status of a patient. The description of the systems and the use cases is actually the initial step in the threat analysis. 
All the steps in the threat analysis which must be followed, will be presented in the next paragraphs.  
 
3.3.1. Threat analysis methodology 
 
The threat analysis is a formal process identifying, documenting and mitigating the security threats and 
vulnerability of a system. Following the threat analysis methodology, proposed in [14] Fejl! Henvisningskilde 
ikke fundet., in this subsection the threats and vulnerabilities for the reference scenarios will be discussed and 
mitigation measures will be proposed. The threat analysis process is divided in three stages – threats modelling, 
assets mapping and building the mitigation plan.  
Threat modelling is a method of assessing and documenting the security risk associated with an application that 
involves also understanding the goals of an adversary in attacking a system based on the assets of interest. This 
allows to enumerate the threats and also to discover the vulnerabilities. Enumerating threats and vulnerabilities 
creates the threat and vulnerability profiles for a system, describing all the potential attacks and all valid attack 
paths. Briefly speaking, the resulted threat model has the following components: A list of threat profiles, a list 
of vulnerability profiles, a list of threat scenarios, a list of use cases. This phase can help to identify both the 
security strengths and weaknesses of the system [14] [16]. To begin with, the system has to be understood 
completely, this means to know the goals, the actors and the devices involved. Then, the next step is the assets 
mapping. Here, everything that could be damaged or violated must be identified. Asset mapping involves 
identifying and documenting the tangible and intangible resources of the system and identify the related entry 
points of the system. The assets value is used as the basis for calculating threat risks and for prioritising 
countermeasures, assets need to be prioritised. In some cases the value of assets is less intuitive especially when 
they are abstract. 
The third stage of the threat analysis is building a mitigation plan, namely selecting from the list of all the 
proposed countermeasures, the most effective combination. This involves determining threats, determining 
vulnerabilities, analysing risks. The risk management helps to balance between what is acceptable and what is 
possible. From the threat and vulnerability list it is possible to extract the information about which threat pose the 
highest risk value. The aspects, which have to be taken into account to assess the risk, are the impact, the damage 
to the assets when the threat would materialise, the size of the vulnerabilities and the likelihood that the threat will 
try to materialise.  
The result of this analysis is a set of countermeasures that might mitigate the threats identified. Since the 
implementation of all the proposed countermeasures is, in most of the cases, impractical due to limitation of 
budget, time and resources, the goal of a beneficial threats analysis process is to propose the set of the most cost-
effective countermeasures against the identified threat.  
 
In [14], eight steps have been proposed for the threat analysis:  
Step 1 – Description of the system: network overview and use cases  
Step 2 – Analyse the technical background of the use cases  
Step 3 – Identify Assets  
Step 4 – Determining Threats and defining threat scenarios  
Step 5 – Determining Vulnerabilities  
Step 6 – Asset Mapping 
Step 7 – Risk Management  
Step 8 – Mitigation Plan  
 
In the following sections, this methodology will be applied for the threat analysis.  
 
The result of this exercise will be a detailed threat analysis for WSNs in Pervasive Health Care applications with 
a thorough threat model. This will be one of the main contributions of this PhD report since to the best of our 
knowledge, only general threat analysis has been published until now in the literature and not specific for 
pervasive tele-care scenarios. [17] 
 
3.3.2. Applying the threat analysis methodology  
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Step 1 – Description of the system: network overview and use cases  
In the Section 3.1.5, the reference scenarios and use cases have been discussed, identifying the envisaged services, 
their goals, the users (the actors) and the used devices. They are summarised in Table 11. The primary actor in the 
Pervasive Health Care Applications using WSNs is the person using the WSNs – medical staff, hospital 
administration and patient. Other actors related to pervasive healthcare services could be patients family, relatives 
and friends, network providers, service providers, insurance companies, others parties requesting information or 
services, anyone who the user sends a message or anyone who sends a message to the user, etc. In this discussions 
the focus is mainly on the medical staff, hospital administration and patient since they are the primary end-
users.  
 
Scenarios Goal of the scenario Actors and confidential 
information to be exchanged  
Main Technical Functionalities   
Wireless 
Hospital 
Simplifying the procedure 
for medical staff, speed up 
and improve the accuracy 
of the diagnose and 
treatment 
Medical staff – current 
physiological data, calendars, 
number of patients, current 
location, personal profile 
Hospital administration - 
administrative information, 
number and location of 
equipment, number of patients 
Patients - identity, social 
security number, EPR, 
location, personal profile 
TF1 - Measure vital signs 
TF2 - Communicate vital signs  
TF3 - Message Notification  
TF4 - Request current vital signs of 
a person 
TF5 - Define position of a 
person/equipment  
TF6 - Request position of a 
person/equipment 
TF7 - Alert notification  
TF11- Request data from user 
profile 
TF12 - Request data from EPR 
TF13 - Request data from calendars 
Residential 
Health 
Monitoring 
Enabling the patients to 
maintain their life outside 
the hospital 
Patients - identity, social 
security number, EPR, current 
location, personal profile 
TF1 - Measure vital signs 
TF2 - Communicate vital signs  
TF4 - Request current vital signs of 
a person 
TF5 - Define position of a person  
TF6 - Request position of a person 
TF7 - Alert notification 
TF12 - Request data from EPR 
Emergency 
Coordination 
Supporting the rescue 
staff, emergency 
physicians, rescue 
transport, intelligent 
emergency coordination 
 
Hospital administration - 
availability of the medical 
equipment, available 
medications, location of the 
accidents, location of the 
rescue team, number of 
casualties  
Patients - identity, social 
security number, EPR, current 
location, personal profile 
TF8 - Define and communicate 
position of a team  
TF9 - Request position of a team 
TF2 - Communicate patient’s vital 
signs  
TF10 - Communication among 
teams 
Table 11: Goal of the scenarios and technical functionalities 
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Step 2 – Analyse the technical background of the use cases  
The system overview is a description of the static parts of the system and contains a list of requirements, the 
system architecture, the system environment, a list of technologies being used and a list of things which require 
security attention. Description of the reference scenario and information flow diagram together with list of 
security and privacy requirements is presented in Section 3.1. Here a picture for the system architecture is added 
and a list of main things which require security attention which could be used by an adversary as attack entry 
points to the system.  
 
 
 
Figure 10: System architecture for pervasive health care scenarios 
 
List of the most important Entry Points (EP) to the system which are specific for the Wireless hospital use cases is 
presented in the following Table 12:  
 
Entry 
Point ID 
Name  Description  
EP1 Wireless radio link All wireless radio links should provide fair MAC schemes. Also wireless 
links can be weak, because potentially, anyone can pickup the signal, as 
it is broadcast in every direction 
EP2 Establish a secure link The first thing two nodes must do before they can establish a secure link, 
is to communicate with each other over an insecure link. This 
communication must establish a secured link. The way how this insecure 
communication happens is very important for the system security 
EP3 Sensitive data stored in 
personal devices 
End user’s sensitive data stored in personal devices must be protected 
such that no disclosure of data is allowed without permission of the user 
EP4 Sensitive data stored in 
hospital server  
End user’s sensitive data stored in hospital server must be protected in 
such a way that only authorised persons can access it or it must be 
encrypted and even if an unauthorised access happened, the sensitive data 
will not be revealed.  
EP5 Take over the role of 
the WSNs coordinator 
in case of energy 
shortage  
Every coordinator of WSN, should have a power check. Before running 
out of power the device should send a message to the rest of the cluster 
that someone has to take-over the functionalities. This message should be 
sent, such that there is enough time for the cluster to relocate the 
functionalities to other nodes. If this is not done (thus, when the device 
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loses power before take-over), it is then possible for another (hostile) 
device to take its place, without the rest of the network noticing. A usual 
take-over should be done by authentication of the two nodes: the old and 
the new one.  
EP6 Malicious node  If an attacker compromises a node, he could later use this node to either 
disrupt communication or steal data  
EP7 Any place in close 
proximity of WSNs 
where an attacker could 
hide 
In this situation, an attacker could use more powerful device to jam the 
communication  
EP8 Direct psychical access 
to sensor node 
If there is no good access control policies in a hospital, an adversary 
could enter the hospital and physically damage a sensor node  
EP9 Context information 
provided by 
untrustworthy providers  
In the pervasive health care applications, in some situations, the systems 
decisions depend on provision of context information by external 
providers. If the provided context information is wrong, this might lead 
to discloser of sensitive data to non-trusted parties  
Table 12: Description of entry points for pervasive health care scenarios  
Step 3 – Identify Assets and Step 6 – Assets Mapping  
In this stage everything which can be damaged or violated in the network is listed, specifying to which actor the 
assets have a certain personal and sensitive value. The assets could be representing content or context, related to 
security and privacy and physical assets. For the sake of simplicity, only the general categories are enumerated, 
without specifying the number of asset for each specific actor.  
In step 6, the value of each asset must be identified and prioritised. Even though giving a value to some of the 
assets, related to a person, is a very subjective process, here suggestion for evaluation is given based on the 
perception of the author. The assets are mapped to three values - defined as – High, Medium, Low. 
 
Assets ID List of Assets  Type of actor  Value of 
the asset 
Physical assets 
AS1 Sensors which are part of BSN Patient, doctor, medical staff H 
AS2 Sensors which are part of the environment  Hospital administration  L 
AS3 Mobile terminal Doctor or medical staff H 
AS4 Hospital server  Hospital administration H 
Assets related to security  
AS5 User ID and credentials   Patient, doctor, medical staff, 
administration 
H 
AS6 Passwords and secret keys  Patient, doctor, medical staff, 
hospital administration 
H 
AS7 User profile Patient, doctor, medical staff, 
hospital administration 
H 
AS8 List of trusted devices and their access 
rights 
Patient, doctor, medical staff, 
hospital administration 
H 
Assets related to privacy 
AS9 Mobile terminal’s “identity” (to whom a 
certain smart phone or PDA belongs)  
Doctor or medical staff H 
AS10 Vital Functions of a person (for a patient - 
part of EPR) 
Patient, doctor, medical staff H 
AS11 Location of a person Patient, doctor, medical staff H 
AS12 Location of a device or equipment  Hospital administration M 
AS13 Person’s ID (for a patient - part of EPR) Patient, doctor, medical staff H 
AS14 Personal information stored in the user 
profile (names, address, bank account, 
social security number, friends, family) 
Patient, doctor, medical staff H 
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AS15 Medical history of a patient (part of EPR) Patient H 
AS16 Movement pattern or history of a person  Patient, doctor, medical staff M 
AS17 Environmental information  Hospital administration L 
Table 13: List and importance of assets 
 
Definition of the threat model for WSNs in Pervasive Health Care Applications 
Step 4 – Determining threats and defining threat scenarios  
In the Table 5 in Section 3.2 the major security and privacy objectives in the Pervasive Health Care scenarios and 
the threats which can violate these objectives are described. This information is necessary for the later stage, when 
the threats profiles will be built.  
 
From these objectives, it can be seen that the major functional component for these applications will be 
 User Data Protection, in order to be able to define the rules of access. These may be simple in terms 
of being part of the network, or more complex as to who may read which parts of the medical record 
of a particular person. 
 Cryptography Support, in order to manage the keys within the network and carry out cryptographic 
operations. Keys may need to be selected such that the access rules are enforced; key management 
techniques must be chosen such that they fit the needs for the sensor networks.  
 Security Audit may be relevant in order to track back security violations, in particular, where sensible 
user data are disseminated, e.g. in the medical scenario. For sensible audit data, Identification and 
Authentication may be necessary. In general, security audit may include lower level intrusion 
detection schemes and appropriate reactions, but this is not mandatory for this application. 
When building threat profiles, an important question to be answered is – “How the intruder can materialise a 
specific threat?” To answer this question, threat scenarios are also provided as part of the threat profile. Threat 
scenarios of the pervasive health care are presented in the following paragraph.  
Threat scenarios 
After determining the security and privacy threats, the possible threat scenarios (TS) must be identified. These 
scenarios show how the threat materialises, in other words how the system is compromised. The threat scenario 
should contain all the actions which can possibly happen. An attack tree is a good way to describe and investigate 
threat scenarios. The determination of entry points, e.g. the points in the network where the threat-source enters or 
interacts for the first time with the network, is part of building threat scenarios. For simplicity sake the threat 
scenarios from the highest level of the attack tree are shown here, giving their ID too.  
 
1st level 2nd level  
TS1 - the sensor is destroyed  TS1.1 - physically destroyed by a person 
 TS1.2 - chemically destroyed if some chemicals are in 
the environment  
 TS1.3 - destroyed if something happens in parts of the 
building  
TS2 - adversary listens to the wireless channel TS2.1 - unauthorised monitoring of communication 
 TS2.2 - the message is not encrypted  
TS3 - The attacker assumes the identity of a 
trusted entity 
TS3.1 – the attacker steals somehow identity 
information  
 TS3.2 - the attacker overhears or eavesdrops identity 
information 
TS4 - attacker gets access to data he is not 
authorised to access 
TS4.1 - attackers has obtained and uses user’s password 
 TS4.2 - access to the data is not protected with a 
password  
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TS5- attacker changes the message  TS5.1 - attacker may modify parts of the message 
 TS5.2 - an attacker may delete part of the message 
TS6 - the attacker obtains confidential 
information from external source  
TS6.1 - The attacker buys the information  
 TS6.2 - The attacker blackmails somebody who can 
provide the confidential information  
TS7 - The attacker has different pieces of 
information 
TS7.1 - The attacker has access to information which is 
stored at different places  
 TS7.2 - Some pieces of the information are not 
protected with access control  
 TS7.3 - Some pieces of the information are not 
encrypted 
TS8 - Attackers reveals user’s/node’s identity  TS8.1 - The user is not anonymous  
 TS8.2 - Pseudonyms are used but they are long-term 
and the identity is revealed  
TS9 - information is released to inappropriate 
party 
TS9.1 - Information is sent by mistake  
 TS9.2 - Not updated list of parties with authorised 
access 
TS10 - Malicious node uses the same frequency 
band  
 
TS11 - Attacker observes traffic information 
directly  
TS11.1 - Attacker follows the route  
 TS11.2 - Attacker backtracks the route  
TS12 - Attacker infers events by the fact that 
there exist communication in certain periods  
TS12.1 - The attacker can see communication in 
different parts of the network  
TS13 - Sleep deprivation attack   
TS14 - Flooding the network   
TS15 - Malicious node disrupts position 
identification  
 
TS16 - Attacker disrupts time synchronisation   
TS17 - Adversary impersonates the source of the 
code update  
TS17.1 - Masquerade the WSN manager 
 TS17.2 Impersonate the writer of the code  
Table 14: Threat scenarios  
 
To build the threat profiles (Table 15), for each of it a number of characteristics must be described – ID, name, 
classification, the source of the threat, the assets involved and the entry point to the system. The threat sources 
could be natural, human or environmental. The classification in the table is made based on the type of the 
objective – security or privacy. 
The following Table 16 presents the threat profiles, grouped by type. More detailed classification of the major 
threats for the Pervasive Health Care scenarios is presented in Step 7 – Risk Assessment.  
 
Thre
at ID 
Threat Name Classification Source of the 
threat  
Assets involved Entry 
point  
Threat 
scenario 
Threats to communication links and data integrity  
1 Disrupt 
Communication 
Security  Human, 
natural 
AS10,11,12,13,
14,15,16,17 
EP6,7 TS5 
2 Disable Sensors Security Human, 
natural, 
environment  
AS1, 2 EP8 TS1 
3 Disable 
Processing 
Security Human, 
natural, 
environment 
AS10,11,12,13,
14,15,16,17 
EP8 TS3, TS17 
4 Impair Security Human, AS10,11,12,13, EP8 TS1 
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Transceiver natural  14,15,16,17 
5 DoS  Security human AS10,17 EP5,6 TS13,14 
6 Inject False 
Message 
Security human AS10,11,12,13,
14,15,16,17 
EP1, 
6,7 
TS10, 3 
7 Man-in-the-
middle 
Security  human AS10,17 EP6 TS3 
Threats to traffic analysis and confidentiality of the communicated data 
8 Eavesdropping Security  human AS10,11,12,13,
14,15,16,17 
EP1, 7 TS10, 
TS7.3, TS2, 
TS2.1 
9 Masquerade/ 
Impersonation 
Security  human AS10,11,12,13,
14,15,16,17 
EP6 TS3 
10 Node 
compromise  
Security  human AS10,11,12,13,
14,15,16,17 
EP5,6 TS3 
11 Add, delete, 
modify 
aggregated data  
Security  human AS10,17 EP5,6 TS3,4 
12 Inferring 
location, 
identities, events  
Privacy Human AS11,12,13,16 EP1, 
EP3 
TS12, 
TS12.1, 
TS7, TS7.1, 
TS7.2, 
TS7.3 
13 Linking location, 
identities, events  
Privacy human AS11,12,13,16 EP1,3 TS12, 
TS12.1, 
TS7, TS7.1, 
TS7.2, 
TS7.3 
Threats to information sharing 
14 Unauthorised 
Access to data  
Security and 
privacy 
human AS9,10,11,12,1
3,14,15,16,17 
EP2,3 TS6, TS6.1, 
TS6.2 
15 Inappropriate 
release of 
information to 
adversaries  
Privacy  human AS9,10,11,12,1
3,14,15,16,17 
EP6, 7 TS3, TS9 
16 Compromised 
gateways or 
nodes  
Privacy  human AS10,17 EP6,8 TS3,4 
17 Infer privacy 
data for the user 
from context 
information 
Privacy  human AS11,12,13,16 EP1,7 TS7.2, 
TS7.3, TS8 
Threats to localisation 
18 Track subject’s 
current location  
Security  human AS11,12 EP1,6,7 TS8,9,12, 
15 
19 Track subject’s 
movements   
Privacy   human AS11,12 EP1,6,7 TS8,9,12, 
15 
20 Reveal node/ 
user’s identity 
Privacy  human AS13 EP6, 
3,1,2 
TS8,12 
Threats to reprogramming 
21 Reprogramming  Security  human AS5,6,7,8 EP6,8 TS17, 3 
Threats to time synchronisation and freshness 
22 Disrupt time 
synchronisation  
Security  human AS10 EP1,6 TS5, 10 
23 Communication 
of old massages  
Security  human AS10 EP1,6 TS16 
24 Replay message  Security human AS10 EP6 TS16 
25 Jamming the Security human AS10 EP7 TS10 
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communication  
26 Incorrect timing 
of events  
Security human AS10, 11,12,16 EP7,6 TS5 
Table 15: Threat profiles 
 
Step 5 – Determining Vulnerabilities  
After the threat profiles were built, it is now analysed which of the listed threats could be exploited by threat 
sources through vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities will show the security and privacy weaknesses of the system 
which might be realised as attacks.  
Vulnerability (V) is a flaw in the network, which can be exploited when a threat materialises. It should be also 
known which threats exploit the vulnerability. In order to make the mitigation of vulnerabilities more convenient 
for the security designer, each vulnerability is mapped to a fundamental threat by which it is exploited and the 
technical functionality during which the vulnerability could be exploited. 
Here it is also built vulnerability profiles list, with ID, name, threat scenario, the fundamental threat, the technical 
functionality and the weakness index. The weakness index can be: critical, potentially critical, not critical. 
The threat scenarios for the whole system analysed in the previous paragraphs are numerous. For each of them, a 
number of vulnerabilities exist, thus giving a long list. In the Table 16, where the list is presented, the focus is on 
those, related mainly to privacy and which are related to the human nature of the end-user. This is because even 
though many security measures could be technically implemented in the system, via expensive design efforts, 
despite of the limited sensor node resource, still, the negligence of the end-user itself may lead to serious privacy 
breaches. With this list, the intention is to raise awareness for this fact since the pervasive heath care applications 
will deal with sensitive private data and the users must be informed and they must not neglect the actions which 
could protect it. 
 
Vulner
ability 
ID 
Name Exploited by 
Threat 
scenario 
Fundamental 
threat  
Technical 
functionality 
Weakness 
index 
Related to human factor  
V1 Low password/credential 
complexity 
TS6, TS6.1, 
TS6.2 
THR14 
Unauthorised 
access 
TF4, TF6, 
TF9, TF11, 
TF12, TF13 
critical 
V2 Removed 
password/credentials by the 
user 
TS6, TS6.1, 
TS6.2 
THR14 
Unauthorised 
access 
TF4, TF6, 
TF9, TF11, 
TF12, TF13 
critical 
V3 User stores 
password/credentials to an 
easily accessible place 
TS6, TS6.1, 
TS6.2 
THR14 
Unauthorised 
access 
TF4, TF6, 
TF9, TF11, 
TF12, TF13 
critical 
V4 User mobile terminal could 
be stolen 
TS6, TS6.1, 
TS6.2 
THR14 
Unauthorised 
access 
TF11 Potentially 
critical 
V5 Users are not sufficiently 
informed about privacy 
risks  
TS3, TS9 THR15 - 
Inappropriate 
release of 
information to 
adversaries 
TF11 Potentially 
critical 
V6 Users are not sufficiently 
educated to use security and 
privacy measures  
TS7.2, TS7.3, 
TS8 
THR17 - Infer 
privacy data 
for the user 
from context 
information 
TF11 critical 
V7 User does not log-off the 
system after use 
TS6, TS6.1, 
TS6.2 
THR14 
Unauthorised 
access 
TF4, TF6, 
TF9, TF11, 
TF12, TF13 
critical 
V8 Password system is not TS6, TS6.1, THR14 TF4, TF6, critical 
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user-friendly and is complex 
and the user does not use it 
TS6.2 Unauthorised 
access 
TF9, TF11, 
TF12, TF13 
V9 Users gives their 
password/credentials to 
other persons  
TS6, TS6.1, 
TS6.2 
THR14 
Unauthorised 
access 
TF4, TF6, 
TF9, TF11, 
TF12, TF13 
critical 
V10 Exposing user’s personal 
information to many 
institutions and companies 
TS12, TS12.1, 
TS7, TS7.1, 
TS7.2, TS7.3 
THR12, 13 - 
Inferring and 
linking 
location, 
identities, 
events   
TF11, TF12, 
TF13 
Potentiall
y critical 
V11 User has secrets, which can 
be used to blackmail him 
TS6, TS6.1, 
TS6.2 
THR14 
Unauthorised 
access 
TF4, TF6, 
TF9, TF11, 
TF12, TF13 
Potentiall
y critical 
V12 Gullible user TS6, TS6.1, 
TS6.2 
THR14 
Unauthorised 
access 
TF4, TF6, 
TF9, TF11, 
TF12, TF13 
Potentiall
y critical 
V13 Inattentive user TS6, TS6.1, 
TS6.2 
THR14 
Unauthorised 
access 
TF4, TF6, 
TF9, TF11, 
TF12, TF13 
Potentiall
y critical 
V14 Impatient user TS6, TS6.1, 
TS6.2 
THR14 
Unauthorised 
access 
TF4, TF6, 
TF9, TF11, 
TF12, TF13 
Potentiall
y critical 
Related to security design flaws  
V15 Sensitive data not encrypted TS10, TS7.3, 
TS2, TS2.1 
THR8 - 
Eavesdropping 
TF2, TF3, 
TF7, TF8, 
TF10 
Critical 
V16 Sensitive user data accessed 
without user’s agreement  
TS6, TS6.1, 
TS6.2 
THR14 
Unauthorised 
access 
TF4, TF6, 
TF9, TF11, 
TF12, TF13 
critical 
V17 Insufficient message 
encryption 
TS10, TS7.3, 
TS2, TS2.1 
THR8 - 
Eavesdropping 
TF2, TF3, 
TF7, TF8, 
TF10 
Potentiall
y critical 
V18 No password/credentials 
where there should be  
TS6, TS6.1, 
TS6.2 
THR14 
Unauthorised 
access 
TF4, TF6, 
TF9, TF11, 
TF12, TF13 
critical 
V19 All information related to 
credentials is sent in one 
message 
TS10, TS7.3, 
TS2, TS2.1 
THR8 - 
Eavesdropping 
TF2, TF3, 
TF7, TF8, 
TF10 
Potentiall
y critical 
V20 Administrator could assign 
wrong privileges 
TS6, TS6.1, 
TS6.2 
THR14 
Unauthorised 
access 
TF4, TF6, 
TF9, TF11, 
TF12, TF13 
critical 
V21 The number of tries to enter 
the password is unlimited 
TS6, TS6.1, 
TS6.2 
THR14 
Unauthorised 
access 
TF4, TF6, 
TF9, TF11, 
TF12, TF13 
critical 
Related to policies and laws  
V22 Privacy laws can be easily 
violated  
TS3, TS9 THR15 - 
Inappropriate 
release of 
information to 
adversaries 
TF4, TF6, 
TF9, TF11, 
TF12, TF13 
Potentiall
y critical 
V23 Weak policy protection and 
detection 
TS3, TS9 THR15 - 
Inappropriate 
release of 
information to 
adversaries 
TF4, TF6, 
TF9, TF11, 
TF12, TF13 
Potentiall
y critical 
V24 Unauthorised people can TS10, TS7.3, THR8 - TF2, TF3, Potentiall
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come close enough to 
overhear the channel 
TS2, TS2.1 Eavesdropping TF7, TF8, 
TF10 
y Critical 
V25 An intruder device is 
(physically) able to enter the 
network premises 
TS10, TS7.3, 
TS2, TS2.1 
THR8 - 
Eavesdropping 
TF2, TF3, 
TF7, TF8, 
TF10 
Potentiall
y Critical 
V26 The password is the only 
required credential for 
access (single-point failure) 
TS6, TS6.1, 
TS6.2 
THR14 
Unauthorised 
access 
TF4, TF6, 
TF9, TF11, 
TF12, TF13 
Critical 
V27 Private information is freely 
available or easy to access  
TS12, TS12.1, 
TS7, TS7.1, 
TS7.2, TS7.3 
THR12, 13 - 
Inferring and 
linking 
location, 
identities, 
events   
TF12 Potentiall
y critical 
Related to trust  
V28 Insufficient user or device 
credibility check 
TS3, TS9 THR15 - 
Inappropriate 
release of 
information to 
adversaries 
TF2, TF3, 
TF7, TF8, 
TF10 
Potentiall
y critical 
V29 Insufficient check on the 
trustworthiness of the 
service by the user device 
TS3, TS9 THR15 - 
Inappropriate 
release of 
information to 
adversaries 
TF2, TF3, 
TF7, TF8, 
TF10 
critical 
V30 Trust-lists on different 
devices are not 
synchronised 
TS3, TS9 THR15 - 
Inappropriate 
release of 
information to 
adversaries 
TF2, TF3, 
TF7, TF8, 
TF10 
critical 
V31 The device doesn’t have a 
black list of untrustable 
services, devices  
TS3, TS9 THR15 - 
Inappropriate 
release of 
information to 
adversaries 
TF2, TF3, 
TF7, TF8, 
TF10 
critical 
Table 16: Vulnerability profiles 
 
Step 7 - Risk Analysis and Management  
A standard qualitative risk analysis based on impact and likelihood is used to assign risk levels to each threat.  
The impact of the threat is an assessment of the consequences of a successful attack, and is based on factors such 
as the amount and importance of the compromised information, and the economic cost of the attack and of any 
recovery actions required from it.  
The likelihood of the threat is an assessment of the probability of a successful attack, or equivalently the 
frequency with which successful attacks based on this threat are expected to occur. This assessment is based on 
several factors including the type, skill level and motivation of attackers, the ease of mounting the attack, 
availability and cost of any special equipment required, the existence and number of vulnerabilities that may make 
successful attacks easier, and the likelihood and consequences of the attacker being caught. The impact and 
likelihood are combined using Table 17 to obtain the overall risk level of the threat [3]. In Table 17 and the 
remainder of this document, the following key is used for impact, likelihood and risk levels: 
 
Impact  
L=Low M=Medium H=High
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L L L M 
M L M H 
L
ik
el
ih
oo
d
 
H M H H 
Table 17: Calculating risk level from impact and likelihood 
 
The risk level will be used in the following paragraphs in order to decide whether any security requirements, or 
countermeasures, are required to counter the threat. Generally speaking, threats with a low risk can either be 
ignored or only require minimal protection against. Threats with a medium risk need to be addressed to a 
reasonable degree of thoroughness, but direct and indirect costs of the security requirements should not be 
excessive. Threats with a high risk need to be thoroughly addressed with strong security requirements. 
Threats to communication links 
Threats to Confidentiality 
Very sensitive data are exchanged in a healthcare scenario: patients’ information as ID, EPR and location are 
transmitted on the communication link as well as medical staff’s information (IDs that might be related to their 
functions and rights, location and physiological data).  
All in all, in this scenario threats to communications links can be considered as the most dangerous ones as an 
important property as confidentiality might be easily violated with simple and quite cheap equipments. Besides, 
the attacker does not need to be an expert hacker to be able to perform it.  
 
 
Wireless Hospital Residential Health Monitoring 
Night Shift 
Assistant 
Backup Shift 
Assistant 
Acute 
Patient 
Monitoring 
Continuous 
Care 
Emergency 
Coordination Threats 
Im Li Ri Im Li Ri Im Li Ri Im Li Ri Im Li Ri 
Eavesdropping H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H 
Masquerade/ 
Impersonation 
H M H H M H H M H H M H H M H 
Node compromise H M H H M H H M H H M H H M H 
Table 18: Threats to confidentiality in Pervasive Health Care scenarios 
 
Threats to Integrity 
Integrity loss is another major threat in medical care applications that might lead to serious damages to the users’ 
safety if the attack is successful. The impact in all the medical application space and for all the threats has to be 
considered high, as in case of success, attacks will lead to data corruption that can turn into wrong requests and 
then wrong operations thus likely affecting users’ vital functions.  
The likelihood is considered to be medium for all the mentioned scenarios and all the threats, as these threats are 
slightly more difficult to be performed; corruption of data in this scenario is not the first aim of an attacker. The 
combination of these likelihood and impact leads to have a high risk associated to all the use cases.  
 
Threat Wireless Hospital Residential Health Monitoring Emergency 
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Night Shift 
Assistant 
Backup 
Shift 
Assistant 
Acute 
Patient 
Monitoring 
Continuous 
Care 
Coordination 
Im Li Ri Im Li Ri Im Li Ri Im Li Ri Im Li Ri 
Man-in-the-middle  H M H H M H H M H H M H H M H 
Masquerade/ 
Impersonation 
H M H H M H H M H H M H H M H 
Node compromise H M H H M H H M M H M M H M H 
Table 19: Threats to integrity in Pervasive Health Care scenarios 
Threats to reprogramming 
The aim of reprogramming attacks in the pervasive heath care application space would be either to disrupt 
communications so that the network services would appear unreliable or to gain access to sensitive information 
collected for patients and/or medical or emergency staff. Since the services offered to the end-users are considered 
critical, it is likely that reprogramming attacks would aim to modify data or to inject false data into the network. In 
most of the use cases the impact of reprogramming attacks would be medium or high.  
 
Wireless Hospital 
Residential Health 
Monitoring 
Night Shift 
Assistant 
Backup Shift 
Assistant 
Acute 
Patient 
Monitoring 
Continuous 
Care 
Emergency 
Coordination Threat 
Im Li Ri Im Li Ri Im Li Ri Im Li Ri Im Li Ri 
Man-in-the-middle H M H H M H M L L M L L H M H 
Masquerade/ 
Impersonation of sender in 
communications 
H M H H M H M L L M L L H M H 
Node compromise H L M H L M H L M H L M H L M 
Masquerade/Impersonation 
of WSN manager 
H M H H M H M L L M L L H M H 
Masquerade/Impersonation 
of code originator 
H M H H M H M L L M L L H M H 
Table 20: Threats to reprogramming in Pervasive Health Care scenarios 
 
 
Step 8 – Mitigation Plan  
After the presented very detailed analysis of the threats and vulnerabilities of the system, this section is now 
concluded with discussing a mitigation plan. This mitigation plan is a set of countermeasures that might mitigate 
the threats identified.  
Proposing countermeasures for all identified threats for WSNs in medical related scenarios gives a big number of 
security, privacy and trust establishment protocols and algorithms. Many of the current existing solutions 
presented in Section 2.3.4 could be considered. However, in many of the cases these solutions do not give the full 
protection, have themselves some weaknesses and may not be very suitable for resource-restricted nodes. It is 
because of this consideration that the presented below mitigation plan with protocols and algorithms which is 
considered suitable for WSNs and for the applications in question. The mitigation plan is based on the discussed 
system, security, privacy and trust requirements for the reference scenario. Since one of the major distinctive 
characteristics of the work proposed with this PhD thesis is allowing for flexibility in the security and privacy 
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protection, in the mitigation plan different options for countermeasures are presented which might be used in 
different combinations, depending on the exact system set-up, sensor node parameters, user requirements, etc. 
Exactly what combinations of mechanisms and algorithms could be used to ensure flexibility, will be discussed 
later in this thesis, in Section 5.1.   
The implementation of all the proposed above countermeasures is, in most of the cases, impractical due to 
limitation of budget, cost, time and resources. Additionally, the goal in this PhD report is to provide measures to a 
set of very specific objectives, defined in the beginning in Section 3.2.1. So, to focus the proposed mitigation plan 
to reply to the security, privacy and user-friendliness objectives, a set of countermeasures in the form of adaptive, 
context-aware security and privacy framework for WSNs in pervasive HealthCare applications are proposed. This 
proposed generic framework is designed in such a way to answer all the listed in this section requirements. Since 
till now the research community has published some partial solutions to countermeasure, some of the discussed 
threats and a complete solution is out of the scope of this report.  
 
In the next sections the focus is on the following identified threats:  
- Violate information privacy, i.e. any disclosure of personal data or information directly related to the 
individual using a medical service or application without the user’s prior approval or knowledge.  
- Violate confidentiality of the communication, i.e. any disclosure of personal data or information to 
non-trusted parties. 
- Violate context privacy, i.e. any disclosure of identifiable information related to the context in which 
the user is using the medical service and from which indirect information for the user could be extracted.  
 
The following Table 21 presents the proposed mitigation plan.  
 
Threats and Vulnerabilities Preventive approaches Specific Mitigation Options 
Violation of Security Aspects 
THR9 - Masquerade/ Impersonation 
THR10 – Node compromise  
THR15 - Inappropriate release of 
information to adversaries  
 
 
Authentication mechanisms 
Fejl! Henvisningskilde 
ikke fundet. 
Authentication based on the identities 
claimed by nodes or use of symmetric 
network and group keys 
Pairwise authentication using 
symmetric link keys and μTESLA for 
source authentication 
Authentication through Elliptic Curve 
digital signatures 
THR8 – Eavesdropping  
THR12 – Inferring events, identities, 
location 
THR13 – Linking events, identities, 
location 
Encryption mechanisms Optional Encryption 
RC5 (CTR mode) 32 bits block length, 
6 rounds & 24-bit key 
RC5 (CTR mode) 32 bits block length, 
12 rounds & 40-bit key 
Asymmetric encryption 
THR6 - Inject False Message 
THR7 – Man-in-the-middle 
THR11 – Add, delete, modify 
aggregated data  
Integrity protection 
mechanisms Fejl! 
Henvisningskilde ikke 
fundet. 
Optional integrity protection  
0/32 bit integrity 
32/64 bit integrity 
64/128 bit integrity 
THR23 – Communication of old 
messages 
THR24 – Replay message 
THR26 – Incorrect timing of events  
Mechanisms to ensure 
Freshness Fejl! 
Henvisningskilde ikke 
fundet. 
Optional freshness 
Relative freshness through message 
sequence numbers 
Strong freshness through timestamps 
Violation of Privacy Aspects 
THR14 - Unauthorised access to data  
THR16 - Infer privacy data for the user 
from context information 
Controlled information 
disclosure Fejl! 
Henvisningskilde ikke 
fundet. 
policy – based  
role – based 
THR20 - Reveal node/user’s identity  Mechanisms to ensure node 
anonymity Fejl! 
Henvisningskilde ikke 
fundet. 
pseudonym creation schemes 
group formation to increase the silence 
periods  
capability-based privacy-preserving 
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scheme 
THR14 - Unauthorised access to data  
THR15 - Inappropriate release of 
information to non-trusted parties  
Mechanisms for controlled 
data access; including 
hierarchical and multi-party 
access control [24] 
hierarchical team-based access control  
secure multi-party access control 
THR18 - Track subject’s current 
location 
THR19 - Track subject’s movements  
Mechanisms to ensure 
location anonymity Fejl! 
Henvisningskilde ikke 
fundet. 
data cloaking 
mix-zones 
mix-contexts  
Table 21: Mitigation plan 
 
Furthermore, some specific State-of-the Art mechanisms for context-aware controlled information disclosure and 
adaptive confidentiality will be proposed to prevent that these threats materialise. Together with the above 
presented threat analysis, threat model and mitigation plan for medical applications with WSNs and with adaptive, 
context-aware generic privacy protection framework for WSNs in medical scenarios, they are one of the main 
contributions of this PhD report. 
 
3.3.3. Summary of Section 3.3 
 
This chapter presented one of the main contributions of this thesis – namely thorough security threat and 
vulnerability analysis, leading to definition of thereat model for pervasive tele-care applications, identification of 
security risks, risk management and proposal of overall mitigation plan. First, threat analysis methodology was 
shortly presented consisting of eight main steps. These steps were followed to reach to the final stage. Initially the 
system was described in terms of scenarios and their goals, main actors in the scenarios and the confidential 
information which is exchanged during system operation. For each of the main scenarios, main technical 
functionalities of the system were listed. After that information flow diagram was used to list the security and 
privacy requirements for the use scenarios. Possible entry points to the system were identified and described 
which could be used by an adversary to initiate an attack or exploit system vulnerability. After that for each 
category of main actor, list of assets were identified and value each asset has been defined. The assets were 
mapped to High, Medium or Low values.  
The next step was to determine a list of threats for each security and privacy objective and to define threat 
scenarios, with the aim to build threat model. The threat scenarios were presented as attack tree, but for the 
simplicity sake only the first two levels of the tree were presented. The next step was to build threat profiles with 
threat ID, threat name, type, source of the threat, assets involved, entry point and threat scenario via which an 
attacker can enter the system or the network. The same approach was further used to build vulnerability profiles – 
listing vulnerability ID, name, exploited by threat scenario, fundamental threat, technical functionality and 
weakness index. Risk analysis and risk management for the major threats for the reference scenario were after that 
proposed.  
In the end of the section, overall mitigation plan for the threats for pervasive health applications was presented. 
Since a complete solution to all threats is out of scope of this report, in the next chapters solutions will be 
proposed to a subset of the identified threats. However, for the proposed privacy protection framework, for some 
of the major threats, some suitable existing mechanism will be identified in Section 5.  
 
3.4. Summary of Chapter 3 
 
In order one communication system to be protected against security, privacy and trust attacks and vulnerabilities, 
the respective requirements must be analysed and fed into a threat and vulnerability model. The goal is to draw up 
a mitigation plan to overcome these threats and vulnerabilities. Briefly speaking, this is what has been presented 
in Chapter 3. This process started with detailed analysis of the reference scenario and the use cases and with 
description of the system (who the main actors are, the devices used, the information flow, context attributes, 
etc.). Then, the exact security, privacy and trust requirements were drawn up, used as a basis for identification of 
the major security threats and vulnerabilities. The pervasive health care system was looked at different 
perspectives – from the main actors and the material and non-material assets for them, to access points which 
could be used by an attacker to enter the systems, to threat scenarios by which a threat could be materialised, and 
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in the end solutions by which these threats could be prevented. The proposed solutions are considering the trade 
off of what is possible to be done and what is realistically and economically feasible. This threat model and 
mitigation plan could be followed step by step by system designers when they build pervasive health care system 
which is security protected and protects the privacy of the groups of the end-users.   
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Chapter 4 - Presentation of Adaptive Context-Aware Privacy 
Protection Framework 
 
This chapter presents the Adaptive Context-Aware Privacy Protection (ACAPP) Framework. Initially the 
motivation for this proposal is presented. System specific requirements and privacy objectives are further 
presented. Next section describes how the ACAPP framework is integrated in the Security Manager, also 
explaining the information flow among the building blocks. After that, the proposed privacy protection 
mechanisms are presented. How the proposed concepts and mechanisms could be applied in the reference 
scenarios is explained further. This part is concluded with comparison of this proposal with existing solutions.   
 
4. Proposed Adaptive Context-Aware Privacy Protection 
Framework 
 
The main focus of this chapter is to present one of the main gravity points in this thesis – namely, the proposed 
Adaptive Context-Aware Privacy Protection Framework (ACAPP), starting with list of its key features. The main 
building blocks of the framework are described, together with how it is integrated in context-aware security 
management. The importance of the context-awareness is discussed in order to make the framework more optimal 
and suitable for the reference scenarios. In the end, it is described how the security management and context 
monitoring could be applied in practice. 
 
4.1. Motivation for proposing The Adaptive Context-
Aware Privacy Protection Framework 
 
The principal distinctive aspect of ubiquitous sensorised environments using the reference HHA is the 
heterogeneity of the various access systems that will be combined into a common, flexible and seamless platform 
to complement each other in an optimum way for different application and service requirements [1]. Ubiquitous 
sensorised environments and future mobile environments will provide a framework for adequate connectivity for 
data delivery. On top of the connectivity, open architectures and platforms for service control and delivery will 
allow a wealth of communication services and applications to be offered to users and businesses [2]. The 
integration of ubiquitous WSNs in future mobile systems could be obtained by providing a toolbox approach [3]. 
Such a toolbox approach is necessary in order to satisfy the diverse requirements from different sensor network 
applications and scenarios. 
 
At the same time, the specifics of HHA as reference network architecture raise new research issues for privacy 
and trust establishment:  
 the hybrid nature of the architecture due to interaction between different networks with different security 
and privacy services and trust establishment policies,  
 the large number of nodes in level 2 (environment) and objects in level 3 which might themselves be 
hierarchically organised,   
 the nodes in the levels 2 (environment) and 3 (objects), even though with different resource constraints, are 
still very limited in computation capabilities, and   
 the sinks in level 1(people) are mobile terminals.  
 
The security of the data and the communications (which leads to integrity) are essential requirements for the end 
applications and services to be reliable, while the protection of the privacy of the end users is essential for their 
adoption. Privacy concerns arise mainly because different types of sensor networks may be deployed for different 
purposes and will have different levels of trust. Hence, the diverse security, trust and privacy requirements of the 
applications, services and nodes impose the need for an adaptive, scalable and flexible security and privacy 
framework.  
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In the HHA, diversity comes also from the fact that the nodes from certain levels have various computational, 
memory and power capabilities and different roles in the network (for example gateway, coordinator, end-node).  
 
This calls for scalable, adaptive and general enough approaches for privacy protection and trust establishment 
in the HHA. As pointed out previously in Section 2.3, from the diverse set of security issues in the levels 1 
(people), 2 (environment), and 3 (objects) of the HHA, the ones related to security, privacy and context-
awareness are discussed in this thesis.  
 
All these essentials call for flexible, scalable and adaptable solutions, and are the motivation for proposing the 
following core properties of the security and privacy framework: 
 Flexibility and Scalability  
 Context-awareness  
 Adaptability  
 
These core properties will be discussed in more detail in the following sections. But before that, here their 
definitions are presented: 
 Flexibility and Scalability – reconfigurable framework to provide the most suitable levels of security 
and privacy functionality for different node architectures, hardware limitations, user requirements, 
and application spaces. Essentially, different versions of the framework can be deployed for the 
network components, providing varying levels of security and privacy protection functionality. 
 Context-awareness - the ability of the privacy protection framework and mechanisms to react on 
change in the context in such a way that they provide the best privacy protection for the users and 
their sensitive information while minimising the user distractions.  
 Adaptability – ensuring that the system works at the best of its capability, taking into account the 
trade-off among device constraints, change in context and different users’ preferences. Essentially, 
the security protocols and primitives that are used for each communication after the network 
deployment are selected according to the context of the communication. 
 
4.2. System specific requirements for the security and 
privacy framework 
 
In order to support the requirements of future applications that may emerge with the integration of WSNs in 
ubiquitous systems, flexible architectures are required. Such architectures, for example the e-SENSE 
architecture Fejl! Henvisningskilde ikke fundet., introduce the desired flexibility. The overall architectural 
framework must: 
 be flexible enough to allow a system to be configured for various application environments based on 
the selection of appropriate protocols and service functions 
 provide relevant infrastructure within the system to allow more efficient operation of protocols 
through cross layer interaction 
 allow the WSNs system to adapt its behaviour according to change in context 
 offer enhanced support functionality required for many applications 
 
To support the features listed in above for the overall architecture, the integrated security and privacy framework 
should comply with the following system specific requirements: 
 
 Power efficiency: one of the most important constraints in WSNs is the low power consumption 
requirements. In fact, being wireless sensor nodes limited in computational capacity, memory and power, and 
being the power sources generally irreplaceable, their lifetime is strictly related to the power consumption. 
The long life time of such networks depends crucially on the wise and frugal use of energy. Additionally, the 
support for security, privacy and trust mechanisms in general increases the communication overhead. This 
justifies the need of an adaptive and flexible security framework which aims at preserving energy. 
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 Adaptability: to ensure that the system works at its best possible, taking into account the trade-off between 
device constraints, which changes with the time, the changes of the context (e.g. service or location) and the 
different user’s preferences. Adaptive variations are needed in order that the systems continue functioning as 
programmed by the end-user as well as they meet the computational demands and power consumption. 
Essentially, the security protocols and primitives which are used for each communication after the network 
deployment are selected according to the context of the communication. 
 Flexibility and Scalability: the framework should be reconfigurable and scalable in order to provide the best 
suitable levels of security, trust and privacy functionality for different node architectures, hardware 
limitations, end-user requirements, and application spaces. Essentially, different versions of the framework to 
be deployed for the network components, providing varying levels of security functionality.  
 Profile-based: in order to make use of available context information and to allow for personalisation of the 
ubiquitous systems, descriptive profiles should be used. These profiles could be related to the nodes, the 
context, the end-user, etc… 
 Policy-based: the framework must accommodate very diverse scenarios having different requirements with 
security, privacy and trust. The goal is to help the overall system to work with minimum intervention from an 
administrator, industry expert, medical staff or end-user. Therefore, decisions must be taken based on 
beforehand agreed policies and rules.  
 Support for mobility: in most of the application spaces, different types of mobility exist. For instance, this 
might be a mobility of the entire BSN attached to a person’s body with respect to sensors in the environment 
or only a mobility of some of the sensors within BSN. Support for mobility in this discussion must be 
considered as information for node location (and from here, person location) and the change in context when 
a node moves. Mobility will influence the work of the following mechanisms:   
 Trust establishment – like mechanisms for mobile nodes to establish trust relationships when 
entering an environment with unknown nodes 
 Re-authentication – like fast and energy-efficient re-authentication mechanisms  
 Privacy protection – like different policies for disclosing sensitive information based on the 
current location of the source of the sensitive data, the location of the requesting party, type of 
requested data, etc… 
 Definition of different security levels according to the location of the nodes  
 
 Requirement for Graphical User Interface: in the pervasive healthcare, the end-user must be able to 
interact with the system via simple and intuitive GUI, in order to select and modify preferences, settings and 
rules. The parameters modified by the user might concern privacy protection mechanism (as the users might 
be able to select the most suited privacy level according to their personal preferences), security level and trust 
establishment. 
 Pre-defined settings and policies: some settings and policies must be pre-defined. This means that as soon 
as the node enters the network, according to the context information and to the information provided by the 
network administrator or the end-users themselves, default settings are assigned. These will help the system to 
operate without intervention and to adapt to the changing contexts. 
 
4.3. Privacy objectives for the selected scenarios   
 
In Section 3.3, where the threat model was described, the security and privacy objectives for the system were 
briefly presented. In the following paragraphs, privacy objectives for the reference scenario are elaborated in 
more details.  
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As outlined in [5], the success of the end-user acceptance in pervasive health scenarios depends on the provision 
of appropriate privacy mechanisms and ensuring flexibility and easiness of use in the end-user control over these 
mechanisms.  
The reference scenario was described in Section 3.1.2. Here more details from point of view of HHA are 
provided.  In a hospital, patients are equipped with BSN with a coordinator node (in level 2) measuring their 
physical status. The data collected from BSN is transmitted to the hospital database via mobile terminals carried 
by frequently passing by medical staff (nodes in level 1). The medical staffs are also equipped with BSNs to 
detect their overall status. The coordinator node (CN) in the BSN and the mobile terminals are fully functional 
nodes (FFN) while the end sensor nodes (EN) from the BSN are very limited in resources. At the same time, from 
the sensors in the environment, information for the position of the medical personnel or the patients can be 
provided. Data for the medical personnel can be sent to their colleagues on shift to perform collaborative tasks or 
in case of emergency. In home settings, information for the patient can be sent to care providers. An obvious 
concern in these scenarios is privacy in a number of aspects.  
Privacy in this discussion is broadly defined as the possibility for the user to have control over the disclosure of 
privacy sensitive information. Important question is for example “who sends what type of data to whom and when 
and who can access it”. Privacy can be violated by for example revealing sensitive information or user’s identity 
to non-trusted parties, by tracing user’s location or monitoring the history of user’s behaviour. The threats for 
privacy were discussed in more details in Section 3.3.2. 
 
The privacy of the users could be enforced by following public privacy regulations and the user’s control over the 
disclosure of all their private sensitive information. The context information is either directly related to the person 
or to objects the user can interact with or to situations or environments (Tables 3, 4). All of this data can reveal to 
a certain degree, directly or indirectly, private aspects of the user.  
 Identifying information can be used to trace a node or device and following from this, to recognise or 
identify the user (in the discussed scenario medical staff or patient) and could also contain additional 
information about the surrounding environment, the state of an object belonging to the person, or an 
object under the control of the user from which privacy attributes of the person might be inferred.  
 Personal data are those data that are directly related to the health status of a person and other personal 
information such as address, social security number, etc. Both identifying information and personal data 
are assets for the user (Table 13) and might have different privacy values to the user and hence require 
different levels of protection.  
 
Countermeasures for these threats will seek to disclose personal data only to trustworthy parties, to keep the user 
sensitive data confidential, to provide the minimum required node-, user- or context- identifiable information, to 
ensure control when private information must be revealed even to trusted parties in accordance with the user 
preferences.  
 
The privacy objectives discussed in this thesis are:  
 Maintaining information confidentiality, i.e. to prevent any disclosure or manipulation of the message 
content to any other party  
 Maintaining information privacy, i.e. to prevent any disclosure of personal data or information directly 
related to the individual to a medical service or application without the user’s prior approval or 
knowledge.  
 Maintaining context privacy, i.e. to prevent any disclosure of identifiable information related to the 
context in which the user is using the medical service and from which indirect information for the user 
could be extracted. 
 
Briefly speaking, in relation with the discussed application spaces, the privacy of a person can be ensured by:  
 For location - changing pseudonyms with different time duration and blurred location information (When 
the exact location is known, there are different methods how the information could be blurred before 
sending. Location accuracy parameter provides indications for the range of blurring.) 
 For the ID – use of a pseudonym instead of the ID of the node    
 For personal information – controlled revealing of only the minimum set of user sensitive data with 
which the current application can work (with the help of rules and profiles) and controlled data access to 
the personal information of the end-user once it is accumulated and stored somewhere else. 
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The following Table 22 gives overview of possible approaches for ensuring privacy.  
 
 
Privacy Aspects And Approaches 
controlled information 
disclosure 
 policy – based  
 role – based  
controlled data access  hierarchical team-based access control  
 secure multi-party access control  
node anonymity  pseudonym creation schemes  
 group formation to increase the silence periods  
 capability-based privacy-preserving scheme  
location anonymity  data cloaking  
 mix-zones  
 mix-contexts  
Table 22: Possible approaches for ensuring privacy 
 
As access control and controlled information disclosure are some of the major points of gravity for this PhD 
thesis, in the next paragraphs they will be briefly introduced. 
 
Access control is the ability to permit or deny the use of a particular resource by a particular entity. 
In computer security, access control includes authentication, authorisation and audit. It also includes measures 
such as physical devices, including biometric scans, digital signatures, encryption, passwords, secret keys.  
Access control models usually fall into one of two classes: those based on capabilities and those based on access 
control lists (ACLs). In a capability-based model, holding an unforgeable reference or capability to an object 
provides access to the object; access is conveyed to another party by transmitting such a capability over a secure 
channel. In an ACL-based model, a subject's access to an object depends on whether its identity is on a list 
associated with the object. 
Both capability-based and ACL-based models have mechanisms to allow access rights to be granted to all 
members of a group of subjects. 
 
Access control systems provide the essential services of identification and authentication (I&A), authorisation, 
and accountability where: 
 identification and authentication determine who can log on to a system 
 authorisation determines what a subject can do;  
 accountability identifies what a subject (or all subjects associated with a user) did.  
 
Information disclosure means the giving out of information, either voluntarily or to be in compliance with legal 
regulations or workplace rules. Controlled information disclosure is when subjects have suitable 
tools/mechanisms which give them abilities to control the release of private information they consider sensitive. 
There are several ways to achieve this. Both ways have some advantages and disadvantages and could be used in 
different scenarios and depending on the security and privacy requirements for the system.  
One way to achieve this is by pre-defining rules for: Which groups of subjects can have access to information; 
what pieces of information could be accessed by the group; what types of permissions are granted to the group or 
a single subject (read or write the content). In this way the access rights are given in advance and the end-user is 
not involved in the time of accessing the information.   
Other way for controlled information disclosure is when the end-user is directly involved in granting the requestor 
the permission to access the content every time a request for information comes. Technically this could be 
implemented by schemes for secure multi-party access control or hierarchical team-based access control. In this 
second option the end-user is really in control of who accesses what piece of data. The disadvantage is that the 
end-user is disturbed. This option could be used for very sensitive information.   
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Access control techniques are sometimes categorised as either discretionary or non-discretionary. The three most 
widely recognised models are Discretionary Access Control (DAC), Mandatory Access Control (MAC), and Role 
Based Access Control (RBAC). MAC and RBAC are both non-discretionary. 
 
4.4. Key features of the proposed adaptive security and 
privacy framework   
4.4.1. Context-awareness  
 
In this discussion, the focus is on the privacy mechanisms and the integrated context-awareness and 
personalisation. Since context and context-awareness play very important role in this proposal, here the important 
points regarding context are revisited in the following paragraph. 
 
Exploiting Context  
Entity of context could be person, place, physical or computational object that is considered relevant for the 
interaction. In this proposal, it is distinguished between identifying information and personal data, both of them 
considered as contexts.  
 Context information could be considered any information about the users, their activities, their health 
status, also coming from their BSN, their other devices, the surrounding environment. Table 4 provides 
more details on contexts in the view of the reference scenario.  
 Context attributes describe a snapshot of the current context from the status of all relevant interacting 
entities.  
 Context assessment entity - collects all low level context attributes (such as GPS coordinates, time, 
physical parameters, health parameters, service type, number of neighbouring nodes, etc) and defines 
higher level context attributes (for example location, domain, user role, presence, etc) which then are fed 
to the user’s system to take intelligent decisions based on predefined rules. More details on the context 
attributes are provided in Section 5.3.2. 
 Context-awareness in this discussion is the ability of the privacy protection mechanisms to react on 
change in the context in such a way that it provides the best privacy protection for the users and their 
sensitive information while minimising the user distractions.  
 Context-aware privacy is the application of the privacy protecting mechanisms which adjusts to the 
context of all entities and make decisions accordingly.  
 
For the sake of this discussion, context information is divided into context attributes linked with the users’ side 
and their devices, called internal context attributes (ICA), and context attributes provided by external entities, for 
example location service and application, called external context attributes (ECA). ICA contain attributes for the 
user’s device - CPU usage, battery power, free memory (which according to [7] should also be a subject to access 
control), communications media and also context directly connected with the users themselves like a current 
health status provided by BSN. ECA are all attributes provided from external parties - the location, the service, the 
application, etc...  
For the ECA, the user’s system should receive trusted information for location and context from the external 
services. The question for the trustworthiness of the location and context information is another very important 
and challenging issue which is out of the scope of this thesis. Threats coming from context were described in 
Section 3.3.2. Trusted location and context information should be used by the users’ devices to assist users in their 
interaction and making intelligent decisions, preferably acting on user’s behalf based on predefined scenario 
settings and preferences. Based on information provided by the surrounding WSNs from the environments, the 
user has to be informed with the help of their devices that they are in the area of a certain service of interest to the 
users. For example location-based service could be at the reception in the entrance of a hospital – the pervasive 
system automatically registered the user to the receptions and notifies the doctor with whom he/she has 
appointment. Going further, in more sophisticated systems, trusted location and context information should be 
used to predict users’ needs and offer them appropriate available services based on patterns of their behaviour.  
 
4.4.2. Policy-and Profile-based Management 
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For ensuring minimum intervention of the end-user and systems flexibility for the diverse nodes in HHA, the 
context attributes are analysed with the help of predefined policies. Subject of the policies and rules are low-level 
context attributes and these rules are defined as low-level rules. The rules concerning high-level contexts are 
defined as high-level rules. Context-reasoning supports definition of high-level rules using high-level context 
information from the current context and low-level rules (for example coordinates into a meaningful for the end-
user and for the system location). In this way, the context-aware system is “aware” of the current system state. 
This further is stored as current status of the system, the user and the environment. The system automatically 
defines Scenario based on primer context parameters: the current location and role of the end-user (as a source of 
USD – User Sensitive Data) and the role and location of the requesting party (the node with which trust 
relationship must be established). The decisions are taken as dependent on current scenario. A more complex 
Rule Agent implemented on a FFN may consider perhaps up to a hundred of rules applicable to a current scenario. 
 
4.4.3. Default settings  
 
In their everyday life, the users have different roles and usually have certain places where these roles are 
applicable. For example, they are employee at the office, family member at home, trainee at the fitness center, 
patient at the hospital. In this proposal certain scenarios are defined based on most frequent everyday situations. 
One of the functionality of the privacy protection framework is to protect user’s privacy based on these roles, 
without the need of user’s intervention all the time. This could be obtained by introducing default settings in the 
system. Appropriate templates could help the user to set up these default settings. Assigning privacy flags (PF) for 
filtering all pieces of the sensitive information helps the autonomous behaviour of the users and their devices. PFs 
indicate how the user wants this data to be handled and revealed by the privacy protection mechanism. The PFs 
presented in Section 5.2.2 are also the tool to give the control in the hands of the user. The default disclosure of 
the user’s sensitive information is “never disclose” (pessimistic approach). 
In this proposal, the sensitive user data is grouped by domains and could have different level of granularity and a 
hierarchical structure. The highest level is defined as “data abstractions”. In some cases, request comes only for 
the highest level of granularity. Therefore, there are templates also for the data abstractions based on different 
domains and for the low-level of granularity of the user sensitive information. For example the template for data 
abstraction “Address” is a container for the parts of the address (Figure 20). The user only needs to change, if 
necessary, the default value of the PF for each of these data and data abstractions.  
Templates for scenarios are also provided 
The user is able to change and update all the information in the user profiles and to create new roles. The 
scenarios can be changed too and new scenarios created.  
 
4.4.4. Scalability and Flexibility of the framework  
 
Definitions for flexibility and scalability were presented in Section 4.1. 
To provide them, both the framework as a whole but also its main components must support these features. 
Specifically for the privacy framework, the privacy protection mechanisms must be scalable – that means that the 
respective modules of the framework must be also scalable (i.e. having extended, scaled-down and lightest 
versions) and must “fit” in all types of nodes and the system must handle them without e.g. the processing burden 
exceeds the resources.  
In the following paragraph scalability and flexibility are further defined for the three aspects of privacy on which 
the focus of the proposal is: 
 
For the information and context privacy 
Scalability of the context-aware privacy protection is defined as a set of maximum number of context attributes 
and rules which can be processed by a node belonging to a certain resource class:  
 Maximum number of different context attributes directly related to the health status of the user and the 
surrounding environment which are included in the conditions for the policy-based privacy protections  
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 Maximum number of different Low and High level rules, necessary for building up the reasoning to support 
the privacy protection of the users’ medical data and their lifestyle and any other necessary information, 
defined as sensitive by the users themselves 
 
Different number of rules are applied for diverse nodes (gateway, coordinator, end node) based on their 
capabilities. Scalability is also ensured from the possibility to select this version of the privacy protection 
framework which best corresponds to the role of the node in the network and its capabilities as explained in 
Section 4.6.1.  
 
Flexibility is defined in terms of: 
 The rules, policies and profiles support the work of both health professionals and health care subjects  
 Provision of personalized control for different levels of privacy protection  
 
For the information confidentiality 
Flexibility is defined in terms of: 
 Different values of the parameters of the algorithms providing confidentiality  
These will be explained in details in Section 5.1. 
 
Overall, the security and privacy protection framework ensures that the properties of flexibility, scalability, 
adaptivity and context-awareness are satisfied both in the overall framework and in each component.  
 
4.5. Privacy Protection Framework as part of The 
Adaptive Security Framework 
 
Privacy protection mechanisms for Hybrid Hierarchical WSNs have been discussed in [8]. Preventing 
unauthorised access is coupled with privacy policies that define who may receive and use what type of data and 
for what purposes. The provided personal sensitive information must comply with general privacy policies based 
on legislation on one hand and rules set-up by the individual on other hand. The end-users themselves can have 
the option to define which of the context information about them they feel to be sensitive. Hence, controlled 
information and information filtering before disclosure, is necessary. 
The protocol stack for level 2 (environment) HHA nodes could be divided into four logical subsystems - 
connectivity, middleware, management, and application, designed to facilitate cross-layer optimisation. Each 
subsystem comprises various protocol entities, which offer services at various access points to other subsystems, 
and can be combined in a number of ways to configure the protocol stack according to the sensor node’s role and 
application requirements. the Application Subsystem, hosting one or several sensor applications, the Middleware 
Subsystem, providing data transfer services for the transport of the application data packets, the Connectivity 
Subsystem, consisting of functions required for operating the physical layer, the medium access control, and the 
network and transport layer, and the Management Subsystem, responsible for the configuration and initialisation 
of the stack. The proposed security framework is implemented by a cross layer Security Manager, positioned in 
the Management Subsystem of the flexible protocol stack [10], depicted in Figure 11. The Security Manager is 
cross-layer and context-aware, given that context information is made available from other network entities from 
the context layer, such as for example location entity, and from the application subsystem. Its main components 
are Profile and Rules Agent; Security, Privacy Agent, Trust Agents, Entity with Privacy and Trust Mechanism and 
a Small Data Store. To satisfy the flexibility property, as mentioned in Section 4.4.4, a toolbox approach is taken 
for the Security Manager, which is designed to be configurable regarding the modules that it contains. For privacy 
protection, Profile and Rules Agent, Privacy Agent, Privacy Safeguard mechanisms and the Small Data Store 
interact as shown on Figure 12. The flexible security protocol for ensuring confidentiality is situated in the 
Connectivity subsystem.  
Since part of the context information could be considered sensitive for the users, they have the option to indicate 
with the help of the Privacy Flags (PF) how this data will be treated. It must be noted however, that the users must 
be also informed in advance which types of personal data and node identifiers can be used for identification as 
well, depending on the available context information. The users must be aware for the need of a trade off because 
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the smart systems and the context-aware applications, in order to function properly, need some sensitive 
information which must be revealed by the users following the minimisation approach.  
 
 
Figure 11: Generic Adaptive Security Framework within the FLEXIBLE PROTOCOL stack– Scaled-
down and Extended Versions 
 
 
4.6. Building blocks of the Security Manager  
 
The Protocols and Mechanisms component is the most fundamental, since it is the one required for all types of 
nodes in the network. It contains the security primitives necessary to implement several security protocols in a 
way that is transparent to the layers above it in the protocol stack. The adaptivity of the security mechanisms is 
ensured by the Security Agent, responsible for determining the most suitable security mechanisms and protocols 
for every message exchange. Decisions on the cooperation of nodes are based on their trust status, provided by the 
Trust Agent, while the Trust Establishment Mechanisms block is responsible for determining the trust status for 
unknown nodes. The Context Monitoring Algorithm and the Context Assessment Entity have the goal to monitor 
very important context parameters from the network, from its own systems itself in order to detect if the system is 
in danger. In case of a security risk, the Security Manager takes appropriate actions as defined in the table with 
countermeasures. The Privacy Agent is responsible for determining if and in what form data should be disclosed, 
and for invoking the Privacy Safeguard Mechanisms, which interfere with the data by filtering it before any 
disclosure, by allowing or forbidding it, or by pseudonymising it. The Privacy and Trust Assistant is an 
application support component, existing only in user-related full-function nodes (for example a smart phone or 
PDA) and provides the interface between the user and the device for the configuration of data privacy policies and 
trust relationships. 
The Profiles and Rules Agent interfaces with the Security, Privacy and Trust Agents for the exchange of security, 
privacy and trust definitions respectively. The Profiles and Rules Agent sends requests to the Small Data Store to 
get or modify (if required) the Security Level, Trust Level, and profile information that are stored in the respective 
lists entities. The context information that can lead to reconfigurations comes from Service and Node Discovery, 
Location and Positioning and the Applications. 
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Within the protocol stack implemented in any end-sensor node, cluster head or gateway, the Security Manager 
interfaces with various layers. The Security Agent interfaces with the connectivity layers for the configuration of 
the Protocols and Mechanisms component. The Trust Agent interfaces with the connectivity layers for the 
exchange of security protocol messages with peer nodes, and for the establishment of trust relationships. The 
Security Manager also offers its services to other layers of the protocol stack. Security requirements can come 
from the application layer. Privacy policies and trust relationships could be obtained directly from the user with 
the help of the Privacy and Trust Assistant. 
 
The extended version of the security framework applies to the coordinator and gateway nodes as well as to simple 
nodes without very harsh memory, battery and computational constraints (Figure 11). The scaled-down version 
residing in a sensor node from the BSN, because of the very limited power, memory and computational 
capabilities, only performs a specific security mechanism as requested by the Security Manager in the handheld 
device. In addition to the components that might be omitted, others allow for lighter versions to be deployed, in 
order to provide only a subset of the services defined. Nodes might be equipped with a subset of the mechanisms 
defined, depending on their computational capabilities, their role in the network and their communication needs. 
In Figure 11, the two versions presented (scaled-down and full) are not strict regarding their components, since 
some components are customisable. Since the components are themselves customisable, this essentially enables 
many more than two versions to be deployed (i.e. additional intermediate versions). More details for these 
versions of the framework are presented in the next Section. 
 
In the following paragraph, the main communication flow among the building blocks is briefly described and 
depicted on Figure 12. 
The SERV-QUERY(parameters) is a request, sent by the Profiles and Rules Agent to the Service List, regarding 
service. The Profiles and Rules Agent can request, with this same primitive but using different parameters, either 
just getting the Security Level or changing the Security Level associated to the service. SERV-UPD is the 
response to the SERV-QUERY. It can carry either the Security Level information or just the notification that the 
Security Level has been changed. 
The TRUST-QUERY(parameters) primitive is a request, sent by the Profiles and Rules Agent to the Access 
List/Trust List. Similar to the SERV-QUERY (parameters), the Profiles and Rules Agent can request either 
getting the Trust Level or changing the Trust Level associated to the node ID. TRUST-UPD is the response to the 
TRUST-QUERY. It can carry either the Trust Level information or the notification that the Trust Level has been 
changed in the Access List/ Trust List. 
The PROF-QUERY(parameters) is issued towards the Profile List. The Profile List provides the profile for the 
corresponding node/user through the PROF-UPD primitive. 
The primitive SEC-LEVEL-INDICATION sends to the Security Agent all the information that the Profiles and 
Rules Agent gets from the List and the Rule Module and is relevant to determine the Security Level.  
The primitive SEC-LEVEL sends the Security Level for the corresponding node/user to the Security Protocol 
entity.  
The primitive PRIV-INDICATION allows the exchange of privacy information between the Privacy Agent and 
the Profiles and Rules Agent. 
The primitive PRIV-PRESRV sends the privacy (and pseudonym) information to the Privacy Protection 
Mechanism entity. 
NODE-TRUST-INDICATION primitive allows the exchange of trust information between the Trust Agent and 
Profiles and Rules Agent.  
The primitive TRUST-EST sends the trust information to the Trust Establishment Mechanisms. 
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Figure 12: Main communication flow – interaction among the building blocks 
 
Further in this report all the building blocks of this Security and Privacy Framework will be discussed in more or 
less details, except the Trust Agent and Trust Establishment Mechanisms, which are out of the scope of this work.  
 
4.6.1. Ensuring Adaptability and Flexibility in the 
Security Management Framework 
 
Adaptability is supported by the proposed security framework in several ways.  
 Firstly, with the help of the Security Agent, Security Levels are assigned for each communication (Table 
23), which determines the security mechanisms that are applied, according to its security needs. For 
example, in the use case for continuous home care, where a BSN is attached to the patient’s body and 
communicates data via a handheld device which acts as a gateway, the Low Security Level could be 
assigned when the patients are at home and the High level when they are in public places.  
 Secondly, adaptability is supported by the representation and establishment of various trust relationships 
between communicating parties by the Trust Agent.  
 Finally, the Privacy Agent is responsible for determining if data should be disclosed, and if it should be 
provided anonymously according to the data sensitivity and according to the scenario and application 
requirements. Privacy level flags indicate how the user wants the data in question to be handled and 
revealed by the Privacy Agent.  
 
The definition of Security, Tryst and Privacy levels are presented in Table 23 Fejl! Henvisningskilde ikke 
fundet.. 
 
Parameters How Adaptability and Flexibility is Ensured  
Low – provides non-privileged services and allows exchange of non-
sensitive data 
Medium – provides limited protection, even if the data exchanged within 
the WSN is not necessarily sensitive 
Security Levels 
High – provides privileged access to service and/or exchange of highly 
sensitive data. 
Unknown – devices that enter the network and request access to some 
service for the first time 
Trust Status 
Untrusted – devices that are not allowed to access the network for any 
reason even if they have previously been granted access 
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Trusted – devices that have previously established a trust relationship and 
already share a trust key with the WSN 
“Always give” – give data without asking the user for confirmation 
“Check with the Profile Agent” – check device profile for exception list 
and priority rules from Rules Agent before giving the data 
“Ask the user” – ask the user before handling sensitive data 
Privacy Level 
Flags 
“Never give” – never disclose the sensitive data 
Table 23: Ensuring Adaptability and Flexibility 
 
As described in the Section 4.6.1, flexibility is ensured by enabling the role, capabilities and security needs of each 
node in the network to define the subset of Security Manager components which reside in the node. Below is 
explained what is meant by different versions of the Security Manager.  
 
Extended version of the proposed framework: The main components described below refer to fully functional 
node (FFN) and a gateway node. Security Manager consists in this case of the Profiles and Rules Agent, the 
Security Agent, the Privacy Agent, the Trust Agent, the Protocols and Mechanisms, the table with the 
countermeasures and the small Data Store, which are positioned in different logical parts of the flexible 
architecture.  
 
Scaled-down version: The Security Manager as depicted in Figure 11 contains the superset of the building blocks 
that a node may be equipped with. It is assumed that the Security Manager will operate as described in nodes that 
have enough computational capabilities, are cluster heads or gateways and can be subjects to regular maintenance. 
According to the role (node/cluster head/gateway, strictly defined long-term role/highly mobile) and constraints of 
each node in the network, it may be equipped with a scaled-down version of the Security Manager. If the 
reference scenario is taken as an example, the extended version of the security framework resides in the handheld 
user device, while the end sensor nodes from the BSN have the scaled-down version. The Security Manager 
residing in the handheld is responsible for defining the level of security and trust services for the communications 
with the BSN on one side and with external networks on the other side. It also gives the end-user possibility to set 
up rules for disclosing sensitive information to other networks and different requesting parties and for 
anonymisation of data. The scaled-down version residing in a sensor node from the BSN, because of the very 
limited power, memory and computational capabilities, only performs a specific security mechanism as requested 
by the security mechanism in the handheld device.  
 
Lighter version: Except from the components that might be omitted, the other ones allow for lighter versions to be 
deployed, in order to provide only a subset of the services defined. The Security Protocols and Mechanisms 
component may support only a subset of the security levels. For highly constrained nodes with strictly defined 
role, one security level may suffice for its communications with the cluster head. Moreover, the Trust 
Establishment Mechanisms are required for nodes that, during the network lifecycle and without reconfiguration, 
will need to communicate with nodes different from those they were initially configured to trust. Nodes might be 
equipped with a subset of the mechanisms defined, depending on their computational capabilities, their role in the 
network and their communication needs. 
 
The components that might be omitted or might provide only a subset of the services described are: 
 The Security Protocols may support only a subset of the security levels. For highly constrained nodes 
with strictly defined role, one security level may suffice for its communications with the cluster head.  
 A more simple information flow will be defined for within the Security Agent for nodes that are 
configured to support only one security level. 
 The Privacy Protection Mechanisms are required only for nodes that act as communication points with 
service providers and gather personal or corporate sensitive information. 
 The Privacy Agent may be omitted for nodes which according to their role do not require privacy 
protection or anonymity 
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 The Trust Establishment Mechanisms are required for nodes that, during the network lifecycle and 
without reconfiguration, will need to communicate with nodes other than those they were initially 
configured to trust. Nodes might also be equipped with a subset of the mechanisms defined. 
 The Trust Data Store may include only an access list together with an indication on the other nodes 
supported security levels. The more sophisticated version of the trust database is required for nodes that 
have highly diverse communication needs. 
 The Graphical User Interface (GUI) is optional. It will only exist in devices that can support it, are related 
to a human user and may require reconfigurations. 
 
4.7. The importance of context-awareness  
 
Having in mind the different reference scenarios and the application of BSN in them, the security and privacy 
framework presented above is valid for any kind of environment. However some modifications might be done in 
order to optimise the system.  
If the patient is in a public place, it is not surprising that in this scenario the system will face major interference 
problems; therefore authentication and encryption are two vital requirements, as described in Section 3.2.  
On the other hand, if the patient is at home or in the office, there is no need for such robust mechanisms, the 
energy consumption of the sensors could be reduced by choosing lighter encryption techniques and protocols. 
In order to introduce this automatic adaptability, two important types of context are required: the recognizing of 
location and the detection/recognizing of current profile. They are important because it is needed tools to obtain 
data from the surrounding environment to determine if the users (and respectively the BSN) are in a trusted or non 
trusted environment and if they are alone or not. Then, based on this context information, Security Manager is 
able to choose the best security and privacy level for the network. 
However, location and current profile is not the only context information used by the system. Other types of 
contexts are necessary. They are presented in the following paragraphs.  
 
The context model in this report represents three classes of real world objects (person, location, node) and 2 
classes of conceptual objects that characterise pervasive healthcare contextual environment (scenario – current 
user role, requesting party identity and their locations; event – for the health status of a person - normal, pre-
emergency, emergency).  
Low-level context attributes (LLCA) is basic contextual information which is directly measured by sensors, as in 
[5] – raw context data obtained from various sources, in heterogeneous formats (in this discussion readings from 
the body sensors, coordinates, physical parameters of the environment). From them, information for the user’s 
state and the surroundings can be deduced (for example meaningful location, user role), forming high-level 
context attributes (HLCA).  
The Context assessment entity collects all low-level context attributes and defines high-level context attributes and 
this allows the ACAPP framework to take intelligent decisions based on predefined rules.  
The Context assessment entity notifies the Profile and Rules Agent to update all relevant context attributes in the 
context profile when they are changed. ICA is updated within the user’s device and ECA are updated each time 
when they are provided from external entities. Some relevant examples of association of LLCA with HLCA 
mentioned in Section 3.1 are provided in Table 24.  
 
 Low Level Context Attributes  Higher Level Context Attributes  
Person  
(the end-user) 
Exact location, physical parameters 
measured from BSN 
User role, location of source, mood, 
Scenario, direction, speed 
Selected Service Domain, time period for communication, 
Exact Location, time stamp, Requesting 
party identity, service provider 
destination role, location of destination, 
Scenario, trustworthiness 
Environment Exact location, number of neighbouring 
nodes, communication medium, distance 
from other nodes 
Presence, anonymity level, transmitting 
power 
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User’s device time stamp, battery level, CPU usage, 
memory usage, IP address, bandwidth 
Device mode (sleep/wake), transmitting 
power 
Node  battery level, processor usage, memory 
usage 
Device mode (sleep/wake), transmitting 
power 
Scenario  Source ID, Source location, destination ID, 
destination location 
User Role at certain location 
Location Physical coordinates  Meaningful location for the user – home, 
office, hospital, gym 
Measurements 
from end-sensor 
nodes 
Oxygen, heart rate, glucose Events for health status – normal, pre-
emergency, emergency  
Table 24: Context Attributes 
 
4.8. Applying Security Management and Context 
Monitoring 
One of the contributions presented in this PhD thesis is the adaptability feature of the security and privacy 
framework, including the need to have a mechanism to change levels of some of the security and privacy 
parameters according to the location of WSN and to the interaction with the surrounding environment. Having this 
in mind, the Security Manager comes into play as a cross-layer entity in the flexible protocol stack (Section 4.6). 
The Security Manager with different versions of it, suitable for variety of types of nodes (end-sensor, aggregator, 
coordinator node). In order to function properly, The Security Manager needs to “monitor” the change in the 
context as explained previously in Section 4.6.1. This is done with a dedicated algorithm, called Context 
Monitoring Algorithm (CMA) which is another contirbution of this thesis. In the following paragraphs the 
responsabilities of CMA are described. 
The Security Manager tackles all security and privacy issues regarding the WSNs behaviour. One of its tasks is to 
analyse the network’s activities w.r.t. security and this is performded with CMA. CMA is responsible to track and 
analyse the network’s status, anomalies and context information. According to the data provided by this 
algorithm, the Security Manager is able to determine a corresponding reaction to maintain the network’s integrity 
and functionalities by changing if necessary the security level. 
 
The following Figure 13 shows the reactions of the Security Manager, if security attacks took place:  
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Figure 13: Trade off among security protection and performance (Detection – Reaction in the BSN) 
 
In technical terms, one of the tasks of CMA is to broadcast requests and analyses traffic. The broadcast requests 
are mainly used to request the sensor nodes’ batteries status. The traffic analyses is vital to determine if the nodes 
are working properly and if the system is under attack. In order to achieve these goals an initial estimation of the 
number of messages that the aggregator should receive in a period of time, should be done. However, to perform 
this task correctly, the Security Manager needs to know from the beginning how many sensors the network has 
and what their characteristics (freshness and update) are. The information is provided to the Security Manager by 
the CMA. 
Another important task of CMA is to track the baterry status of the end-sensor nodes in the whole BSN and 
according to the remaining battery level, to take approprite actions.  
 
In the following paragraphs some of the most important procedures performed by the Security Manager are 
explained:  
 
Procedure against security attack: 
In the BSN, the detection of possible attack is managed by the CMA, running by the Security Manager. To detect 
an attack, the CMA needs to know the typical attacks and how they affect the network. When an attack is 
identified, the Security Manager looks into the table of countermeasures. In case of a determined attack it may 
order the network, via the coordinator node, to accomplish a specific technique to increase the level of security 
(like example strong authentication or encryption). Actually, it is the coordinator node that puts in action the 
orders of the Security Manager towards the end-sensor nodes. The sensor nodes change then their security level. 
More details for these procedures are provided in Section 5.5.  
 
Procedure against low battery: 
The tracking of the battery level is done by the Context Monitoring Algorithm via the Security Manager in the 
BSN. If the battery power drops to a certain level, via the GUI (The Privacy and Trust Assistant) the user is 
directly informed for the level and which procedure is launched. For example, the Security Manager can 
determine if the data is saved on a mobile device and if this back-up device continues to manage the network.  
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The countermeasures initiated by the Security Manager in reply to different threats and risks, are presented in the 
following Table 25: 
 
SECURITY MANAGER 
 Readings 
Warnings Actions Level of security 
Batteries status 
Three warnings: 
below 40% 
below 20% 
below 10% 
(critical warning) 
Display the warning in the 
mobile device 
Below 20% the 
level of security 
may be decreased 
to save energy 
below the 
expected – report 
sensor 
malfunction 
Find which sensor is not 
working properly, display 
it on the mobile device and 
send the information to the 
user’s hospital database 
No changes 
Compare the 
number of 
estimated 
messages received 
during a 
determined period 
of time (1 minute) 
above expected – 
intrusion detected 
The keys are 
compromised! Revoke the 
keys. Ask for ID and Pre-
distributed key, change 
new keys 
Increase the level 
of security (if 
possible) 
Scan for specific 
attack 
CRC errors - 
possible jamming 
or interference 
Increase frequency 
hopping or change channel 
on the affected node(s) 
No changes 
Aggregator being 
overflowed with 
data - DoS 
Revoke all keys, reboot 
system (takes at least 8 sec. 
times the number of sensor 
nodes) 
Increase the level 
of security (if 
possible) 
Node sending 
more data than 
expected – Node 
compromised 
Revoke its key, report to 
the user (display) and 
hospital database 
Increase the level 
of security (if 
possible) 
Context 
Monitoring 
Algorithm  
Scan for specific 
attack 
Eavesdrop Impossible to detect 
because there is no change 
in the network’s behaviour 
No changes 
Table 25: Security Manager and Context Monitoring Algorithm 
 
The following Figure 14 depicts the functionality of CMA [9]. 
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Figure 14: The functionality of the Context Monitoring Algorithm 
 
 
4.9. Summary of Chapter 4 
 
This Chapter 4 presented the motivation for proposing the context-aware privacy protection mechanisms 
integrated within security management framework. Its distinctive features are flexibility and scalability, context-
awareness and adaptability. The major part of its components is placed in the management subsystem and some 
other parts in the connectivity and the application subsystem.  
The system requirements are for power efficiency, adaptability, flexibility and scalability, profile-based, policy-
based, need to support mobility, need for GUI and predefined settings and policies.  
The privacy objectives which are to be preserved by the proposal in this PhD report are maintaining information 
confidentiality, information privacy and context privacy. 
The main components of the security framework are the block for protocols and mechanisms, the security, privacy 
and Trust, Profiles and Rules Agent and the small data store. Context information is provided to the Security 
Manager by other entities of the management subsystem forming the context assessment entity. Important role for 
enhancing the functionality of the systems is the context-awareness. The component responsible for it is the 
context monitoring algorithm which monitors the battery status and scans for specific attacks. In case some 
anomalies are detected, it takes appropriate actions based on a table with countermeasures.  
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Interaction among the main building blocks and the main communication flow is further presented.  
To ensure adaptability and flexibility, different security levels, trust status and privacy level flags were introduced. 
Extended, scaled-down and lighter versions of the overall security framework were defined for different classes 
and roles of sensor nodes.  
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Chapter 5 - Proposed Privacy Protection Mechanisms and 
their applicability 
 
In this chapter another main contribution of this thesis is presented in details – namely, the proposed privacy 
protection mechanisms. First, a shot review of existing mechanisms is made and their suitability for WSNs 
discussed. Then, the proposed security protocol suit for adaptive confidentiality is described. Second, the context-
aware mechanism for controlled information disclosure is presented. Since the access control is based on profiles 
and rules, other important blocks of the framework are then described in details – the Profile and Rules Agent, 
with the defined profiles of user, context, application, scenario. It is also discussed how scalability and power-
efficiency is ensured. In the end, the applicability of the proposed mechanisms to the reference scenario for 
outdoor, home and hospital locations was exemplified and the mechanisms were compared with some existing 
solutions.   
 
5. Proposed Privacy Protection Mechanisms and their 
applicability  
 
To remind, the ACAPP Framework aims to ensure information confidentiality, information privacy and context 
privacy, as presented in Section 3.2.1. All these aspects of privacy protection are guaranteed using different 
mechanisms. Which is the most appropriate mechanism to be applied? – It depends on the Privacy Agent. These 
mechanisms will be described further in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.  
In the Mitigation Plan presented as the final stage from the threat analysis, countermeasures for the most 
dangerous security attacks were presented (Table 21). However, here in the beginning of this section definitions of 
some of the security primitives which will be later discussed are briefly presented: 
 
Authentication: 
The broadcast nature of the transmission medium makes information more vulnerable than in wired applications. 
Thus, security mechanisms such as encryption and authentication are essential to protect information transfers. 
Authentication and Access Control process have 2 different sides: initial entity authentication (creating security 
associations) and authentication for sessions (which is based on keys, established during initial authentication).  
Access control procedures heavily depend on an initial entity authentication phase in which a node entering the 
network has to set up some keying material with its neighbours that will be used to enforce cryptography and a 
data authentication at link layer. These keys can be obtained in different ways based on the entity authentication 
phase. Initial authentication between a sensor and a network often requires that the administrator participates and 
introduces sensors to each others. For instance, administrators may utilise a centralised server (by typing a sensor 
specific password to the server) or authenticate sensors in distributed manner (the administrator may keep sensors 
close each other in order to change keys using short range radio e.g. Near Field Technology). Different initial 
authentication schemes are more trustworthy than others. 
 
Encryption: 
This is the procedure that guarantees secrecy of the data exchanged. Any encryption algorithm depends on some 
key, and keys are normally generated during authentication phase, so the two phases are strictly connected. 
Few encryption algorithms are suitable for sensor networks with harsh resource constraints. According to the 
comparison performed in [1], TEA is the most perfect encryption algorithm to minimize memory footprint and 
maximize speed;  
SEAL is a very fast stream cipher optimized for machines with a 32-bit word size and plenty of RAM. Although 
encryption process is relative faster than RC5, the key setup process of SEAL requires several kilobytes of RAM 
space and rather intensive computation.  
RC4 is widely used in many applications, under certain circumstances it has been proven to be insecure [2], but 
whenever correctly deployed it is used in robust protocols such as TLS or TKIP (into IEEE 802.11i). 
 
Integrity: 
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In information security, integrity means that data cannot be modified without authorisation.  
Integrity, together with confidentiality and availability is one of the core principles of information security, also 
known as CIA Triad.  
 
Availability 
For any information system to serve its purpose, the information must be available when it is needed. This means 
that the computing systems used to store and process the information, the security controls used to protect it, and 
the communication channels used to access it must be functioning correctly. 
 
Data integrity is a term used in computer science and telecommunications that can mean ensuring data is "whole" 
or complete, the condition in which data are identically maintained during any operation (such as transfer, storage 
or retrieval), the preservation of data for their intended use. Generally speaking, data integrity is the assurance that 
data is consistent and correct. 
Often such integrity is ensured by use of a number referred to as a Message Integrity Code (MIC) or Message 
Authentication Code (MAC). 
In plain words, integrity can be compromised through: 
 Malicious altering, such as an attacker altering content  
 Accidental altering, such as a transmission error, or a hard disk crash  
 
An attacker can perform a wide variety of attacks aimed to alter data exchanged over insecure networks. These 
have been discussed in Section 3.3. Again, countermeasures are based on the use of some form of secure integrity 
code based on shared keys generated during network access. 
5.1. Algorithms for ensuring confidentiality and their 
suitability  
 
The focus in this subsection is to discuss existing algorithms for confidentiality and authentication from the 
perspective of their suitability for WSNs and for the selected reference scenarios and how they could be enhanced 
with context-awareness and flexibility features in order to be applied in the ACAPP framework.  
 
5.1.1. Confidentiality 
 
Confidentiality has been defined by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) as "ensuring that 
information is accessible only to those authorised to have access". In other words, confidentiality is the property 
of preventing disclosure of information to unauthorised individuals or systems.  
 
Confidentiality is ensured with Encryption and Authentication Algorithms. First the discussion will be about RC5 
and AES algorithms and then The Diffie-Hellman Algorithm (DHA) and The Elliptical Curve Cryptography 
(ECC) will be discussed. 
Discussion on the RC5 and AES Algorithms 
 
Strength 
The RC5 algorithm is recognised by the cryptographic community to be a secure algorithm. The only way to 
break a secure algorithm is to try every possible key on a sequence of encrypted data, known as the brute force 
attack. As the length of the key increases, the number of possible keys increases exponentially. For example, a 56-
bits key as 256 possible keys, and if it is assumed that a computer can compute a million key per second, it will 
take approximately 2,258 years to a single attacker to find the correct key. A 64-bits key will take the same 
attacker more than 585,000 years [3].  
The AES encryption process, based on the Rijndael algorithm is currently the most secure algorithm 
implemented. In addition to its incredible strength, it is light enough to be implemented in smart card located in 
3G mobile phones and PDA. As a comparison with the RC5 described above, if a computer would be able to solve 
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a 56-bits key encrypted data with RC5 algorithm in 1 sec, it would need 149,000 billions of years to find the 
correct key… 
 
Variable Parameters 
The RC5 has the particularity to be modulated according to the user wishes to improve the security or the 
performance. In this way several parameters could be set. The conventional notation for any RC5 algorithm is 
RC5-w/r/b where: 
 w is the word size in bits. It represents the length of the data blocks of plaintext and ciphertext 
treated. The most common size is 32 bits, but 16 and 64 bits are also available. RC5 encrypts two-
word blocks, which means that plaintext and ciphertext are 2w-bits long each.    
 r is the number of rounds. The tolerable values are 0 to 255 rounds. The expanded key table S 
contains t = 2(r+1) words.    
 b is the length of the secret key K in bytes. The number of bytes of the key could be chosen between 
0 and 255. As shown in the previous paragraph, a 56-bit key is more than enough to guarantee 
sufficient security in this particular case. 
 
However, the assumption is that the shorter the lengths are and the smaller the number of rounds is, the weaker 
the algorithm is.  
 
The AES algorithm is based on variable key lengths which are 128, 192 and 256 bits used to encrypt 128-bits 
blocks of data. The Rijndael algorithm allowed more data blocks sizes that were not adopted in the AES standard. 
As it can be seen, even if the AES algorithm is much more secure than the RC5, it remains less flexible for the 
security and privacy objectives defined in this report.  
 
Algorithms 
The RC5 algorithm is divided into three parts: 
 A key expansion algorithm, used to create additional keys from the main key. 
 An encryption algorithm 
 A decryption algorithm 
 
The encryption process is based on only three basic operations:  additions, exclusive-or (XOR), and rotation.  
 
The AES algorithm is a more complex. Every 128-bits data blocks are divided in 4 blocks. 
To these blocks, 4 operations are made: 
 A byte substitution. Each byte is replaced by a different, thanks to a S-Box (a table of substitution). 
 A shift in rows. In each rows of the small blocks, bytes are shifted by 0, 1, 2 or 3 places.  
 A mixing in columns. Each column vectors of 4 bytes are multiplied by a 4x4 matrix. 
 A XOR addition with a sub-key. The sub-keys are defined by a key expansion algorithm, as for the 
RC5. 
 
These four operations are duplicated as many times as the number of rounds the algorithm is defined, except for 
the last round, where the mixing in column step is avoided. 
 
Advantages of the AES algorithm 
AES is currently the most secured algorithm implemented. Its robustness would allow it to go through years 
without being solved, at least for a couple of years. It is quite easy to implement on any type of hardware and 
software since it only uses simple operations.  
 
Disadvantages of the AES algorithm 
The strength of this algorithm is its substitution table. It gives it a higher level of security than the RC5 for 
example. However, one of the constraints in sensor motes is the memory size, and it is not possible to add such a 
table (which should be dynamic) in the motes. Moreover, the encryption process, although simple, would use 
resources and consume batteries faster than the RC5.  
 
Short discussion 
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The conclusion is that for the proposed system, comaprisn AES with RC5, even the 64-bits RC5 algorithm, 
despite of the fact that is breakable, seems to be much more secure than the privacy levels to be reached. 
Moreover, the RC5 algorithm allows much more customisation than the AES algorithm.  
Thus, the use of the RC5 algorithm is considered a good compromise between security, adaptability and 
performance.     
 
Proposed Adaptive Confidentiality  
The proposed ACAPP framework is adaptive w.r.t. its building blocks and w.r.t the algortums and mechanisms, 
which in their turn have possibility to be flexible.  
In the following subsection one of the security algorithms which is enhanced with flexibility is described – 
namely the proposed mechanism by which adaptive confidentiality is ensured in ACAPP. 
Adaptive Parameters for RC5 
The assumptions 
The RC5-32/12/8 (64-bits key) algorithm has been solved by a group of volunteers which has joined the power of 
more than 40,000 2Ghz computers for a period of 1,757 days to find the correct key[33]. From this sum of 
operations, some assumptions are defined to find some suitable parameters to take into account in the adaptive 
security system.  
The simulations were performed considering the parameters of MICA2dot sensor nodes, that have 8-bits / 4Mhz 
processors. This implies that: 
 To solve the same problem (RC5-32/12/8) with a single node, it would take more than 140 
billions of days. 
 If the number of rounds was divided by 2, the computational time was also divided by 2, but it was 
kept a sufficient level of encryption. Estimated time to solve the key: 70 billions of days. 
 If the length of the block of plaintext was changed, it would affect neither the security nor the 
processing time, so this paramewter would not be changed. 
 If the length of the key was reduced, the computational time would be divided by 2 for each bit 
removed. It would only remove 8 bits per 8 bits and it would give the following results : 
 
o 70 billions / 28 = 273 millions of days for a 56-bit key 
o 70 billions / 216 = 1 million of days for a 48-bits key 
o 70 billions / 224 = 4,172 days for a 40-bits key 
o 70 billions / 232 = 16 days for a 32-bits key 
o 70 billions / 240 = 1,5 hours for a 24-bits key 
 
In an ideal case, a single sensor node could be able to solve a RC5-32/6/3, in only 1,5 hours. However, it would 
imply that: 
 The sensor node would have compute at the maximum of its capabilities during all this time, and 
may be out of batteries before finding the right key. 
 The assumption is that the sensor node would be able to do such a computation. 
 The assumption is that there is not any new key exchange between the nodes and the aggregator. 
 
Definition of the different levels of confidentiality 
In the following paragraph the line of thought when defining the confidentiality levels is present. 
 
For trusted environment, which is considered to be the home environment, as defined in Section 4.6.1, the security 
requirements are lower, thus leading to less computations. This lower level of security is sufficient to provide 
satisfactory performance and higher batteries lifetime. In such a scenario, a MICA2dot sensor node of the network 
could be able to process its encryption algorithm in less than 0,35 ms, according to the simulation results.  
Thus, the consideration is that the RC5-32/6/3 algorithm is suitable for the trusted environments. 
Starting from this point, the encryption process by modifying the two parameters is increased (number of rounds 
and key length) to define the medium and high levels of security, to be applied in a contolled and public 
environments respectively. In this way, the length of the key is set to 40 bits, which would require a computational 
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effort of 2 days to a computer, if the number of round is still fixed at 6. This is defined as the medium level of 
security, which would be used in a hospital scenario. 
To define the high level of security, the number of rounds is modified from the medium level of security from 6 to 
12, which should double the computational process to solve the key (approximately 4 days). However, if these 
parameters seem to have some easy breakpoints, the key exchange process is taken into account, which occurs at a 
frequency higher than daily.    
 
The different levels of confidentiality with their RC5 parameters are summarised in the following table:  
 
Confidentiality Levels Block Length  Number of rounds Key length 
Low 32 bits 6 24 bits 
Medium 32 bits 6 40 bits 
High 32 bits 12 40 bits 
Table 26: RC5 parameters providing different levels of confidentiality 
 
5.1.2. Algorithms for authorisation and their 
suitability  
 
Broadly speaking, authorisation determines what a subject can do on the system. When a subject is authorised to 
perform an action for a system, it is usually the case that the subject has the permission to “read” (R) or “write” 
(W). Read could be to read content; Write could be to change content.  
 
In this section The Diffie-Hellman Algorithm (DHA) and The Elliptical Curve Cryptography (ECC) are 
discussed.  
The Diffie-Hellman Algorithm 
This algorithm is used for the authentication process that consists of the keys exchange. The particularity of this 
algorithm is that both nodes own a secret number that is never revealed in the network. Both combined, this two 
numbers provide the encryption key that is exactly the same for the two nodes, that is the reason it is called the 
symmetric key. The following example depicts the concept:  
Node A and Node B want to exchange vital information that no one would be able to intercept and decrypt. They 
first have to generate an encryption key.  
 
The Algorithm 
 First, they will define two numbers p & g.  
o p is a large prime number (> 512 bits) 
o g is called the “base” or “generator” 
 
 Second, they will both define their own secret number. 
o Node A choose a 
o Node B choose b 
 
 Third, they will compute their public number. 
o Node A will compute x = ga mod p 
o Node B will compute y = gb mod p 
 
 Fourth, they will exchange their public number.  
o Node A knows p, g, a, x, y 
o Node B knows p, g, b, x, y 
 
 Fifth, they will compute the encryption key. 
o Node A will compute ka = y
a mod p = (gb mod p)a mod p  
  =  gba mod p 
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o Node B will compute kb = x
b mod p = (ga mod p)b mod p 
  = gab mod p 
 
The encryption key is ka = kb = k.   
 
Possible attacks 
It is assumed now that adversary C wants to decrypt information sent by both Node A and Node B. Then he has to 
listen to the network to get ga and gb since they are emitted in a public medium. In this case, it is supposed that 
adversary A also knows the value of g. However, to find the values a and b he will have to compute a discrete 
logarithm of ga and gb which is currently impossible with big values of p. 
An alternative is called “man in the middle” attack. In this case, Adversary C will be between Node A and Node 
B. He will get the value ga from Node A and send the value ga’ to Node B. In the same manner, he will get the 
value gb from Node B and send the value gb’ to Node A. Node A and Node B will both think they have the same 
encryption key whereas Node A will have gab’ and Node B ga’b. Thus, Adversary C will be able to decrypt all the 
messages that come from both sides.  
 
Possible Counter-Measures   
To avoid this kind of attack, two solutions are possible:  
 The signature of the exchanged values with the use of a couple of asymmetric keys certified by a 
trusted third party. 
 The exchange of the values x and y in Station-to-Station protocol. 
 
The Elliptical Curve Cryptography (ECC) 
 
Unfortunately the Diffie-Hellman procedure, just by itself, requires some processor and memory resources which 
for a normal computer are insignificant but for a sensor node the case is very different. The problem sensor nodes 
have to face is the computation of heavy exponential mathematical expressions as shown in section 5.4.1.3. 
Therefore in the proposed framework the use of Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman as the best suitable authentication 
procedure for WSN to be used. With the use of elliptic curves there is no longer need to work with heavy 
exponential equations. Instead the work is with the well known elliptical curve equation in a (x, y) Cartesian 
coordinate system. 
 
The elliptical curve equations 
Applied to real numbers for simplicity, they are defined by the following formula: 
 
baxxy  32Equation (1) 
 
Where a and b are real numbers. 
 
The property of the elliptical curves is the non singularity of the curve, which means that the curve never crosses 
itself. Moreover, if two points P and Q on the curve are taken, a third point R could be defined that correspond to 
P+Q, which could be represented as the third intersection point of the curve when a line is drawn that goes 
through P and Q.  
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Figure 15: An elliptical curve representation [4] 
 
From the points P(x1,y1) and Q(x2,y2), it is possible to find the coordinates of the point R with the following 
formulas [5]:  
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Application to the cryptography 
The main operation in elliptical curve cryptographic schemes is point multiplication. This operation presents the 
most desired properties in cryptography, i.e. the forward operation is quite simple but its inverse is very difficult. 
The main characteristics of Diffie-Hellman still persist in this method.  
Point multiplication is done by calculating Q=kP, where k is an integer and P is a point on the elliptic curve 
defined in the prime field. Scalar multiplication is performed through a combination of point additions and point 
doublings, e.g. . Each curve has a specially designated point G, called the base point, chosen 
such that a large fraction of the elliptic curve points are multiples of it.  
PPP  ))2(2(29
The elliptical curve equation has been implemented in the Diffie-Hellman algorithm for higher robustness against 
attackers. In the previous example, instead of choosing p and g, Node A and Node B would have made their 
choice on an elliptical curve equation and a point P on the curve. Node A and Node B both choose a real value ka 
and kb, and send the product with P to the other party. Node B will get kaP from Node A, which will get kbP in 
return. 
Both nodes can compute ka(kbP) = kb (kaP) = kakbP which is a point on the curve and the encryption key. Once 
again, to break the encryption key, the attacker will have to solve the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem 
(ECDLP), i.e. to find k given P and Q=kP. This calculation is computationally intractable for large values of k. 
 
So far the best known attack against ECC is called the Pollard’s rho attack [6]. Pollard’s rho attack belongs to the 
class of collision search attacks, which achieve better performance than brute force attacks. However, as the field 
size increases, it has been proven that Pollard’s rho attack gets more difficult as 
2
)( 2/1n
 where n represents 
the group size, which is exponential to the key size.  
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Therefore the conclusion is that for big group sizes this attack will take a long time to break ECC. Since the 
best known algorithm to attack ECC runs more slowly than the best known algorithm to attack other 
cryptosystems, ECC can offer equivalent security with smaller key sizes.  
 
As an example a 160-bit ECC key provides the same level of security as a 1024-bit RSA key [7]. This is the main 
reason why ECC is so attractive for small devices with lower energy and processing capabilities.  
 
5.1.3. Proposed Security Protocol Suite: Combining 
RC5 and Elliptic Curve -Diffie-Hellman  
 
In order to provide flexibility and adaptivity feature for confidentiality and authorisation algorithm, suitabale for 
small devices with very limited energy and computationals capabilites such as sensor nodes and the neccesary 
level of security, the posibility of combining RC5 and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman will be investigated in order 
to propose suitable for the discussed systems secrty protocol suite.  
 
As described before, RC5 is not sufficient to provide us a high level of security, therefore the Elliptic Curve 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol is added to sthrengthen the weeknesses.  
 
The applicability of this protocol to WSN is expalined below:  
Since the available channel for the sensors to communicate with the aggregator may be eavesdropped by a third 
party, there is the need to use the proposed protocol siute. In order for the two parties (end node sensors on one 
side and aggregators or coordinators on other side) to obtain their keys, some domain parameters have to be 
agreed upon. In this case (p,a,b,G,n,h) should be exchanged between them. Therefore they can compute the same 
key K.  
Through this process another problem arises. How it is sure that the aggregator/sensor is communicating with the 
right sensor/aggregator? Is should not be forgetten that although the sensor’s range is limited, in some situations 
the aggregator may capture incoming signals from sensors which are not part of the network. This situation might 
easily occur if someone seats next to a person and they both have BSNs. 
To investigate this possible scenario, the following solution is proposed: Instead of using the key K obtained by 
the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman, an extra operation is performed that will create a K’ which will use the sensor 
node’s ID. Since the sensor node’s ID should never be sent without being encrypted because it could be eavesdrop 
and then easily cloned, the recommendation is that after obtaining the key K both the sensor and the aggregator 
should perform an XOR operation between the key K and the node’s ID. In order for this procedure to work 
properly the aggregator has to know all the sensors IDs but that was already assumed before. However since the 
aggregator does not know with which sensor it is communicating, in the worst case it may have to do this XOR 
operation the same number of times as the number of sensors. According to the simulation results, this process 
wastes energy and some latency problems might occur, therefore there was the need to come up with a more time 
efficient solution. Since the goal of BSN in the medical scenario is to treat the vital information first, the use of 
flags after the encrypted messages is studied. 
 
The idea of adding a vital informaiton flag (VIF) does not compromise the required security level. Below it is 
explained how VIF works:   
Two numbers are defined. The first number is on a single bit, defined as 1 for vital information and 0 for non-vital 
information. 
The second number is on a byte: from 0 to N, where N represent the number of the end-sensor node, defined when 
the BSN is designed. Both information would be stored in the end -ensor nodes and the aggregator. 
 
 
Vital / Non-Vital parameter Number of the node Encryption Key Information registred in… 
0 0000 0001 Key 1 Node 1 , aggregator 
1 0000 0010 Key 2 Node 2 , aggregator 
1 0000 0011 Key 3 Node 3 , aggregator 
0 0000 0100 Key 4 Node 4 , aggregator 
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Table 27: Information about vital/non-vital node 
 
Then, both numbers could be integrated in the frame before the encrypted message: 
 
Authentication Numbers Encrypted Message 
0 0000 0001 0010 1010 1101 0101 0110 0010 0111 0001 0001 …  
Table 28: Example of encrypted message 
 
Discussion 
If an attacker gets the frame, he would be able to read the numbers, but it couldn’t use them to decrypt the 
message as they are fully independent from the encryption algorithm. Once the aggregator receives the message, it 
directly knows which node it comes from and can decrypt it with the right key. With this solution latency is no 
longer a problem because priority messages could be identified and also the aggregator only has to find the right 
key in its table, which is a process very fast and doesn’t consume much energy. One problem with this solution is 
eavesdropping, since the flags and the number of the node are not encrypted, the adversary may have access to 
this information. Therefore he is able to determine from which sensor a certain message came from. However the 
adversary cannot easily identify the kind of sensor (if it is the heart rate sensor or the breathing rate sensor, etc). 
Therefore he cannot predetermine the content of the message. 
 
5.1.4. Summary of Section 5.1  
 
In this section it was discussed how confidentiality with flexibility feature could be achieved. Two algorithms 
have been analysed – RC5 and AES. Even if the AES algorithm is more secure than the RC5, it remains less 
flexible for the security and privacy objectives defined in this report. Moreover, the encryption process with AES, 
although simple, would use resources and consume batteries faster than the RC5. Therefore, RC5 was selected 
and on Table 5 it was shown how, via a combination of its parameters, different levels of confidentiality were 
defined.  
Another part of the confidentiality is the authorisation process. The suitability of The Diffie-Hellman Algorithm 
(DHA) and Elliptical Curve Cryptography (ECC) for authentication was discussed in this section.  
Unfortunately the Diffie-Hellman procedure, just by itself, is quite haeavy for the resourse contsrained sensor 
nodes. This is bacuase of the heavy exponential mathematical expressions. To avoud this resosurce consuming 
process, in the proposed framework the use of Elliptic Curve-Diffie-Hellman is taken as a more suitable 
authentication procedure for WSN based on the elliptical curve equation in a (x, y) Cartesian coordinate system.  
Taking into account all the presented in the above paragraphs, it is concluded that the proposed security protocol 
suit (RC5 combined with the Elliptic Curve - Diffie-Hellman) will ensure the privacy which is needed for the 
reference scenario even in the lowest security level with the goal of energy savings and extended battery lifetime. 
The results from the evaluation of the proposed security protocol suit will be presented in Section 6.3. 
 
5.2. The Proposed Context-Aware Mechanism for 
Controlled Information Disclosure  
 
In the pervasive health-care scenarios, personal data is being accumulated and communicated, which raises 
privacy concerns, as explained in Section 1.3. Apart from that, some other node or communication identifiers 
might be used by an attacker to infer additional information (location, identity) which can intrude the privacy of 
the sender (Section 3.3.2).  
In this section the focus of the discussion is on how enhancing controlled information disclosure with context-
awareness could better protect the privacy of the end-user in pervasive telehealth and telecare systems with 
WSNs.  
 
5.2.1. Exchange of privacy primitives 
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A request for user data triggers a series of actions in the Security Manager. This request is processed from the 
application subsystem, via the management subsystem, to the connectivity subsystems of the sender and receiver’s 
side. Figure 16 shows how the privacy primitives are exchanged within these subsystems. Upon receiving the 
request for a privacy service from the application subsystem APMA–PRIVACY.req, the management subsystem 
defines the necessary privacy indications and requests with MACO–PRIVACY.req to provide them for the current 
transmission. Confirmations to the management and applications subsystems are sent back with MACO–
PRIVACY.cnf and APMA–PRIVACY.cnf. 
 
Management Subsystem Connectivity SubsystemApplication Subsystem Management SubsystemConnectivity Subsystem
MACO-PRIVACY.req
MACO-PRIVACY.ind
MACO-PRIVACY.cnf
APMA-PRIVACY.req
APMA-PRIVACY.cnf
Transmission
maco_privacy()
Sender Side Receiver Side
 
Figure 16: How the privacy primitives are exchanged 
 
5.2.2. Block for privacy protection mechanisms 
 
The access to the data is filtered through the Privacy Safeguard which is part of the privacy protection 
mechanisms. The privacy safeguard mechanism shown on Figure 17 is responsible for taking decisions 
concerning controlled information disclosure for data subject to control, with the help of assigned privacy flags.  
In the following paragraphs, the proposed context-aware mechanism for controlled information disclosure is 
explained. It is called Privacy Safeguard (PS). Its main purpose is to filter privacy information (user-sensitive, 
context and any other node identifiable information) when a request for information comes.  
 
Every personal data for the end-user or confidential corporate data, subject to policy for controlled information 
disclosure, it is supposed to have its own privacy flag that can be set up in the process of the default setup or later 
by the user or by the network administrator prior to any usage (with the help of the privacy and trust assistant – 
via GUI). The privacy flag implements the policy of how this particular piece of sensitive data must be treated 
before disclosing [8]. 
 
The main service offered by the Privacy Safeguard Mechanism is getFilteredSourceData: returns the allowed user 
sensitive data according to the privacy flag. The query is processed according to this rule: if the flag is “Always”, 
the expected data value is returned; if it is “Never”, and empty value is returned, if it is “Ask”, the user is 
explicitly asked whether the query can be processed. If it is “Check the profile”, the policy for data disclosure is 
checked for the user profile. This is depicted in the following Figure 17.  
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Figure 17: Privacy Safeguard Mechanism [8] 
 
5.2.3. Anonymity  
 
For the privacy protection process to be complete, another important aspect must be mentioned – ensuring 
anonymity, also the types of mechanisms used to create the pseudonyms.  
Anonymity mechanisms can ensure that users may use a resource or a service without being distinguished from 
other users and without disclosing their identities to third parties. Anonymity is defined as “the state of not being 
identifiable within a set of subjects”, referred to as the anonymity set [9]. With respect to acting entities, the 
anonymity set consists of the subjects who might cause an action. With respect to addressees (subjects being 
addressed), the anonymity set consists of the subjects who might be addressed. To enable anonymity of a subject, 
there always has to be an appropriate set of subjects with potentially the same attributes. It is thus a requirement 
for anonymity mechanisms to be context-aware. 
As long as the users are anonymous, they could disclose any personal data, such as the location, that can be 
considered as essential in future ubiquitous sensor networks. Considering a user’s location as personal data, as 
long as no identifying information is attached to the location, i.e., the user is anonymous, the privacy of the user is 
protected. As in many network settings the use of identifiers is integral part and often necessary for correct 
operation of most applications, the goal is to make these identifiers temporary and change them to prevent the 
collection of too many information about a node that – in the long run – will help identifying it. In addition, 
changing identifiers in the right situation helps to break the connection to any identifying information that – 
purposefully or not – have been provided to the peer. Like this, the user can maintain control of the information 
that can be associated to her.   
In order for anonymity to be achieved, the data communicated in the sensor network needs either to be 
depersonalised or pseudonymised with respect to the identity of the sender, in cases that a legitimate network 
service requires user identification. Pseudonymity is the use of pseudonyms instead of ID [10]. Pseudonyms with 
different scopes and duration can be used for each communication, from node pseudonyms to transaction 
pseudonyms, for achieving different levels of long-term unlinkability. In general, anonymity is stronger the more 
often and independently the pseudonyms are selected. But this has of course its costs - in some approaches for 
achieving anonymity, this requires additional communication and computation efforts. 
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In addition, the potential impact of the pseudonym change is also important. Situations that allow a direct 
mapping of the pseudonym to the node, for example by restricted space identification may require a pseudonym 
change shortly before and after this situation, in order to limit the amount of available information about the traces 
for the identified user. Following this, an important question which is investigated in the literature is for the trade-
off between how often the pseudonyms are changed and the achieved anonymity level on one side, and the 
application requirements on the other side. Having in mind the resource constrained sensor nodes and the cost to 
compute a new pseudonym, in comparison with the standard approach when the pseudonyms are changed 
periodically. It is of importance the suitable moment when a pseudonym must be changed. Thus the node must 
have mechanism to evaluate the current context in order to decide when the most suitable time to change the 
pseudonym is, in order to avoid energy waste. For this purpose, a Pseudonym Manager could be introduced in 
ACAPP to create or change pseudonyms, as shown on Figure 18. The mechanism itself by which pseudonyms are 
created and by which the life-time of the pseudonyms are defined, could be part of the block of the Privacy 
Mechanisms. However, proposal of mechanism for improving anonymity is out of the scope of this PhD thesis. 
More information for anonymity mechanisms can be found in [11].  
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Component Model of Privacy Protection Framework  
 
5.2.4. Interaction among the entities 
 
The Profile Agent handles profiles of the user, of the context, of the application, and of the situation. To 
define the current user role, the context is taken into account. Scenarios are also defined - for the most 
common situations of the user’s daily life based on information for the role and location of the user and role 
and location of the party requesting the sensitive user data. This was presented in Table 24 (HLCA). The 
small Data store holds user profiles descriptions of important preferences and characteristics; role categories; 
security, privacy and trust policies, priority rules, the access rights and different policies. It gives the user 
personalisation options of having a number of profiles based on different roles - employee, parent, patient, 
etc. In each of the profiles, security and privacy preferences of the user are defined. The Adaptive Privacy 
Protection block takes the context, the situation, the anonymity level, trust level, and privacy preferences as 
input to decide how to protect the privacy of the user. The PS filters with privacy flags all the private and 
personal data from being disclosed to any outside party without prior approval or knowledge of the user. 
Rules for revealing private information and access policies are handled by the Rule Agent. Figure 19 presents 
the interaction flow for controlled information disclosure when a request for user data comes. 
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Figure 19: Interaction flow for controlled information disclosure [11] 
 
5.2.5. Data Abstractions 
 
To decrease the delay introduced by the context-aware privacy protection, all sensitive data, aimed at being 
communicated, can be grouped into data abstractions. In this case, the filtering is done on the level of the data 
abstractions. For deeper level of granularity, each data abstraction consists of more detailed sensitive data. Each 
data abstraction and data has its own PF which can be set up (default setup) prior to any usage. Figure 20 gives a 
brief overview of the data abstractions for a patient in the reference hospital scenario. Data abstractions are 
introduced with the aim of reducing the power cost and the response time in the communications which do not 
require protection of low granularity sensitive data. 
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Figure 20: Data abstractions [8] 
 
5.2.6. Summary of Section 5.2 
 
In this section it was shown how the privacy primitives are exchanged among the application, management and 
connectivity subsystems among the sender and the receiver. Then, the main blocks of the privacy protection were 
presented with the respective services. The mechanism ensuring personalisation and flexibly in the controlled 
access is the Privacy Safeguard with a number of options for filtering of the data - “Always”, “Never”, explicitly 
“Ask” the user and “Check the user profile”. Filtering of the data depends on the data granularity. However, to 
achieve faster filtering, data abstractions for thematic groups of personal data have been proposed. This could be 
used when the request for data is with less granularity.  
If anonymity provision is one of the scenario and user requirements, Pseudonym Manager Block could be 
introduced, which handles the creation of pseudonyms and defines the exact moment to change them.  
 
5.3. Profile and Rules Agent  
 
As described in the previous section, the filtering of the user data before any disclosure is based on pre-defined 
user roles and rules for revealing information, for actions to be taken in case of emergency, etc. 
The approach taken in this work for controlled information disclosure is a mix between the role- and policy-based. 
Therefore, the Profile and Rules Agent plays a major role in the privacy protection framework. 
The Profile and Rules Agent has several sub-modules: Profiles for objects (devices, persons and their roles), 
Profile of Context, Application/Service Profile and Scenario Profile.  
The profiles are described in the Profiles and Rules Agent in xml format; each field of the user profile has its own 
privacy flag which, by default, is set up to “Never” but it can be changed by the user in any moment via GUI. The 
user data which privacy flag is different from “Always” are considered sensitive. Each profile has a template that 
basically is an empty profile.  
The actions that can be taken by the Profile and Rules Agent are loading data from the Data Store, updating and 
deleting the whole profiles as well as only part of the profile. 
 
The most important services that the Profile and Rules Agent provides are:  
getCurrentRole(), getCurrentLocation(), getCurrentContextAttributes(), 
getCurrentApplicationTypeParameters(). 
 
5.3.1. User Profiles 
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In the User Profile there is information defined for user roles and corresponding location of the requesting party 
based on the most common daily activities.  
 
For more advanced users or the network administrator, it is possible to load a profile template, save a profile as a 
new user, update own user profile or delete it with the help of the Privacy and Trust Assistant (via GUI). These 
actions are respectively taken up through the commands LoadUserProfileTemplate(), saveNewUserProfile(), 
updateUserProfile(), deleteUserProfile() 
 
Each field of user data has its own SET and GET set of actions which are listed below:   
 getUserID, setUserID, getUserIDFlag, setUserIDFlag, getFirstName, setFirstName, 
getLastName, setLastName. 
 
The PF management interface is used to setup and update the PFs.  
 getXPrivacyFlag: gets the PF of user sensitive data from the user profile. In this case X is the policy 
protected data  
 setXPrivacyFlags: sets the PF for a certain user sensitive data X. 
 
In particular for the reference scenarios described in Section 3.1.2, the user (e.g. the patient) can request to see his 
vital functions information, while, in case the users are doctors, they might request to know the vital functions of 
the patients as well as location information through the following service queries: getData, setData, getDataFlag, 
setDataFlag, getVitalFunctions, getLocationInformation, and so on. 
 
The system is also able to define the current role of the person-based context information for the current GPS 
coordinates or relative indoor location and then map it to a meaningful location for the person using the following 
set of services: setXRole, getXRole, getXRoleFlag, setXRoleFlag. Examples of descriptive roles for the reference 
scenario are: patient, family member, friend, doctor, nurse. There are also services to get and set PFs for 
controlled information disclosure regarding the current role. 
The core user roles with the corresponding locations implemented are UserAtHome(Parent, home), 
UserAtWork(Employee, office), UserAtHospital(Patient, Hospital), UserInCar(Driver, Car), 
UserHobby(GolfPlayer, GolfClub). 
An important question is how exactly the system defines which the current user profile is, after considering the 
current parameters of some context attributes. This is presented in Table 29. 
 
 
GPS interval Source_Location  Source_Role, Probability 
((x1,y1), (x2,y2)) Location_Name Role_Name, P 
((xhm1,yhm1), 
(xhm2,yhm2)) 
Home User, 1; Parent, 0.9; Spouse, 0.8; Child, 0.5; 
Patient, 0.5; Employee, 0.3; Friend, 0.3 
((xof1,yof1), 
(xof2,yof2)) 
Office User, 1; Parent, 0.7; Spouse, 0.8; Child, 0.1; 
Patient, 0.2; Employee, 0.9; Friend, 0.2 
((xhs1,yhs1), 
(xhs2,yhs2)) 
Hospital User, 1; Parent, 0.7; Spouse, 0.8; Child, 0.2; 
Patient, 0.9; Employee, 0.1; Friend, 0.1 
 Public (out of 
other locations)  
User, 1; Parent, 0.7; Spouse, 0.8; Child, 0.4 
Patient, 0.2; Employee, 0.1; Friend, 0.6 
Table 29: Selection of the current user role  
 
Additional services are:  
 get and set additional policy protected data with PFs (through the services setNewPrivacyData, 
getNewPrivacyData, setNewPrivacyDataFlag, getNewPrivacyDataFlag) 
 there might be some others 
 
In Table 4 the sensitive data which needs privacy protection was presented. The profiles, the user roles, the 
locations and the user sensitive data (USD), and the values defined for them, are presented in Table 30.  
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Context Values 
Source_Role (SR) Patient, Spouse, Family member, Employee, Friend, User  
Destination_Role 
(DR) 
Doctor, Family member, Boss, Friend, Spouse, Child, Unknown, 
Location (L) Home, Office, Hospital, Car, Public, Unknown,  
User sensitive data 
(USD)  
General Categories   
User Identity (GivenName, FamilyName, Gender…),  
Medical history, 
Medical data(BloodType, Allergy, ChronicIllness…),  
Social security number,  
Address (Country, City, StreetName…),  
Telephone , Location 
Table 30: Defined values for user roles and user sensitive information  
 
Examples of predefined rules for disclosure of USD for the medical scenario are presented in Table 31. 
 
5.3.2. Context Profile 
 
The Context Profile deals with the context attributes and extracts the current context attributes from the context 
profile. It is responsible for providing context information as accurate as the system can deliver it. The contexts 
which are taken into consideration within the pervasive healthcare applications of all the considered scenarios in 
this PhD thesis are: Vital Function, Indoor Location, Outdoor Location, Environment physical parameters, 
available hospital equipment. (Table 4) 
The location of an object (this could be an end-device, a person, etc…) is actually very important information 
which is treated with more specific queries. The system sets or gets the location (together with the PF for 
controlling the information disclosure) through the commands: getXLocation, setXLocation, getXLocationFlag, 
setXLocationFlag where X is indicating the source (the object) and the possibility for revealing the location.  
Examples of meaningful location values could be provided with different accuracy and area: hospital, room in a 
hospital, home, etc.  
Beside, the system or the end-user might be interested in a more accurate or specific information about the 
location, like for example the GPS coordinates or indoor location, the name of the room where the user is located, 
the name of the building, the name of the street, the name of the city or the country: getXLocationAccuracy, 
setXLocationAccuracy, setXLocationAccuracyFlag, getXLocationAccuracyFlag. 
The assumption here is that “raw information” which represents context attributes is provided to the management 
subsystem. Further, for the work of the privacy protection framework, this raw context data is then “translated” 
into meaningful input information which must be fed into the privacy protection mechanisms via suitable 
predefined rules and policies. The component which takes care of the mapping of context attributes to meaningful 
policies is the Rule Agent, as explained in Section 5.2.2. 
To remind, the current context information could be dynamic or relatively static, as presented on Figure 9 and 
Table 4, and is used for the ACAPP mechanisms to work properly.  
 
5.3.3. Application/Service Profile  
 
This profile describes the application/service type and features the provided services.  
The application type, according to the scenarios described previously in this document, can be for example 
Enhanced Professional Communication, Emergency Localisation for the pervasive healthcare applications.  
The service profile is considered to be part of the context. The service profile contains information for the types of 
the following parameters: the requesting party, the requesting location, the domain types (medical, entertainment, 
sport, etc…), interaction type (one-one/one-many), location accuracy requested (different levels of granularity – 
exact GPS coordinates, room, building, street), requested identifiable user parameter (ID, exact user name, 
pseudonym, label name), service duration (short, medium, long).  
ServiceName = f (RequestorID, RequestorLocation, DomainType, InteractionType, LocationAccuracyLevel, 
UserParameter, TimeDuration).  
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If a patient visits the hospital for a visit for example, at the reception, a registering service will automatically 
register the patient on his/her entrance. The registering service is defined as (CityHospital, Registrator, 
HospitalregsitrationDesk, Medical, One2One, HospitalBuilding, LabelName, short). 
According to the chosen application type, different parameters are relevant and likely to be treated by privacy 
mechanisms, for example in the reference scenario, the location of the patient and the doctor are important and 
vital signs of the patient and location of the doctor are important and assumed to be sensitive information. They 
are subject to controlled information disclosure.   
It is also important to specify the duration of the expected communication for the given application, if the type of 
application is long term or short term. This is also linked to evaluation of how often the pseudonym needs to be 
changed, in case the location privacy of a person is required to be protected. 
 
The services related to the Application/Service Profile are: 
 getApplicationType(): it returns the type of the application 
 getApplicationTypeParameters(): it returns the important parameters of the application type 
 
 
5.3.4. Profile for Scenario 
 
For the scenario to be defined, the role and location of the requesting party should be identified. In the user 
profiles descriptions in the Profile Agent, the user describes the most probable requesting party role called 
DestinationRoleName linked with the role of the destination DestinationRole (DR) and the location of the 
requesting party DestinationLocation (DL), as explained in Section 5.3. Respectively Source Role (SR) and 
Source Location (SL). Examples for most probably destination roles: FamilyAtHome(Family member, home), 
BossAtWork(Boss, office), DoctorAtHospital(Doctor, Hospital), MedicalStaffAtHospital(Nurse, Hospital). The 
user has the option to create new destination roles. Working assumption is that the requesting party identity and 
location are provided by the trustworthy service provider and this information is used in the creation of the current 
scenario.  
In the Scenarios Profiles (stored in the small Data Store), a list of most common scenarios for the daily life of the 
user is stored. The number of possible roles of source is rs; number of possible roles of destination is rd; number 
of possible locations of source is ls; number of possible locations of destination is ld. The number of all possible 
scenario combinations based on SR, SL, DR, DL is  
Equation (4)   ls * ld * rs * rd =N.  
The current scenario profile is  
ScenarioName(SourceRoleValue, SourceLocationValue, DestinationRoleValue, DestinationLocationValue, 
ProbabilityValue, ScenarioFlagValue).  
 
To illustrate the gain when using scenario profiles for most common daily situations, when there are 4 different 
SRs, 4 different DRs, 4 different SLs and 5 different DLs, then N=320. After analysis, only the realistic ones are 
taken into account by setting their ProbabilityValue=1. In one of the implemented set of scenarios, the realistic 
number Nr is approximately 86 out of 320, (Nr / N =27%). ScenarioFlagValue is assigned in the setup stage by 
the users themselves and the values are (A-Always give | R-Ask User | N-Never give). This flag is used in cases 
when the result for the rule for providing or not sensitive information depends only on the current scenario. This is 
done also with the goal to decrease continuous the user involvement and to reduce the daily in the communication.  
 
Example of current scenario is PatientDoctorAtHospital (UserAtHospital, DoctorAtHospital, 1, Always). For each 
realistic scenario a LabelName of the user is defined by the user herself which can then acts as (that also can be 
linked to) a long-/short-term pseudonym. For example, as mentioned before, the registration service in the 
hospital, the LabelName is created when the first time user is registered in the hospital and it is used in all the 
necessary communications/EPR access to keep the anonymity of the patient [8]. 
 
5.3.5. Rules Management  
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In the Profile and Rules Agent, the profiles of nodes, services, applications, users and situations are managed. 
Default profiles exist too. From them, the profiles of the user can be modified, updated and deleted. It must be 
underlined that this version of the Profiles and Rules Agent, which is more complex, should be considered for 
implementation in devices with higher capabilities only. Simpler and less complex policies with a minimal set of 
rules are applied to end-sensor nodes with limited capabilities. As described in Section 4.5, the Profile Module of 
the Profile and Rules Agent in a full functional device contains the following profiles: Node/Device Profiles, User 
Profiles, Service/Application Profiles, Context Profiles. Examples of user profiles and roles (source role), 
location, user sensitive data, are presented in Table 31. 
Although the rules are predefined, there is always the choice for the user to change part of the rules for disclosing 
information.  
 
The Rule Module processes the rules for filtering the sensitive user data. Each rule is function of the scenario (it 
could be any of the relations for the source, for the destination or both), the context attributes, conditions to be 
satisfied, USD, results and actions.  
 
Rule = f (input, condition, user sensitive data, result, action) 
 
The conditions are expressed as a logical function.  
 
Result is the PF value for the USD: A - Always give; C - Check profile; R – Ask User; N - Never give.  
The action for the USD is taken based on the PF value and it can be: Give data - Check profile - Ask user for 
permission - Never give data.  
 
 
R
Rule 
ID 
Destination_
Location 
Destination 
_Role 
Source_ 
Location 
Current 
Source Role 
Rule for revealing user 
data  
P
t01 
Hospital Doctor Home   Patient  Always (medical status), 
never for the rest of data  
P
t02 
Hospital Doctor  Hospital  Patient Always (medical status), 
Always (medical history), 
Ask user (address)  
Never for the rest of data  
P
t03 
Home  Spouse  Hospital  Patient  Always (current location) 
Always (medical status) 
m01 Office Boss Home  Employee  Never (medical status), 
Never (medical history) 
Never (current location) 
E
m02 
Office Boss  Office  Employee Never (medical status),  
Never (medical history) 
Always (current location) 
P
r01 
Home  Child Office  Parent Always (current location) 
P
r02 
Home  Child  Hospital  Patient  Always (current location) 
p01 
Home  Spouse  Office   Spouse  Always (current location) 
Always (medical status) 
U
s01 
Public  Unknown  Home  User  Never for all data 
U
s02 
Public  Unknown  Public  User  Never for all data 
Table 31: Examples of possible predefined rules 
 
Some relevant examples of lower level rules for the medical scenario describe the behaviour of the SR and the DR 
are provided below. The Source Role represents the party who requests the disclosure of data or information. In 
the following, two cases were described:  
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“Rule A” explains what happens when a patient (destination) outside of hospital asks for the location of her/his 
doctor (source of information): since the doctor sets her/his PF for location data to “Never” when the doctor is out 
of working shift and patient is asking for it, this information cannot be disclosed.  
“Rule B” is instead a rule for an emergency: it defines when the doctor should take action according to the 
heartbeat rate of the patient. If the heartbeat rate goes above a certain threshold (TH), then an action is needed. 
 
Rule A:  If DR=patient and DL=not_in_hospital, USD_requested=SR_location, SR=doctor and 
Time_doctor=out_of_shift then privacyflag(location data) = N 
Action A = the location of the doctor will not be revealed and for providing any other user sensitive 
data, the user will be asked explicitly via GUI 
Rule B:  If SR=patient and SL=hospital, USD_requested=SR_hearthbeatrate, DR=doctor then privacyflag(data) 
= A 
Action B = IF (USD_requested < TH) THEN (patient status is good  no action) ELSE (Patient 
status is not good  DR takes action) 
 
More examples of high-level rules, applied to the information flow of the backup shift assistant scenario are given 
in Table 32 as in [11]. 
 
Context data Rule Agent – Example of context-aware rules 
Patient’s medical data Release to doctor and nurse on current shift only 
Patient’s Indoor Location Show to doctor and nurse on current shift only 
Patient’s ID Show to doctor only 
Type of service If service = hospital service, trust level= trusted 
Doctor’s Indoor Location  Show to nurse on shift only 
Doctor’s ID Show to nurse on shift only 
Nurse’s Indoor Location Show to doctor on shift only 
Nurse’s ID Show to doctor on shift only 
Colleague’s Location If location is public and remaining energy in all nodes is higher 
than , set security level to high, otherwise set to low thresholdE
Table 32: High level context information and respective rules 
 
Selection of applicable rule  
 
Explanation of how applicable rules are selected is given in the flowchart in Figure 21. In this case, several 
assumptions have been made:  
 BSN consists of a coordinator node (CN) and a limited number of end nodes (EN). These nodes are 
known in advance from the setup phase. Starting from this assumption, the trust establishment 
procedure in the flowchart is not considered.  
 The coordinator node moves with the end nodes. 
 Malicious nodes’ attacks are not considered. 
 
Doctor A, who is at the hospital during nightshift, asks for location information of the back-up assistant - 
colleague on shift Doctor B who is at home at the moment. The privacy protection framework in the handheld 
device of Doctor B receives the request for USD (location). Then current destination location CDL = hospital; 
current destination role CDR = colleague; current source role CSR = doctor; current source location CSL = home. 
The predefined rule for Doctor B’s location is “Provide my current location if the colleague on shift asks from the 
hospital and my current role is doctor”. When a request for USD comes, context information for the current user 
location, current time of the day is already provided to the Security Manager by entities from the context 
assessment.  
To remind, the assumption is that user roles and locations based on the everyday life of the person are defined in 
the configuration phase. Also in this phase rules for high and low-level context are defined by an authorised 
person together with the rules for personal information depending on the application.  
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Figure 21: Selection of applicable profiles and rules 
 
5.3.6. Summary of Section 5.3 
 
The approach taken in this work for controlled information disclosure is a mix between the role- and policy-based. 
Therefore, the Profile and Rules Agent plays a major role in the privacy protection framework. 
The proposed profiles are for objects (devices, persons and their roles), context, application/service and scenario. 
Each profile has a template that basically is an empty profile.  
The system is also able to define the current role of the person-based context information for the current GPS 
coordinates or relative indoor location and then map it to a meaningful location for the person. Examples of 
descriptive roles for the reference scenario are: patient, family member, friend, doctor, nurse. 
The profile for the Context is for Vital Function, Indoor Location, Outdoor Location, and Environment.  
The application type could be for example Enhanced Professional Communication, Emergency Localisation for 
the pervasive healthcare applications.  
The service profile is considered to be part of the context. It contains information for the types of the following 
parameters: the requesting party, the requesting location, the domain types (medical, entertainment, sport, etc…), 
interaction type (one-one/one-many), location accuracy requested (different levels of granularity – exact GPS 
coordinates, room, building, street), requested identifiable user parameter (ID, exact user name, pseudonym, label 
name), service duration (short, medium, long).  
In the Scenarios Profiles, a list of most common scenarios for the daily life of the user is stored. The scenario is 
defined as a combination of Role and Location of the source and destination of the data. 
Last but not least, the Rule Agent is an important component of the privacy protection framework. Each rule is 
function of the scenario, the context attributes, conditions to be satisfied, USD, results and actions. There are rules 
for low and high level context data. This controlled information disclosure mechanism considers the current 
scenario and context in order to find the applicable rule for disclosure. How the applicable rule could be selected 
is presented on Figure 21. 
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For the different categories of nodes, as presented in Section 4.6.1, different versions of the Profile and Rules 
Agent are applied. The most complex agents are for full-functional nodes.  
 
5.4. Addressing scalability and power efficiency 
 
5.4.1. For information and context privacy 
 
How much memory and power resources are necessary for the controlled information disclosure mechanism 
depend on the required level of granularity in the implemented versions of the profiles and rules. Scalability is 
ensured with the options to implement very simple rule engine with 10-50 applicable rules and which consider 3-6 
context attributes in resource constrained nodes. For the gateway and coordinator nodes which have more 
important role in policy negotiations and which must consider more complex context, rule engine with 200 rules 
and 20 current context attributes might be envisaged. However, even in this case, using compression of the data 
will reduce the memory needed but will increase slightly the energy consumption and the response time.  
Power efficiency will depend highly on the specific scenario and on the desired user preferences too - if the users 
would like to have protection of their personal data and if they would like to have their anonymity and location 
privacy ensured.  
In these aspects, ensuring anonymity, location privacy and pseudonyms creation are the processes which will 
require most computation and communication overhead. Moreover, the location privacy solutions in many cases 
require cooperative behaviour which also leads to increased communication overhead.  
 
 
5.4.2. For information confidentiality 
 
Several factors may affect the benefits achieved in practice by the introduction of the flexibility property in the 
confidentiality algorithm. One of them is the processing versus communication power. In previous studies, it has 
been shown that energy costs of data transmission far outweigh the costs of computation (e.g. [12]). For the 
suggested method of varying the number of rounds and key size for RC5 encryption, this may have some effect on 
the computation cost but will have no effect on the data transmission costs. Therefore, the benefit may not be of 
very big significance in practice. Another issue is that many scenarios require integrity more than encryption 
protection, and therefore in practice nodes may have to constantly apply integrity protection, but may sometimes 
not have to use encryption. Adding integrity protection increases the message size by more than encryption and 
may even require more computation (e.g. 5.9J/byte for SHA-1 compared to 1.62J/byte for AES encryption as 
measured in [12]. Therefore, the benefit of being able to switch encryption on and off may be insignificant 
compared to the overall cost caused by having to use integrity protection at all times. This is presented in [13]. 
 
5.4.3. Summary of Section 5.4  
 
To summarise, the framework is flexible in order to allow for different versions of it to be deployed for a 
coordinator or gateway node and a small sensor node, given that they have both different hardware limitations, 
and communication and security requirements. The framework is adaptable in order to allow for different 
protocols and primitives to be applied after deployment for the communications within the nodes of a BSN, and 
the communications between cluster heads and gateways. 
For information and context privacy, scalability is ensured with the options to implement very simple rule engine 
with 10-50 applicable rules and which consider 3-6 context attributes in resource constrained nodes. For the 
gateway and coordinator nodes which have more important role in policy negotiations and which must consider 
more complex context, rule engine with 200 rules and 20 current context attributes might be envisaged. If 
ensuring anonymity, location privacy and pseudonyms is a scenario and user requirement, this will lead to less 
power-efficiency since this will require most computation and communication overhead. 
For information confidentiality, for the suggested method of varying the number of rounds and key size for RC5 
encryption, may have some effect on the computation cost but will have no effect on the data transmission costs. 
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Bigger effect could be achieved if encryption is switched on and off if acceptable from the scenario and user 
requirements.  
 
5.5. Applicability to the reference scenarios  
 
In the previous chapter, the ACAPP framework and its components were described in detail. The goal of this 
section is to give examples of how the proposed concepts and mechanisms could be applied in practice. First, the 
interaction of BSN with foreign networks is described. Three cases will be considered: BSN in a public place, in 
home and in a hospital. Further, the configuration guidelines for the Rule Agent are followed and the reactivity of 
the Security Manager to change of context is described in order to provide working examples for two 
applications. 
 
In accordance with the example scenarios selected to demonstrate the ACAPP Framework, example 
configurations for the security framework will be provided for: 
 A BSN of the reference scenario (backup shift assistant) - rules for health status and for notification 
 A BSN of the reference scenario (backup shift assistant) - rules for localisation 
 
5.5.1. Interaction of BSNs with foreign networks  
 
In Section 3.2, the scope of the proposed solution was presented. One of the communication scopes was with 
nodes of trusted subscribed networks or occasional communication with nodes of unknown networks. 
In the following paragraphs it will be shown how the Security Manager functions in these two communication 
scopes.  
Case 1: Outdoor scenario (In a public place) 
This is the case when there is communication with nodes of unknown networks. It is the scenario which is 
exposed to most security threats as presented in Section 3.3. Interference is a possible threat not only from the 
same type of sensors but also from all other available wireless services and networks. Confidentiality is a major 
requirement too. It is assumed that the network is always in this case and it only can be changed if a connection is 
established successfully with another network.  
This is a typical scenario that requires high level of security. The management of the security parameters by the 
Security Manager is presented in the following Figure 22. 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Outdoor Scenario (In a public place) 
121 of 173 
Kopi af PhD-Anelia-v1.6D-06Apr09   
Case 2: Home scenario 
This is the case when there is communication with nodes of trusted subscribed networks.  
 
It is the scenario exposed to least security threats because it is a controlled environment. Confidentiality is not a 
main concern here between those who live in the house (assuming a family house). Authentication for each user 
can be done easily because they are few, in a family house typically about 5 people or even less. Taking all these 
factors into account for this type of location, low level of security for the BSN is selected.  
 
 
Figure 23: Home Scenario 
 
 
The office scenario can be seen as staying in a “foreign house”, i.e. the users are still in a trusted environment but 
now the environment is only partially controlled by them. In this scenario the system uses the medium level of 
security. The use of the office network to provide an alternative for the mobile phone may also be applied, in case 
of shortage of battery power for example. 
 
Case 3: Hospital scenario  
This is the case when there is communication with nodes of trusted subscribed networks too.  
The Hospital scenario has an interesting particularity; in this case many BSNs will be near each other, which may 
cause problems regarding authentication procedures and interference. Having this in mind, it is proposed the use 
of the medium level of security to be used. The Power Management Algorithm of the end-sensor nodes will have 
a very important task in this scenario. It has to control precisely the transmitting signal power of the sensor nodes 
so that interferences may not occur.  
In this scenario there might be the need to add more sensors to the existing BSN. This task should only be done by 
the hospital staff and with extreme caution because the keys will be exchanged for the first time and it is necessary 
to make sure it is performed with the right sensors. The figure would be the same as above for the home 
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environment, except that instead of Home sensor network on the right side, it is the Hospital sensor network with 
assumptions: the security level is high; scanning for attack: all 5 min; scanning for user: all 5 sec. 
 
Other scenarios could be analysed with more details but it is considered that these three scenarios allow for a good 
representation. However, some other ubiquitous networks can interact with the BSN, for example the patient’s car 
network. In this case, the patient’s vehicle can be used to improve the transmission/reception quality and there 
could also be some interaction between the body and the BSN. In the case when while driving, the patient suffers 
some kind of attack, the BSN could deliver this information to the car’s processing unit, which in return would 
activate an emergency procedure, e.g. turning on the emergency lights or decreasing the car’s speed to a complete 
stop, etc. 
 
5.5.2. Configuration of the Profiles and Rules for 
providing adaptability 
 
In Section5.3, the profiles for nodes/devices, user, scenario and context, and services have been defined. In a pre-
deployment phase, the devices are loaded with a set of pre-defined profiles and rules, corresponding to multiple 
policies, which allow the initialisation of the device as soon as it joins a network, making it possible the insertion 
of it in any type of network.  
Once the device has been deployed, it needs to be guaranteed the adaptability of the policies in the different 
situations which might arise, as the security protocol, and hence primitives, are selected according to the context 
of the communication, taking into account the trade-off among device constraints and context itself, as well as 
user’s preferences.  
 
In this section the profiles and rules that the Privacy and Security Agent use for providing adaptability, after the 
network deployment, are given. These rules are necessary in order to decide which security level to apply 
depending on the context and to help the system to operate without intervention and to adapt to the changing 
contexts. There are groups of rules corresponding to different context events, for example – health status rules, 
notification rules. More details are provided in the rest of this section. 
Backup Shift Assistant Scenario – rules for health status and for notification  
 
Health Status Rules 
Among all the possible contexts, the following three context events are considered: “normal”, “pre-emergency” 
and “emergency” which describe the health status of the patient. The measurements from the different body 
sensors provide summarised picture of the collective information for health status. It is possible to define them 
through four parameters (thresholds) for each context data presented in Section 5.3.2: two thresholds are used for 
delineating when the patient is in an emergency case (above U-ETH, or below L-ETH), and the four of them are 
used instead to define the “pre-emergency” case, as depicted in Figure 24.   
It is assumed that for the “normal” context, the initial security levels for all the security services are high, as if that 
the end-user is in public place. This is Case A as described in the previous section.  
 
 
Figure 24: Rules for definition of the health status of the patient 
 
In the following Table 33, rules for determining the security levels accordingly to the change of context are given: 
 
 Initial security levels Final security levels 
                 Security services 
 
Change of context 
A E I F A E I F 
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Normalpre-emergency H H H H H M H M 
Normal  emergency H H H H H L H L 
Pre-emergency  normal H M H M H H H H 
Pre-emergency  emergency H M H M H L H L 
Emergency normal H L H L H H H H 
Emergencypre-emergency H L H L H M H M 
Table 33: Determining the security levels according to the change of health status 
 
Notification rules 
“Notification rules” are rules that, based on the context information, notify a certain category of person (medical 
staff, family or both) of the present heath situation of the user/patient. In the following Figure 25, it is showed 
which category is alerted in case an emergency or pre-emergency situation happens.   
 
 
Figure 25: Rules for notification based on health status of end-user 
 
Battery Level Rules  
Further need of notification rules arises when the battery level is reducing, as depicted in the following Figure 26. 
In this case, the battery level, and not the status of the patient, represents the context information. This case has 
been mentioned in Section 4.8 where the Context Management Algorithm was described.  
 
 
Figure 26: Rules for notification based on status of battery 
 
Examples of other privacy rules (low and high level) for medical staff are presented in Section 5.3.5. 
 
Backup Shift Assistant Scenario – rules for localisation 
 
In the previous section, for the backup shift assistant scenario, it is described low level rules for the notification of 
the status of the user/patient, as well as basic rules that show how the security service are changing according to 
the change of the status of the patient. These rules are still valid in the case of change of localisation, in the 
Backup Assistant scenario. Furthermore, rules concerning the localisation of the user must be added, in order to 
have the medical staff and the user’s family aware of user’s location when it is required.  
When the health status of the patients is “normal”, the security levels of the security services change according to 
their location as depicted in the following Figure 27. In this case the context information is a combination of the 
health status and the user’s location. 
 
 
Figure 27: Rules for security levels depending on different locations 
 
High level rules are a combination of low level rules as explained in the following examples:  
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IF {“location=public” AND “time=evening” AND “context=pre-emergency”} THEN {“notify the 
relative of the position of the user”} 
 
IF {“location=hospital” AND “time=night” AND “context= emergency”} THEN {“notify the doctor for 
the health status of the patient”} 
Flow charts for change of Security Level 
 
The following flowchart (Figure 28) explains how the security level in the coordinator node (CN) from a BSN is 
changing based on a change in context (in this case the context is location and it is changing from home to public). 
Figure 29 explains the change in the security level in the end-node (EN).  
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Figure 28: Change of security level in the coordinator node from a BSN based on a change in context  
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Figure 29: Change in the security level in the end-node from a BSN based on a change in context 
 
5.5.3. Summary of Section 5.5 
 
To show how the security and privacy framework could be applied in practise, examples for outdoor, home and 
hospital scenario were presented. It was explained in detail the behaviour of the Security Manager when a change 
of one the context attributes is happening – namely, change in location.  
Furthermore, configuration examples for the profiles and rules for the reference scenario were presented – for 
health status, for determining security levels when the health status of the end user changes and when the location 
changes. In the end of the section, it was shown how the security level is changed in the different subsystems of 
both in the coordinator and the end-sensor node.  
 
5.6. Comparison with existing solutions  
 
The focus of this section is to position the proposed solutions in this thesis with existing ones. The Security 
Manager is compared with SPINS and CodeBlue. The privacy protection framework is compared with PRIVES 
and with a privacy service for collaborative application using mobile phone. In the end, the profiling is compared 
with existing initiatives.  
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So far SPINS [14] is the most used protocol for security in sensor networks, therefore a comparison between the 
Security Manager and SPINS is the best way to present the innovations brought with the proposed here security 
protocol suite. 
SPINS and the Security Manager rely on RC5 for the encryption/decryption process, however in SPINS the key is 
generated through random numbers based on a MAC function, while in the Security Manager this key is obtained 
with the ECC. This also implies that in SPINS all keys depend on a secret master key while in the proposed 
security protocol suite all keys are independent and uncorrelated. 
 
Table 34 presents the main characteristics of these two protocols: 
 
 SPINS 
 
Security Manager 
Encryption/decryption 
algorithm 
RC5 in CTR mode RC5 in CTR mode 
Authentication procedure MAC function ECC-DH 
Freshness Weak freshness provided by the 
CTR encryption 
Weak freshness provided by the 
CTR encryption 
Strong freshness Use of nonces Not implemented 
Adaptability No Yes 
Low Overhead Yes Yes 
Reduced latency (Use of 
flags) 
No Yes 
O.S. TinyOS TinyOS 
Broadcasting µTESLA No specific protocol 
Power management No Yes 
Table 34: SPINS vs Security Manager 
 
As it is possible to see from the Table 34, several new features were added, specially the adaptability and power 
management and a new authentication procedure was developed in order to ensure an improved security. With the 
use of flags a new mechanism to fight latency was introduced, which is important for communicating of 
measurement of vital signs. 
The ECC-DH requires more computational time than the MAC function which means that the proposed security 
protocol suit spends more energy in the authentication procedure. However, since this process is only performed 
every 4 hours and with the energy saved from the adaptability and power management features, the whole 
mechanism fully compensates this event. 
Detailed analysis of the proposed security protocol suit and performance evaluation is presented in Part D of this 
report.  
5.6.1. CodeBlue and the Security Manager 
 
CodeBlue [15][16] is a project which uses WSNs for medical care, such as pro-hospital, in-hospital emergency 
care, disaster response and stroke patient rehabilitation. Comparison between the proposed security protocol suit 
and the requirements/characteristics of CodeBlue follows in the next paragraphs.  
Regarding vital information, CodeBlue and some of its references [17] recommend a sample rate of one second. 
The proposal in this report has a standard sample rate of 10 seconds for vital sensors. However two additional 
sample frequencies could be introduced without major modifications. Having the possibility to get a sample every 
5 seconds or every second, clearly satisfies that recommendation. 
 
Let us imagine that a doctor wishes to monitor the patient’s heart rate every second because the patient is in a 
critical state. The doctor only has to send this instruction to the patient’s aggregator node which will then send a 
request to the specific sensor node to increase its sample rate. The aggregator also has the task to alert the CMA 
that the sensor in question will send a larger number of messages then previously expected (the number doubles 
for  a 5 seconds sample rate and is multiplied by 10 for a single second sample rate). In this way, the whole 
system adapts itself to the new circumstances. It should be kept in mind that the 10 seconds was stipulated having 
in mind the increase of the sensor nodes’ lifetime (regarding energy consumption). It is also possible that the 
increase of the sample rate in the case of emergency is pre-defined in the Rule Agent. In this situation it is not 
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even necessary that the doctor sends a special request for this to the coordinator node, this will be done 
automatically. These rule settings could be done in the “emergency” rule group.  
Regarding emergency responses, a new feature is introduced in the protocol suit. While the exchanging key 
procedure is running, an emergency situation should imply a response. To face this situation flags are used, i.e. all 
the bits are set to “1” if an emergency is detected. In this way, the aggregator easily detects a top priority message 
and overrides any other procedures that are still running. 
Another significant difference between the proposal here and CodeBlue relies on tracking issues. In this proposal 
the GPS location is only sent when it is detected an abnormal situation either of the patient or the network. In 
CodeBlue this information is sent every 15min, no matter what. Seen from the point of view of the proposed 
privacy framework this violates the patient’s privacy and stimulates an adversary to hack the system in order to 
easily track the patient’s movement (location). The solution from this report does not endanger the patients and it 
keeps their privacy intact. 
 
This current proposal clearly satisfies the requirements imposed by the medical scenarios even in emergency cases 
and once more proves itself as a good alternative to existing protocols.  
 
5.6.2. Privacy Frameworks 
 
Related work addresses complete architectures as well as domain specific privacy solutions.  
In [18] the authors propose a pre-configurable policy-based framework for protecting and sharing private data for 
automotive telematics. Similarly, but for protecting context information in context-aware environments, the 
authors of [19] define a privacy service that grants or denies access to the context data based on predefined 
policies. Both approaches focus on developing means to define and use tailored policies for their frameworks 
adapted to the respective use case.  
In [20] Bessler and Jorns propose an extension to the Parley X architecture [21] to let users create own 
pseudonyms. Further they propose a pseudonym creation scheme – PRIVES – that can be used to create similar 
pseudonyms at different locations with only a single key exchange. The chain of pseudonyms is created using a 
combination of HMAC and SHA.  
Within the PRIME project, architecture is developed to support private use of the Internet across Europe. As 
outlined in [22], the system architecture incorporates novel cryptographic protocols, sophisticated security 
protocols, and artificial intelligence algorithms for privacy protection for the digital world.  
 
5.6.3. Existing Initiatives for Profiling  
 
The OSGi™ [23] specifications define a standardised, component oriented, computing environment for networked 
services. Adding an OSGi Service Platform to a networked device (embedded as well as servers), adds the 
capability to manage the life cycle of the software components in the device from anywhere in the network. 
OSGI’s User Admin Services use database with user information (private and public) for authentication and 
authorisation purposes.  
UPnP [24] enables simple and robust connectivity among stand-alone devices and PCs from many different 
vendors. There are standardised service descriptions for the Device Security and Security Console.  
Although OSGI and UPnP provides means to not only deal with, but also to handle profiles for devices’ and 
services’, they do not provide any direct means to manipulates users’ profiles, where essentially the entire user’s 
sensitive data can be located. In particular if the users’ sensitive data is separate of any of the devices’ or services’ 
profiles, there are no means for the system (OSGI and UPnP) to make decision concerning their protection 
(security, privacy and anonymity) without direct specific request from the user. 
The Rights Expression Language, MPEG REL [25], is intended to provide flexible, interoperable mechanisms to 
support transparent and augmented use of digital resources in publishing, distributing, and consuming of digital 
movies, digital music, electronic books, broadcasting, interactive games, computer software and other creations in 
digital form, in a way that protects digital content and honours the rights, conditions, and fees specified for digital 
contents. Also it provides a flexible interoperable mechanism to ensure personal data is processed in accordance 
with individual rights and to meet the requirement for Users to be able to express their rights and interests in a 
way that addresses issues of privacy and use of personal data.  
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The Web Ontology Language (OWL) [26] is designed for use by applications that need to process the content of 
information instead of just presenting information to humans. OWL can be used to explicitly represent the 
meaning of terms in vocabularies and the relationships between those terms. The ability of the Semantic Web to 
link information from multiple sources is a desirable and powerful feature that can be used in many applications 
[27]. However, the capability to merge data from multiple sources, combined with the inferential power of OWL, 
does have potential for abuse. Users of OWL should be alert to the potential privacy implications. A number of 
organizations are addressing these issues with a variety of security and preference solutions. See for example 
SAML [28] and P3P [29]. 
 
5.6.4. Summary of Section 5.6 
 
In this section, comparison of the Security Manager with SPINS, CodeBlue, other privacy frameworks and 
profiling initiatives was presented.  
The difference with SPINS is in the authentication procedure - the Security Manager uses a security protocol suit 
which is a combination of ECC-DH while SPINS uses MAC function. Security Manager has adaptability and 
reduced latency features. Adaptability is very important for the pervasive application space which allows 
applicability for diverse scenarios. Reducing latency is vital for transmission of health status parameters.  
CodeBlue is a system for emergency response, with recommended sampling rate of 1 sec. Since the pervasive 
health care systems will have main goals to help rehabilitation at home or just transmitting health status to care 
personnel, in this proposal sampling rate of 10 sec is used, which gives possibility for power and battery savings. 
However, in case of emergency, there is always the option the doctor to request sample rate of 1 sec as in 
CodeBlue project. Another difference is that in CodeBlue project, GPS location is sent every 15 min, which 
according to the presented in this PhD report threat analysis, violates the location privacy of the treated subject.  
 
5.7. Summary of Chapter 5 
 
This Chapter 5 presented in details the proposed privacy protection mechanisms. As for adaptive confidentiality, 
the proposed security protocol suit uses RC5 and DHA-ECC. Variation of parameters of RC5 defines deferent 
levels of confidentiality. To avoid the heavy computation of DHA, ECC was proposed for the key exchange.  
The main operation in elliptical curve cryptographic schemes is point multiplication. This operation presents the 
most desired properties in cryptography, i.e. the forward operation is quite simple but its inverse is very difficult. 
The main characteristics of Diffie-Hellman still persist in this method. 
Second, the context-aware mechanism for controlled information disclosure was presented. To allow for 
personalisation and context-awareness, the access control is based on a combination of profiles and rules. The 
access control itself is filtering of user sensitive data before any disclosure and this is done with the help of the 
Privacy Safeguard. Other important block of the framework was described – the Profile and Rules Agent, with the 
defined profiles of user, context, application, scenario. The framework allows for scalability and power-efficiency. 
In the end, the applicability of the proposed mechanisms to the reference scenario for outdoor, home and hospital 
locations was exemplified. The mechanisms were compared with some existing solutions - SPINS, CodeBlue, 
other privacy frameworks and profiling initiatives.   
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Chapter 6  
6. Analysis and Evaluation 
 
The main goal of Chapter 6 is to present the analysis for the proposed work. It further discusses the evaluation of 
the ACAPP Framework and the proposed mechanisms, starting with presentation of the evaluation goals and 
continuing with the results of the performed evaluation. It presents the costs of the privacy protection enhanced 
with adaptivity, context-awareness and security management. It further evaluates the security management and 
the adaptive confidentiality.  
 
6.1. Analysis of the proposed framework and mechanisms  
 
In the following subsections it is analysed how the introduced adaptive and flexibility features influence the 
functionality of the proposed adaptive framework and the presented in this PhD thesis mechanisms. The adaptivity 
feature of the security framework will be first analysed. Then this proposal is compared with some existing 
solutions. Further, the context-awareness in the privacy protection framework will be discussed. In the end of this 
section factors which might influence the savings and the efficiency from the adaptive security and the context-
aware privacy protection will be analysed.   
 
6.1.1. Adaptive Security  
 
The following Table 35 gives overview of the parameters and features which have been discussed in the previous 
sections. It presents the aim with maintaining them and what the specifics and measures are. The most important 
from them is considered to be power consumption, security adaptiveness and a number of extra features.   
 
Parameter/Feature Aim Specifics/Measures 
Power 
Consumption 
To preserve the maximum of battery 
level, several measures could be taken 
- reduction of the transmission power 
- adaptation of the security level 
- reduction of the number of the sent 
message  
Identification Delay The first time the user or the 
administrator configures the network 
and the profiles of devices manually. 
Next time this is done automatically 
The use of access control list is a simple 
way for this.  
Transmission 
Adaptiveness 
For best system performance, the 
system needs to do a smart 
transmission of data from one network 
to another 
It takes about 10 sec for the aggregator node 
to collect data. After that it does an 
intelligent filtering. If the information is 
vital/important, it transmits directly. Else it 
transmits with an interval of several minutes 
Security 
Adaptiveness 
To maintain the integrity of the 
system, specific requirements are 
defined depending on the type of 
security attack  
General case ->Attack detected ->Increase 
Security  
Intrusion detected->Revoke the keys; 
Request for ID and Pre-distributed key 
Jamming or interference->Increase 
frequency hopping 
Overflow->Revoke all keys, reboot the 
system 
DoS attack-> Restart/Block all foreign 
networks; Increase the security level  
Compromise of a node-> Shutdown/Revoke 
the key’s user; provide feedback to the user 
on the display and update the database 
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Extra features  Optimisation: Creation of a back up 
solution  
The control could be taken by a PDA or a 
laptop in case the coordinator node is out of 
battery  
Extra features Security: the choice of the algorithm is 
important in order to manage the 
authentication and the integrity of the 
system to protect the privacy of the 
user 
The proposed security protocol suit ECC-
DH&RC5 
Extra features Reactivity: warn the user or a medical 
personnel as soon as an anomaly is 
detected 
Implementation of a warning algorithm  
Table 35: Analysis of important parameters of the adaptive security and privacy framework and some 
extra features 
 
Comparison of the proposed adaptive security protocol suit with SPINS was presented in Section 5.6. 
Several new features were introduced with the presented proposal, specifically the adaptability and power 
management and a new authentication procedure was developed in order to ensure an improved confidentiality. 
With the use of flags a new mechanism to fight against latency was introduced, which is an important option for 
measuring and communicating vital health signals. In this respect it could be considered that the proposed 
mechanism for adaptive confidentiality to be an evolution of the SPINS protocol.  
The proposed here protocol suit is applicable for a diverse applications than SPINS since it flexible and can be 
easily adapted, a connection with a trusted network is done automatically (after the first session), the users may 
create their own profile in order to increase the interaction between networks and also they may be warned of 
some critical events and it provides optimal functionality for the current combination of situation, context and 
environment.  
However, The ECC-DH requires more computational time than the MAC function which means that WSNs using 
this proposal will spend more energy in the authentication procedure. However since this process is only 
performed every four hours and with the energy saved from the adaptability and power management features, the 
mechanism compensates this event. 
 
6.1.2. Vulnerabilities according to the security 
levels 
 
From the presented in Section 4.8 Security Manager it could be observed that by decreasing the level of security 
the protection of the network is reduced. But what exactly does that mean? Does the whole network become more 
vulnerable?  
In the following paragraphs it is analysed to which attacks the network is more susceptible when the level of 
security decreases. However, it must be underlined that the level of security is only decreased because it is 
assumed that the users are in a trusted environment, i.e. there is another system to detect intrusions. 
 
When the level of security is changed, two parameters change: the key length in the ECC-DH and the number of 
rounds in the RC5 algorithm. By decreasing those parameters the network is more vulnerable to all attacks related 
to compromised keys such as: 
 Packet injection (malicious packets); 
 Sinkhole attacks (if the adversary is able to impersonate the aggregator); 
 Denial of Service; 
 
It is not easy to predict and even more difficult is to quantify which attack is more likely to occur. However the 
goal in this section is to try to estimate the probability of each attack, having in mind two factors: the time it takes 
to break the key and the easiness to implement such an attack. 
 
From the three possible attacks presented above, the easiest one is the Denial of Service (DoS). Although the 
proposed security protocol suit prepares the system to count the number of messages of a certain sensor and to 
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check if they correspond to the expected number, this procedure is only done once a minute for vital sensors. 
Between these periods the adversary is free to send all the packets at once, i.e. the aggregator node receives in one 
moment what it was supposed to receive in one minute. If only one key is compromised this may not be a big 
problem. However if more keys are compromised, then the aggregator may be overflowed with packets, causing 
DoS. For simplicity and in order to study the worst case it is assumed here that the compromise of one sensor is 
enough to cause DoS. 
The packet injection is intimately related with DoS but in this case the focus is specifically to malicious packets. 
This attack is more challenging than the DoS because the aggregator node (through the Security Manager) expects 
a certain type and size of message from each sensor. Therefore, the adversary needs to have enough expertise to 
deceive the aggregator and make it accept a packet which contains a malicious code (virus). 
 
The hardest attack to perform is certainly the Sinkhole attack. The adversary has to break all the keys and then 
impersonate the aggregator, i.e. he has to gather enough resources to create signal at least as strong as the one 
provided by the real aggregator. If the adversary successfully achieves these requirements he is able to lure all the 
traffic to it and then it only needs to send deceiving information to the real aggregator to make it believe 
everything is working properly. This is by far the worst scenario possible. The adversary has access to all the 
information inside the compromised network. 
 
In order to quantify the probability of success of these attacks, “weights” are estimated which relate to the time it 
takes to break the key and how easy it is to perform the attack.  
The total probability is calculated by the product of the probability to break the key and the probability to succeed 
of each attack: 
 
attackkeyT PPP Equation (5) 
 
 
The following Table 36 and the chart from Figure 30 present the evaluation: 
Table 36: Analysis of the System Vulnerabilities 
 Probability to succeed an attack 
Total Probability 
(succesfull attack) * (Key breaking) 
Attack Type Low level Medium level High level Low level Medium level High level 
DoS 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.12 8.E-03 
Packet 
Injection 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.075 5.E-03 
Sinkhole  0.1 0.03 0.002 0.05 0.0045 2.E-05 
break key 
(PKey) 0.5 0.15 0.01 
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Figure 30: Probability of success for the three attacks in each level of security 
 
As it is possible to see from Figure 30, in the high level of security these attacks do not present a threat. However 
in the low level of security caution must be taken because the probability to succeed one of these attacks is 
significant. From this analysis could be concluded that the user or the administrator must carefully choose 
which places should be considered as trusted, when setting up the system. 
 
It should be underlined once more that these results do not take into account the level of trust of the user’s 
location. The purpose of this section is to present the vulnerabilities of the system regarding the security 
parameters of each level of security. Also these values are a rough estimation based on the characteristics of the 
attacks and the time to break the key.  
 
6.1.3. Privacy Protection and Context-awareness  
 
In many design situations where the user directly interacts with the systems, the KISS principle (Keep it simple 
stupid) is considered. But with respect to implementing the privacy safeguard, breaking the KISS principle might 
be worthwhile, because even with increased complexity, this will give the control in the hands of the end-user and 
will increase the users’ satisfaction and their confidence in using pervasive systems. And this is to fulfil one of the 
main user requirements listed in Section 3.2 and therefore it is expected that the user will be more willing to pay 
for the offered services.  
At the same time, fulfilling the requirement for pre-defined rules is essential to reduce the setup and labour 
maintenance costs. 
Adaptability is ensured with the services offered to the end-user or the network administrator to create new 
profiles and rules, to edit or delete existing ones. 
Another important factor to be considered is the processing vs. communication costs. In the privacy protection, 
when the privacy safeguard mechanism for controlled information disclosure is discussed, it does not influence 
the communication overhead. It is more the internal processing, on which the power is spent. On the contrary, 
providing pseudonymity and anonymity makes influence on the computation and transmission because of the cost 
of computing and communicating a new pseudonym or estimating the current anonymity level. 
 
In the reference scenario, very diverse context information is considered as input to the policies and rules for the 
privacy protection mechanism. For example, the considered context on one hand is directly related to the end-
users and supporting them in their interaction with the flexible system. On the other hand – context data for the 
applications and for the environment are also necessary. They are all essential for the privacy mechanisms and the 
Rule Module to work properly. The more context attributes are considered, the more reactive and autonomous the 
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system could be. But this of course comes with the cost of increased complexity. The vulnerability and 
uncertainty coming from providing the context from a third party, must be also kept in mind.  
 
Previous studies [1] have shown evaluation of a context-aware privacy service for mobile computing considering 
some context linked to the end-user’s mobile device. However, when evaluating such a complex flexible system 
as the one proposed in this report which considers applications with sometimes opposite requirements, it is 
obvious that the number of the context attributes taken into account will increase significantly. This will lead to 
expanding the number of the rules applicable for certain scenarios. On the other side, since the deployed end-
sensor nodes will also have very different set of memory and computational characteristics in comparison with the 
coordinator and gateway nodes, the number of rules and context attributes must be scaled-down for these resource 
constrained nodes.  
In order to address the scalability requirement, the influence of the complexity of the context attributes in the 
work of the Privacy Agent as part of the security services, must be evaluated in terms of response time vs number 
of context attributes; response time vs number of applicable rules; memory requirements for different sets of rules. 
Furthermore, it is good to perform a comparative evaluation of different number of context attributes and different 
number of applicable rules. The main challenge here will be to simulate the context in a realistic way. All these 
evaluations are presented in the next subsections and could serve as a guideline when designing scalable versions 
of the Privacy Agent. 
 
6.1.4. Factors influencing the savings from the 
adaptive security and privacy framework  
 
In Section 4.5 an adaptive and flexible security framework for WSNs has been described that allows for the 
provision of sophisticated, unobtrusive, context-aware applications and services. Memory, storage space and 
processing power are severely limited on some nodes, and this has been addressed by allowing the framework’s 
components to be simplified or even left out according to each individual node’s capabilities and roles. For 
example, the simplest nodes could implement policies as ‘if-then-else’ statements, whereas more capable nodes 
requiring sophisticated policy management can implement policy databases, and even expert systems. Battery 
lifetime can be an issue for some nodes, and this is particularly affected by communications overhead. This 
overhead will be increased by the need to send trust management messages, and perhaps to distribute policy 
updates. Such messages will be infrequent. However, future work will need to look at their impact and potential 
optimisation. Having said that, the adaptability that the framework provides, may lead to significant savings in 
battery power. Without this adaptability, the standard security approach often provides the highest level at all 
times to protect data. In practice, several factors may affect the benefits from the security framework achieved. 
Some of the relevant factors for the lightweight security mechanisms could be [3]:  
 Processing versus communication - For the suggested method of varying the number of 
rounds and key size for RC5 encryption, this may have some effect on the computation cost but will have no 
effect on the data transmission costs. Another issue is that many scenarios require integrity more than 
encryption protection, and therefore in practice nodes may have to constantly apply integrity protection, but 
may sometimes not have to use encryption. 
 Cost of other functionality on the node - The computation and data transmission costs 
of performing security are just some of the costs incurred by wireless sensor nodes. 
 Overheads from security management - Frequent security level changes and trust 
evaluation operations incur communication overheads, while privacy safeguard mechanisms incur processing 
overheads. On the other hand, the security parameters may be communicated by piggy-backing on other 
messages, which will reduce some of the costs. 
 Implementation cost – The complexity and cost for the configuration of the Security 
Manager components can be high for deployments with a large number of highly diverse nodes but it is 
expected to be low for BSNs with just a couple of end-sensor nodes . 
 Required lifetime of nodes and difficulty in replacement - Security Manager’s 
functionality may be preferred for nodes that cannot receive regular maintenance or cannot be replaced.  
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 Dynamicity of scenario - Mobile nodes need the extended Security Manager version in 
order to adapt within a dynamic environment, with the received benefits depending on the frequency of 
environment changes.  
 
6.1.5. Summary of Section 6.1 
 
From the analysis presented in this chapter could be seen that the proposed adaptive security framework and the 
security protocol suit could be seen as evolution of SPINS with the power management, the extra adaptivity 
features and suitability for a bigger number of scenarios.   
In this thesis different security levels have been proposed to achieve power savings – low, medium, high with a 
corresponding set of suitable mechanisms. The lower the security is, the bigger the vulnerability of the system is. 
With low security level, the possibility to succeed DoS attack or packet injection is not neglectable, as seen from 
the analysis. Usually the low security level could be applied when the persons is in trusted environments. 
However, it was noted that the trusted environment must be carefully selected.  
Overall, introducing privacy protection framework and context-awareness requires to some extent involvement of 
the user. It enhances the functionality with offering pre-defined profiles and features but it might be complicated 
for some groups of users (for example very old persons or disabled) if they want to change the initial settings. 
Another perspective is that the users must make informed decisions and this could be difficult if they are not 
aware of the threats for privacy.  
Finally, some of the factors influencing negatively the savings introduced from the adaptive security and privacy 
framework could be implementation costs, overheads from the security management when frequent security level 
changes are needed. Furthermore, if anonymity is a requirement, calculation of new pseudonym increases the 
computation costs.  
 
6.2. Performance evaluation for the proposed privacy 
protection and context awareness 
 
This is one of the final chapters of this thesis. Here it is presented the performance evaluation of the proposed 
adaptive context-aware privacy protection framework starting with definition of the evaluation parameters and the 
aims and the methodology of the evaluation and then the chapter is finished with the results themselves. 
 
6.2.1. Evaluation parameters   
 
In the flexible architecture of the ubiquitous systems, the nodes from BSN and the environment have diverse 
computational, memory and power capabilities and different roles in the network (such as gateway, coordinator, 
end node) as described in Section 4.6.1. The privacy protection mechanisms for the applications spaces with 
heavy end-user involvement, described in Section 5.2, must be scalable (i.e. having extended, scaled-down and 
lightest versions) and “fit” in the different types of nodes where necessary and the system must handle them 
without e.g. the processing burden exceeds the resources. Therefore, to evaluate the scalability of the context-
aware privacy protection, a set of maximum number of context attributes and rules have been defined, which can 
be processed by a node belonging to a certain resource class:  
 Maximum number of different context attributes directly related to a certain application space, the 
status of the user and the surrounding environment – all these are included in the conditions for 
the policy-based privacy protection  
 Maximum number of different Low and High level rules, necessary for building up the reasoning to 
support the privacy protection of the users’ private data and their lifestyle and any other 
necessary information, defined as sensitive by the user themselves 
 
To remind, Flexibility is defined in terms of  
 The rules, policies and profiles support the work of all involved parties – in the reference scenario, 
these are both health professionals and care subjects   
 Provision of personalised control for different levels of privacy protection  
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6.2.2. Privacy Protection Simulator  
 
The test bed for the Privacy Protection and Rule Management Simulator was Pentium 4 - 2.4 GHz with memory 
of 512 MB using Java in Windows XP environment. The demo program for the GUI was also written in Java. The 
GUI consisted of two main windows which represented User side and Requester side. Figure 31 below shows a 
snapshot of the demo program – the user and requestor window.  
 
There are three buttons on the window of the requesting party to simulate a scenario: 
 RESET button - It is used to reset the display. 
 DISPLAY button 
It is used to display the requested user profiles after sent by the user. 
If the corresponding flag for particular user profiles are never, then the information will not 
appear. 
 REQUEST button - It is used to send the requested user profiles to the user 
 
The User Window displays the requested user profiles with their corresponding flags. It also shows the requester 
and his location. The Current Rule ID form shows the ID rule for particular scenario (in this case is Pt01, which 
indicate Doctor in Hospital is asking for user profiles of Patient who is at Home. 
 
There are two buttons on the User Window: 
 REFRESH button - It is used to display the current requests 
 REPLY button - It is used to send the requested user profiles 
 
In case there are some user profiles which have Ask, a new window will appear to ask the user whether those user 
profiles are allowed to be revealed to the requester, as illustrated in the Figure 31 above. The figure shows that for 
user profile full_name have Ask flag, thus a new window appears to ask the user whether it is allowed to be 
revealed. 
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Figure 31: GUI for Privacy Protection Simulator 
 
6.2.3. Aims and Methodology 
 
In order to adapt the ubiquitous system for a specific service in a specific set-up, it is desirable that the system 
designers have clear frames and guidelines about the possibilities and the limits of the systems they want to build 
and/or to set-up. Important decisions for a trade-off in resource-limited nodes could be taken through selecting 
only vital rules and context attributes as explained in Section 5.3.5, which represented the ones related to 
functions of the system vital for the end-user. A bottom-up approach could be followed: once the system set-up 
ensures these vital functionalities, additional features covering less vital functionality could be build-up if the 
resource class of the node allows this. 
Two main aspects of the assessment of the scalable context-aware privacy protection are in focus:  
 
Aspect A - the influence of the complexity and granularity of the context information on the performance of the 
Rule Agent is considered and  
Aspect B - the evaluation of the implication of the Privacy Safeguard mechanism is investigated.  
 
As said, aspect A concerns the rule analysis. The main factors which influence the decision-taking depend on:  
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 How efficient the model of the rules is 
 The percentage distribution of rules for low vs. high-level context attributes  
 The relationship among attribute granularity, rule complexity, response time 
 The overall number of rules and distribution of rules per requested user sensitive data  
 
When it comes to the influence of the complexity of context, important parameters are the overall number of 
considered context attributes, the average number of context attributes per scenario, the average number of 
context attributes per rule.  
As for the Aspect B, the main performance parameter of concern is the delay (or the response time) caused by the 
filtering: the difference depends on if the USD, subject to filtering, is on the high-level or it is on finer-grained 
level (attribute granularity, where for each grain of attribute data there can be a different rule). 
All the above mentioned evaluation parameters are essential to find out which the optimal complexity of the Rule 
Agent is and optimal number of context attributes to be considered for designing scalable and flexible systems, as 
well as for setting each possible particular set-up. 
Indirectly, the format of the rules and the way they are accessed and stored influence the memory usage. Example 
of how the memory can be affected: “Are the stored rules compressed or not?”; “How many bites/bytes are 
needed to store each rule or all the rules?”; “Do the coding/decoding of the rules affect the time response?”  
 
The proposal in this report is based on the belief that in order to decrease the delay caused by processing a request 
for USD and to reduce the influence of the dynamic context change, only applicable rules must be processed. 
Applicable rules (APLR) are defined as a subset “S” of all the possible rules for a certain domain, based on 
everyday activities and common logic (ALLR). The subset “S” takes into consideration certain well defined but 
limited number of context attributes (CATR) where each attribute have a well defined granularity. More detailed 
examples of such rules are provided in Section 5.3.5. 
The proposed approach for the context-awareness is proactive – and the mechanism evaluates the current context 
and identifies the corresponding subset “S” of most probable applicable rules which apply for the current 
situation. Then, when a query for USD comes, the number of rules to be searched has been already reduced since 
only the applicable rules for the current context are selected beforehand. In the examples of the rules which have 
been defined, the higher the number of context attributes and their granularity has been considered, the lower the 
number of applicable rules related to the total number of possible rules, normally is. This is because a smaller 
number of rules have conditions that allow incorporating many contexts.  
The considered use case is the back-up shift assistant from the wireless hospital. In the simulations, four situations 
based on SL (source location) are defined with 200 meaningful rules, with the following percentage distribution 
per location: 
 23% for home  
 31% for office  
 30% for hospital  
 16% for public places 
 
For this investigation, location is selected since the rules for this low-level context attribute are linked to the rules 
for high-level context (for example current source role, current situation). Additionally, Figure 32 presents the 
distribution of applicable rules per requested USD, seen from the patient’s perspective in the mentioned reference 
scenario.   
The context awareness of the privacy protection the simulations depends on 10 context attributes directly related 
to the current status of the individual. They are considered the most important context information for the care of 
the subjects: DL (destination location), DR (destination role), SL (source location),  
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Figure 32: Percentage Distribution of applicable rules per user sensitive data 
 
CSR (current source role), DAY (day of the week), TIME (time of the day), DEV.TYPE (type of sensor node), 
DEV.READING (reading of the sensor node), DEV.BATTERY (battery status of the sensor node), EVENT 
(overall status of the person: normal, emergency, pre-emergency).  
 
In the simulations, the investigation is made respectively with  
 
Cases Number of context attributes Types of context attributes 
Case A the first three context attributes DL (destination location), DR (destination role), SL 
(source location) 
Case B the first six context attributes DL (destination location), DR (destination role), SL 
(source location), CSR (current source role), DAY (day of 
the week), TIME (time of the day) 
Case C all ten context attributes DL (destination location), DR (destination role), SL 
(source location), CSR (current source role), DAY (day of 
the week), TIME (time of the day), DEV.TYPE (type of 
sensor node), DEV.READING (reading of the sensor 
node), DEV.BATTERY (battery status of the sensor node), 
EVENT (overall status of the person: normal, emergency, 
pre-emergency). 
Table 37: Types of context attributes considered in the simulations 
 
6.2.4. Cost of the controlled information disclosure 
 
The evaluation of the context-aware privacy protection is done via:  
 The Rule Agent – evaluation of: rule distributions; time to process the rules; finding the most 
appropriate rule for a certain scenario   
 Introduced delay from the privacy safeguard algorithm, which is defined as the time necessary to 
filter the requested USD  
 Efficiency of the proactive approach in reply to the dynamic nature of context changes – reducing 
the delay when a subset S of the rules relevant only for the current context are extracted. 
 
The performance of the privacy protection for scalable versions of the Rule Agent was evaluated. Rule 
distribution is shown in Figure 32. The Response time in this discussion is defined as the time from placing the 
request for the USD until it is filtered by the privacy safeguard; requested data is found and ready to be processed 
further according to the decisions from the privacy protection. Simulation scenarios for 50, 100, 150 and 200 
APLR and 3, 6 and 10 numbers of CATR have been tested.  
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To optimise the performance, the subset S of the applicable rules depending on the current context (state of the 
system, the subject, location and environment), could be efficiently re- allocated and accessible in the memory, so 
that the response time is decreased.  
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Figure 33: Ratio of the response time - read from file vs. read from memory [6] 
 
How efficient is this optimisation in terms of reduction of the response time is investigated with a ratio R= (read 
access DataStore/read access memory). The difference is in the value of the response time: when all the rules are 
stored in a file in the Small Data Store and all of them are searched or when only the applicable rules for current 
context are stored in the memory. The limit asymptote of the curves of ratio R of 6 and 10 context attributes 
(Figure 33) is around the value 4 for more than 120 applicable rules and no significant difference exists between 
the two cases. In the contrary, there is a ratio R asymptote limit of value 7 in the case of a curve of 3 attributes and 
200 rules.  
Figure 34 a) illustrates how the response time for different number of APLR depends on the semantic richness of 
the context while Figure 34 b) shows its dependence on the number of the applicable rules. The slope gives view 
of how fast the increase of the response time is with respect to the increase of the number of CATR or the number 
of APLR.  
 
 
a)   b) 
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Figure 34: Slope of Response Time vs. Number of Context Attributes (a) and vs. Number of Applicable 
Rules (b) [6] [7] 
 
 
6.2.5. Summary of Section 6.2  
 
The performance evaluation for the privacy protection and context-awareness was performed with two aspects in 
mind: to evaluate the influence of the complexity and granularity of the context information on the performance 
of the Rule Agent and to evaluate the implication of introducing the Privacy Safeguard mechanism.  
The first aspect concerns the rule analysis. The main factors which influence the decision-taking depend on the 
efficiency of the rule model; the percentage distribution of rules for low vs. high-level context attributes; the 
relationship among attribute granularity, rule complexity, response time; the overall number of rules and 
distribution of rules per requested user sensitive data. For the second aspect, the most important evaluation 
parameter is the delay caused by the filtering.  
The simulations have shown that having proactive approach for selection of a set of applicable rules in reply to the 
dynamic nature of context changes, optimises the performance and reduces the delay from the filtering. The 
results show that there is no big difference in the ratio of read from data store in comparison to read from memory, 
when six and ten context attributes are use and with over 120 rules. The slope of the response time vs number of 
context attributes (up to 10 attributes) is linear.  
 
6.3. Performance evaluation for the security management 
and adaptive confidentiality  
 
In this chapter performance evaluation for the security management and for the adaptive confidentiality is 
presented. First the evaluation parameters are listed; then the assumptions are presented and further down the 
gains in power savings and the cost of the proposed solution are presented.   
 
6.3.1. Evaluation Parameters  
 
The performance evaluation of the security management and adaptive confidentiality is done against the following 
parameters:  
 Processing time 
 Message frequency  
 Power savings 
 Memory usage  
 Trade off between energy savings and security levels  
 
These parameters have been selected because they are of special concern for sensor nodes with very limited 
power, memory and processing capabilities. Message frequency plays also important role since the more messages 
are transmitted, the more power is consumed. It is of interest to see what the maximum message frequency period 
is which is acceptable for the pervasive health-care applications. Last but not least, the different security levels 
were introduced in order to save power. Investigation of the trade-off between security levels and energy savings 
could show what could be expected in terms of prolonged battery time when lower security levels are applied. 
 
6.3.2. Security Management Simulator  
 
The GUI of the Security Manager Simulator purpose is to provide a user friendly tool to replicate the procedures it 
have been proposed so far for some typical events that may occur in wireless sensor networks in the discussed 
reference scenarios. 
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The program was written in C++ and with Borland’s C++ builder which allows the use of a Win32 application. 
Part of the code used in this application (the RC5 and ECC) was based on The Security Simulator Fejl! 
Henvisningskilde ikke fundet.. 
The main goal of this simulator was to show the adaptability of the proposed theoretical solution. It should be 
clear for the user that the level of security is dynamic, which also means that both the authentication and 
encryption mechanisms are adjustable according to the context. Since this is a simulation tool, there is no a real 
interaction between the SCM (Security Manager Simulator) and the sensor nodes. 
With the help of this program the period of time each procedure takes could also be measured. This information is 
extremely important to have an idea of what will be the computational time if these procedures were done in the 
sensors. Which actions are triggered when the user presses the buttons of the interface, is shown on Figure 35. 
 
For the test bed, a computer with the following properties has been used: 
 Processor Frequency : 540 MHz 
 Processing unit : 32 bits 
 
In the real case, the sensor nodes taken into account are the MICA2dot with the following properties: 
 Processor Frequency : 4 MHz 
 Processing unit : 8 bits 
 
Security Manager Simulator has the following key features: 
 
 Ability to change the authentication parameters to increase/decrease the key length; 
 Possibility to change the block length and the number of rounds in the RC5 algorithm; 
 Possibility to use the RC5 for both authentication and encryption procedures; 
 Tracks the time each process takes for further analysis; 
 Displays all the actions/reactions of the Security Manager; 
 Presents examples of encrypted/decrypted messages. 
 
Functionalities of the simulator  
In the following paragraphs it is explained what procedures are possible to be simulated with this tool. Since there 
is no real communication with sensors, therefore some of the functionalities within this program rely on the 
generation of random numbers. Through the following sections some assumptions are made: 
 
Power Management 
 
On the Action Window there are three buttons which belong to the Power Management section. These buttons 
represent the energy left in the sensor nodes’ battery. In a real time application these context attributes are fed to 
the context assessment entity and by the Monitoring Algorithm which has the task to request it to the sensor 
nodes. In this case it is possible to choose 40%, 20% or 10% of battery life time. 
If the 40% button is pressed, the Security Manager has to react, i.e. it has to detect the current status and report it 
to the user (through a mobile device’s GUI – The privacy and Trust Assistant) so that the user has the knowledge 
of the current situation of the sensor nodes’ energy. In this case there is the recommendation to schedule an 
appointment to fix the battery problem which is displayed on the user’s window.  
For the 20% and the 10% buttons, one key extra procedure exists. In these cases the level of security is decreased 
and for the 10% the low level of security is forced. The reason to impose the change in the security level is 
justified by the reduction of the computational time necessary for the authentication and encryption procedures, as 
it is possible to demonstrate with the alert window.  
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Figure 35: Security Management Simulator [4] 
 
The User Location 
 
This section of the simulator is dedicated to networks that “go along with the user” such as Body Sensor 
Networks. As it was proposed the level of security changes according to the level of trust some locations may 
offer. In this case low level of security is defined for the home scenario, the medium level for the hospital scenario 
and the high level for public places. These levels may be overrun with the power management instructions, i.e. if 
the batteries are at 10%, the low level of security could be forced. However if an attack is detected the level 
changes automatically to high. This is the best option because, even is the batteries are running out, it is not wise 
to keep the low level of security if the network is being a fragile target to an adversary. It msut be reminded that 
the user should never let the batteries reach such low levels of energy, therefore the “10% situation” must be a 
rare event. By default the system will always start with the high level of security. 
 
For the home scenario, a message is shown on the GUI of the mobile device to alert the user that his home was 
detected, the security settings were changed and it opens the possibility for the BSN and the home network to 
interact. Then the user has to decide if he wants his BSN to connect to the home network. This option is only to 
avoid the situations when the user will only be at home for a very short period of time, e.g. to pick up something 
he forgot. For these cases it is not wise to change all the key just for a few minutes because that would imply to 
run the authentication procedure which is far more consuming then encrypt/decrypt messages using high level of 
security. 
 
Attacks or Malfunctions 
 
This is to simulate the response of the Security Manager program against the most common attacks a network may 
be victim of. 
 
CRC Errors 
Nowadays the use of wireless communications is quite common and since the spectrum is limited, interferences 
may become a major problem. Also jamming is a very common attack given that is very easy to do it. Since in the 
simulator program there is no a real communication with sensors, it is difficult to simulate this situation. The only 
thing done here is to use all the channels available in the sensor nodes (typically 20). If the aggregator/sensor 
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detects that the message has too many errors (incoherent data) it may be requested to change its channel until the 
problem is solved. To remind, this procedure uses code schemes to detect such errors. 
 
Overflow 
If an adversary is able to “get the aggregator’s attention”, i.e. if he is able to obtain a valid key that allows him to 
communicate freely with the aggregator, overflow or DoS is just one easy step away. Since the adversary was 
expert enough to “open a door” to get into the aggregator all key may be compromised. Therefore in this situation 
the countermeasure is the revocation of all keys and assigning new ones giving priority to the vital sensors (use of 
flags) and change the level of security to high. If the problem persists then the best option is to report this situation 
to the user and the hospital database in order to schedule reparation as soon as possible.  
 
More/less data than expected 
This is another attack/malfunction that it is not easy to simulate because the simulator does not use real sensors. 
The simulation relies on random numbers. In a real application the aggregator has a table with all the keys and the 
expected number of messages for each sensor during a certain period of time. If by some reason the aggregator 
receives more/less messages then expected, a malfunction is detected and it is easy to trace the source. The fisrt 
countermeasure would be to revoke the sensor key and renew it. If this process succeeds, it means the sensor is 
most likely to be working and it was compromised. If not, then the sensor is malfunctioning and this situation 
should be reported to the user and the hospital database. 
 
6.3.3. Assumptions 
 
To remind, for the test bed simulations a computer with 540 MHz was used and for the sensors, the parameters of 
MICA2dot have been considered with Processor Frequency 4 MHz. 
For simplicity, it is assumed that there is a linear relation between the two processing units, which means that the 
MICA2dot sensor node is considered to be exactly 540 times less fast than the computer.  
 
Since the only device that would have to deal with the flags is the aggregator node, the priority flag for the vital 
sensors in the authentication process would not be taken into account regarding battery consuming. Indeed, the 
aggregator has higher processing capabilities and higher batteries (however battery is not a really relevant issue 
for the aggregator node). Moreover, the purpose of the flags is to fight the latency because the goal is the 
messages from the vital sensors to be processed first. There is no power saving here, just priorities to make sure 
the system works properly and that the minimum number of messages are lost. 
 
In the results described in the following part, it is assumed that the gain in processing time is equivalent to the 
gain of battery lifetime. In fact, in the sensor node, the processing unit is the only block of the device that 
consumes batteries. Memory is a passive block that is used by the processing unit and cannot work alone. The 
radio resources are not taken into account here because that is related with the frequency of the messages.  
For example, if there is a gain of 16% of the processing time compared to the worst case, the assumption is that it 
is equivalent to a gain of 16% in the batteries lifetime, still compared to the consumption of batteries in the worst 
case. However, it does not directly mean that 16% of the total batteries lifetime will be saved in reality.    
 
6.3.4. Gain in processing time and message 
frequency  
 
First, the results as obtained on the computer during the simulation are displayed, and then the amount of time 
required to do the same operation with a MICA2dot sensor node is computed [4]. The values given for the time 
elapsed are defined as the mean values of 20 samples to be closer to real case.      
 
  Security level 
  Low Medium High 
 Key length  24 40 48 
Computer:  Time elapsed for 1 key 
9459 13980 14961 
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determination (in µsec) 540 MHz - 32 bits 
processing unit Time Elapsed for 1 encryption 
(in µsec) 10 12 13 
 
Time Elapsed for 1 key 
determination (in sec) 5,11 7,55 8,08 
MICA2dot Sensor 
Node :  
4 MHz - 8 bits 
processing unit 
Time Elapsed for 1 encryption 
(in sec) 0,0054 0,00648 0,00702 
Table 38: Time elapsed for each level of security 
 
Then, the time elapsed to process all the message encryptions and key determinations in one day could be 
computed, both for vital and non-vital sensors. The following Table 39 presents the results for one vital sensor: 
 
 
For 1 vital sensor Security level 
 Low Medium High 
Message 
Message frequency (every X sec) 10 10 10 
Number of messages encrypted in 1 hour 360 360 360 
Processing Time in 1 hour  0:00:01 0:00:02 0:00:02 
% of processing in 1 hour 0,03% 0,06% 0,06% 
Processing Time for the message encryptions in 1 
day 0:00:46 0:00:55 0:01:00 
 
Key  
Key determination frequency (hh:mm:ss) 4:00:00 4:00:00 4:00:00 
Processing Time to determine a key (hh:mm:ss) 0:00:05 0:00:07 0:00:08 
Processing Time for the keys determination in 1 
day 0:00:30 0:00:45 0:00:48 
Full Processing Time in 1 day (hh:mm:ss) 0:01:16 0:01:40 0:01:48 
Table 39: Time elapsed for each level of security - for 1 vital sensor 
 
The following Table 40 presents the results for one non-vital sensor. 
 
For 1 non-vital sensor Security level 
 Low Medium High 
Message 
Message frequency (every X sec) 60 60 60 
Number of messages encrypted in 1 hour 60 60 60 
Processing Time in 1 hour  0:00:00 0:00:00 0:00:00 
% of processing in 1 hour 0,0% 0,00% 0,00% 
Processing Time for the message encryptions in 1 
day 0:00:07 0:00:09 0:00:10 
 
Key  
Key determination frequency (hh:mm:ss) 4:00:00 4:00:00 4:00:00 
Processing Time to determine a key (hh:mm:ss) 0:00:05 0:00:07 0:00:08 
Processing Time for the keys determination in 1 
day 0:00:30 0:00:45 0:00:48 
Full Processing Time in 1 day (hh:mm:ss) 0:00:37 0:00:54 0:00:58 
Table 40: Time elapsed for each level of security - for 1 non-vital sensor 
 
 
148 of 173 
Kopi af PhD-Anelia-v1.6D-06Apr09   
The values for vital and non-vital sensor are linearly linked since the only parameter that changes is the message 
frequency. From this statement, in order to get a better idea of the power saving, taking into account the impact of 
the message encryption process, the results will be only focused on the vital sensors in the examples that will 
follow. 
 
The results above do not show the gain of battery lifetime using the different levels of security, which is 
interesting to know. The highest level of security is taken into account as a reference; it is assumed there is no 
adaptive security in others solutions researched before, in order to advance the benefits of the adaptability of the 
discussed system.  
 
1st case: always in low level of security [4] 
 
 
Case 1: low level Security level 
Vital Sensor Low Medium High Total  
% of use 100,0 0,0 0,0 100,0 
Time of working 24:00:00 0:00:00 0:00:00  
Processing Time 0:01:16 0:00:00 0:00:00 0:01:16 
Time of working (if always high level)    0:01:48 
Gain in processing time     0:00:32 
% of power saved compared to high 
level of security     30% 
Table 41: Case 1: low level 
 
As seen from Table 41 above, this is the best case possible seen from poitn of view of time savings. It is assumed 
that the persons who wear the BSN stay the whole day in a trusted environment (their house on weekends, for 
example), it can be saved up to 30% of the battery lifetime during all the day.  
 
2nd case: always in medium level of security [4] 
 
Case 2: medium level Security level 
Vital Sensor Low Medium High Total  
% of use 0,0 100,0 0,0 100,0 
Time of working 0:00:00 24:00:00 0:00:00  
Processing Time 0:00:00 0:01:37 0:00:00 0:01:37 
Time of working (if always high level)    0:01:48 
Gain in processing time     0:00:11 
% of power saved compared to high 
level of security     10% 
Table 42: Case 2: medium level 
 
As seen from Table 42 above, if the end-users spend all the time in places where it is possible to use medium 
security level, it can be saved up to 10% of the battery lifetime during all the day. 
 
3rd case: A typical day [4] 
 
The assumption in this case is that the persons spend 50% of their time in places where low secrity level coul be 
allpied (for example 12 hours staying at home), 35% in places where medium security level could be applied (for 
example in the office for the working hours) and 10% (the rest) in public places.   
 
Case 3: Typical day Security level 
Vital Sensor Low Medium High Total  
% of use 55,0 35,0 10,0 100,0 
Time of working 13:12:00 8:24:00 2:24:00  
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Processing Time 0:00:40 0:00:33 0:00:14 0:01:28 
Time of working (if always high level)    0:01:48 
Gain in processing time     0:00:20 
% of power saved compared to high 
level of security     19% 
Table 43: Case 3: Typical day 
 
As seen from Table 43 above, for a typical day, it can be saved up to 19% of the battery lifetime during all the 
day. 
 
6.3.5. Power savings  
 
In the paragraphs to follow, the power savings of applying the adaptive security are analysed. 
 
Low level of security  
 
 
Figure 36: Power saving in low level of security 
 
This case allows for biggest saving of the battery lifetime (up to 30%) but provides low security level in trusted 
environment. This is a typical case of a patient spending time at home.  
 
Medium level of security 
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Figure 37: Power saving in medium level of security 
 
This case allows a small saving of the battery lifetime and guarantees a sufficient security in partially trusted 
environment. This is a typical case of a patient in a hospital lying on his bed all the day. This level saves up to 
10% of the battery lifetime. 
 
 
Typical day 
 
 
Figure 38: Power saving during a typical day 
 
This is the most interesting case since it represents a typical day of a working person. It is assumed that the person 
is almost 13 hours at home (morning, evening and night), almost 8,5 hours in work environment (work office, 
canteen, etc.) and 2,5 hours in public places (transport, shopping, etc.). For a typical working day, the network is 
able to save almost 20% of its batteries lifetime.  
 
Influence of the sampling rate on the power savings  
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There are some parameters of the BSN which the doctor or the network administrator could influence. Those 
parameters are the sampling rate of the messages sent by the nodes to the aggregator, and the sampling rate of the 
key exchange process. For the vital sensors, it has been defined the messages sampling rate in such a way to avoid 
loss of messages. Indeed, the key exchange protocol takes at max 8 sec (in high level of security), and since 
messages are sent every 10 seconds, all the messages could be delivered. If the messages sampling rate is 
increased, some messages could be lost, each time there is change of the keys.  
 
The key exchange sampling rate has been defined to prevent attackers to enter the system. However, this sample 
rate could allow an attacker to enter the network, if it is in the “supposed trusted place” since it requires only 1,5 
hours to break the key with a single node. But it has been previously assumed that the possibility of an attacker in 
the trusted place without being seen by the end-user (e.g. an intruder in a house) is very small. The second reason 
for the choice of this sample rate is a battery consuming issue. In fact, the most battery consuming process is the 
key exchange protocol, and if this sample rate is increased to 1,4 hours (avoiding any intrusion in this way), the 
lifetime of the sensor node batteries will be dramatically decreased. The following Figure 39 presents a graph for 
the same case as a typical day presented in the previous section to depict this situation. 
 
 
Figure 39: Power saving depending on the key exchange sampling rate [5] 
 
As seen from the Figure 39, even if batteries could be saved thanks to the adaptive security algorithm, in case of a 
higher sample rate, it consumes 29% more batteries than with the use of a lower sample rate. 
 
In case of a patient in critical state, the doctor would have constant monitoring of the patient which implies a 
higher messages sampling rate (i.e. 1 message every second). This will obviously impact the battery consuming. 
To simulate this scenario, it is considered that the patient is laid up in hospital the whole day. Figure 40 presents 
the results of such a case. 
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Figure 40: Power saving depending on the message sampling rate 
 
As can be seen from Figure 40, the additional power consumed by this increase of the message sampling rate is 
huge. With such a high sampling rate, the sensor nodes will consume almost 6 times more energy than in 
the normal case of monitoring. 
 
 
6.3.6. Trade off between energy savings and 
security levels 
 
The sample rates of the BSN must be taken into account and modified with care. As shown in Figures 39 and 40, a 
high sampling rate implies a huge loss of battery lifetime. Moreover, an increase in the message sampling rate will 
automatically involve a loss of messages during the key exchange process, except if a buffer is used to save 
messages during this process. (This could a topic for study in future works). In addition, the bigger the increase 
of the key exchange sampling rate is, the bigger the loss of messages would be.   
 
The three cases presented are some assumptions and they show that the batteries lifetime saving mainly depends 
on the behaviour of the user. If the users are more often in public places (work outside their office for example) 
the power saved would be less. To see the impact of the level of security on the battery consumption and the 
security issue regarding the time needed to break a key, the following Figure 41 must be referred to. 
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Figure 41: Evolution of the processing time and security aspect depending on the level of security [5] 
 
As it is possible to see from Figure 41, there is a clear trade off between energy saving (processing time gain) and 
the provision of security (time to break the key). For the trusted scenario (low level of security) the security is 
not a main concern. Therefore a lot of energy could be saved. In the medium level of security a compromise 
between energy and security is obtained, although in this case the security provision is more relevant. 
 
If the number of sensor nodes is increased, it will not affect the behaviour of the sensor nodes themselves, but the 
aggregator would have to compute much more in the same amount of time. However, since the aggregator has 
much higher processing capabilities than a single sensor node, it would not affect the global performance of the 
BSN. 
 
6.3.7. Memory Usage 
 
Another main concern during the development of the proposed security protocol suit was the required memory to 
run the whole protocol suit. This issue is even more important than the computational time because the sensors 
have a small amount of available memory. Looking at the processor capabilities, it might be used at its maximum 
performance as long as there is energy in the batteries. However the memory cannot be increased unlimited 
according to the growing needs. The proposed security protocol suit has to satisfy the current characteristics of the 
available devices in the moment. 
 
The proposed adaptive confidentiality protocol uses two main algorithms, the RC5 and the ECC-DH which are 
responsible for the memory needs. 
 
The RC5 algorithm is known for its light memory storage. To be more precise and the real amount of required 
memory has been calculated [2]: 
 
The main Code (about 2Kbytes); 
Buffer, equivalent to one data block (8 Bytes); 
Encryption Key (variable length); 
Expanded Round Key (8 Bytes for each round); 
Initialisation Vector (8 Bytes, only in CBC mode). 
 
Looking now at the ECC-DH algorithm [2]: 
 
Key generator public key ( Bytes); 1282
Partial Key (128 Bytes); 
Identity (40 Bytes); 
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Secret Key (128 Bytes); 
Tate Pairing result (128 Bytes). 
 
Applying this knowledge to the proposed protocol suit, Figure 42 presents its comparison with AES: 
 
 
2747 2749 2798
21000
RC5 + ECC (low
level)
RC5 + ECC
(medium level)
RC5 + ECC (high
level)
AES-128
Memory used (in bytes)
 
Figure 42: Memory Allocation for each level of Security and AES 
 
As it can be seen in the highest level of security, the proposed protocol suit uses almost 3kB, which is an 
extremely suitable result for the current sensor nodes, limited to 8KB of memories (MICA2.). The difference 
between the three levels of security resides on the adaptability of the RC5. For comparison reasons it is added the 
memory required for AES-128 [2] which is around 21kB. The AES requires seven times more memory than the 
RC5+ECC. Once more, this result justifies the reason why RC5+ECC has been chosen in this proposal instead 
of AES. 
 
With these results it is concluded that the proposed security protocol suit satisfies the hardware constraints of 
the sensor nodes.  
 
6.3.8. Summary of Section 6.3 
 
From the simulation could be seen that with low security level it can be saved up to 30% of the battery lifetime 
during all the day. A typical day, when most of the time a person is in office and during the evening and the night 
he/she is at home, would save around 20% of the battery life time. 
Power savings for medium level of security could give approximately 10% and the higher power savings could be 
in low level of security – approximately 30%.  
Regarding memory usage, the proposed protocol suit uses almost 3kB, which is a suitable result for the current 
sensor nodes, limited to 8KB of memories (MICA2.). The difference between the three levels of security resides 
on the adaptability of the RC5. For comparison, the AES requires seven times more memory than the RC5+ECC. 
Once more, this result justifies the reason why RC5+ECC have been chosen in this proposal instead of AES. 
Further, the simulations have shown that there is a clear trade off between energy saving (processing time gain) 
and the provision of security (time to break the key). For the trusted scenario (low level of security) the security is 
not a main concern therefore a lot of energy could be saved. In the medium level of security a compromise 
between energy and security is obtained, although in this case the security provision is more relevant. 
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However an open door must be left for future applications. Technology grows at a quick pace and what seems fit 
and secure today, might be inadequate and weak tomorrow. It is believed that soon new sensors will be available 
with much bigger capacities. The answer to the question: “Which is the most suitable encryption protocol?” would 
not be the same as today. However it must be kept in mind that the proposed framework was developed to allow 
an easy change of the key length, among others parameters, in order to increase its security. Even with better 
sensors, RC5 could still be promising to guarantee security for pervasive tele-care applications. 
 
6.4. Summary of Chapter 6 
 
The main goal of Chapter 6 was to analyse and evaluate from different points of view the proposed concept and 
mechanisms for context-awareness and adaptability for ensuring privacy in pervasive telehealth and telecare 
scenarios. It further discussed the evaluation of the ACAPP Framework, starting with presentation of the 
evaluation goals and continuing with the results of the performed evaluation. It presented the costs of the privacy 
protection enhanced with adaptivity, context-awareness and security management. It also evaluated the security 
management and the adaptive confidentiality for memory usage and power-savings.  
From the analysis it could be concluded that the proposed adaptive security framework and the security protocol 
suit could be seen as evolution of SPINS with some extra features- the power management and the adaptivity 
features and suitability for a bigger number of scenarios.  
Three security levels have been considered. Usually the low security level could be applied when the persons are 
in trusted environments. However, the trusted environment must be carefully selected. 
From the simulation could be seen that with low security level it can be saved up to 30% of the battery lifetime 
during all the day. A typical day, when most of the time the persons are in office and during the evening and the 
night they are at home, would save around 20% of the battery life time. 
Regarding memory usage, the proposed protocol suit uses almost 3kB, which is a suitable result for the current 
sensor nodes, limited to 8KB of memories (MICA2.). The difference between the three levels of security resides 
on the adaptability of the RC5. For comparison, the AES requires seven times more memory than the RC5+ECC 
and this justifies the choice of RC5 instead of AES. Further, the simulations have shown that there is a clear trade 
off between energy saving (processing time gain) and the provision of security (time to break the key). 
However it must be kept in mind that the proposed framework was developed to allow an easy change of the key 
length, among others parameters, in order to increase its security. Even with better sensors, RC5 could still be 
promising to guarantee security for pervasive tele-care applications. 
The performance evaluation for the privacy protection and context-awareness was performed with two aspects in 
mind: to evaluate the influence of the complexity and granularity of the context information on the performance 
of the Rule Agent and to evaluate the implication of introducing the Privacy Safeguard mechanism. The 
simulations have shown that having proactive approach for selection of a set of applicable rules in reply to the 
dynamic nature of context changes, optimises the performance and reduces the delay from the filtering. 
On the user side, introducing privacy protection framework and context-awareness requires to some extent 
involvement of the user and for some user groups this could be a challenge. Sometimes the users must also make 
informed decisions for protecting their privacy and this could be difficult if they are not aware of the threats for 
privacy. That means that there must be overall efforts to educate the end-users of pervasive telehealth and telecare 
services.   
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Chapter 7  
7. Conclusions and directions for future work 
 
 
In this final chapter 7 of the thesis the final conclusions will be presented - for the proposed solution for privacy 
protection and for the adaptive confidentiality. Further, overall conclusions for the presented concept for adaptive 
security will be drawn. The chapter is finished with drafting directions for future work. 
 
7.1. Conclusions for Privacy Protection and Context-
awareness  
 
In this section, it is presented preliminary assessment of the scalable and flexible context-aware controlled 
information disclosure for BSN, integrated within hybrid hierarchical architectures in pervasive health care 
scenarios. 
To compare the preliminary findings from the presented in the previous chapters work, it is referred to [1] where 
real-time context information is used to aid in system decision-making for general purpose applications. One of 
the conclusions in [1] for their context-aware system was that context reasoning causes a perceivable delay (about 
one second), which sometimes matters to users. The context-aware privacy protection mechanism proposed in this 
security management framework for flexible architecture differs in the model of the rules, the proactive approach 
for selection of a rule subset, and it results in a minor delay.  
Some evaluation of a privacy service can be found in [2]. In their paper, the application is in collaborative mobile 
services without WSNs integration and considering only a limited number of contexts. From comparing the 
collaborative service presented in [2] with the context-aware privacy protection investigated in this report, it must 
be noted that the proposed here policy framework is scalable and targeted to support different stakeholders in a set 
of application spaces, also providing set-up and design guidelines.  
After proposing flexible and scalable privacy protection framework in Chapter 5, in Section 6.2 it was also 
presented proper evaluation goals and performance metrics to assess the pros and cons of context-aware rule-
management solution targeted to protect privacy of users, when using sensor nodes and handheld devices with 
diverse performance capabilities, residing in level 1 (people) and 2 (environment) nodes of hybrid hierarchical 
architecture. The evaluation should aid the designers of medical and care systems with integrated WSNs in 
understanding how to exploit context, policies and profiling in order to protect privacy; how to find the most 
relevant design; how to access the performance of the solution. 
Additional performance parameters, such as for example memory cost and influence of the period of the context 
changes, have to be further considered. Furthermore, optimisation approaches (i.e. compression) to reduce the 
memory usage, and how they influence the efficiency of the privacy framework, need to be investigated.  
At the same time, in some of the situations, the end-user will need to interact with the privacy protection. This is 
in the cases when explicit request regarding certain sensitive data must be provided and only for this type of 
explicit request the user needs to decide on case per case basis. This might not be very convenient for any 
situations in which the user is requested the data or it could be challenging for some elderly users. Therefore, 
special attention for user-friendliness must be paid and especially for elderly persons. Future direction of work is 
usability testing of the privacy protection service. 
 
7.2. Conclusions for the proposed adaptive security 
protocol suit  
 
When analysing the existing solutions, a weakness in the current protocols for key exchange regarding the 
authentication procedure has been identified. This was the motivation to propose a new solution – security 
protocol suit based on the ECC and the Diffie-Hellman protocol. With the use of the ECC, it is not only increased 
the protection against a very common attack (eavesdropping), but this is also done using smaller keys than any 
other known algorithm. 
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In accordance with the simulation results, the RC5 continues to impose itself as the right encryption/decryption 
algorithm for these computational and energy constrained nodes because it is fast, efficient, light and not easily 
breakable. 
The introduction of flags in the transmitted messages proved to be an efficient solution against latency (the most 
vital information is always treated first) and it allows the detection of emergency situations (which have top 
priority). 
From the analysis presented in Section 6.1, it became visible that in the low level of security, disregarding the fact 
the network is in a trusted place, the probability of the network being compromised is significant. This fact has to 
be taken into account when defining which places should be considered as trusted. 
In the previous section it was demonstrated that the adaptability of the proposed security protocol suit increases 
the sensor nodes’ lifetime. The conclusion was that in the average case it could be saved up to 20% of energy with 
the assumption that these savings will come from applying the adaptive confidentiality only. 
For comparison, study on the benefits from using adaptive security has been investigated in [3]. In that work the 
benefits of the adaptability property on battery power consumption were quantified through a prototype 
implementation on sensor hardware (on Crossbow Mica2 motes - www.xbow.com). The aim of the performance 
evaluation was to quantify the difference in energy consumption between having and not having the ability to 
adapt the Security Level. A simplified version of the framework has been deployed, with the security mechanisms 
being implemented using TinySec and the Security Levels being represented by the TinySec transmit modes. 
Low, Medium and High security levels were characterised by no encryption or integrity protection, integrity 
protection only, and both encryption and integrity protection respectively. This was the main difference with the 
evaluation done in this Phd report. The main conclusion drawn from the experimental evaluation in [3] is that the 
power savings from the adaptability property depend on the proportion of the total time spent in each Security 
Level during network operation, and the frequency of Security Level changes, i.e. to the number of configuration 
messages that are required. 
A careful study on the influence of the sampling rate of the sensors and the medical requirements for BSNs, made 
us realise that changing the keys every four hours brings the best compromise between energy saving and latency. 
With this proposal the user’s behaviour is intimately connected to the security parameters. However the user has 
the option of interacting with the network status through several warnings for low battery which are displayed on 
the mobile device. The user is also given the power to override some of the Security Manager instructions, as 
wished, to stay on a higher level of security than necessary. 
The use of a Context Monitoring Algorithm provides the ability to keep track of the network status and to ensure a 
quick response if a malfunction or an attack is detected. 
It could be argued that the Context Monitoring Algorithm and Security Manager, combined with the Power 
Management feature provide a reasonable security energy-efficient solution for WSNs in pervasive health care 
applications. 
Based on the presented calculations it can be concluded that the full implementation of the proposed protocol suit 
satisfies the memory constraints of the current sensors. In the highest level of security the proposed here solution 
uses 3kB of memory which still leaves room for 1kB for other implementations. 
Another new feature proposed and implemented is the connection with foreign trusted networks in order to 
optimise and increase the functionalities of both networks. With this current proposal the process is done 
automatically (after the first session) without compromising the security of the networks in question.  
 
 
7.3. Overall conclusions for this thesis and future work  
 
The general objective of this thesis was to define how context-aware privacy management services integrated in 
an adaptive security management framework, can be provided within flexible protocol stack, in a way that 
effectively covers the diverse security and privacy needs of realistic pervasive health and elderly care scenarios. 
This has been achieved through the definition of an adaptive privacy framework, integrated in the overall scalable 
security management framework which is able to make use of suitable privacy mechanisms to continually select 
and perform the most appropriate level of security and privacy according to the current context. The framework 
provides a number of options designed to make it suitable for different applicable scenarios and to provide 
adaptability within these scenarios. Table 44 summarises the proposal to address the security and privacy 
considerations that were identified through the requirements analysis (Section 3.2).  
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 Mechanisms Flexibility and 
Configurability 
Adaptability 
Security services Various sets of 
mechanisms for 
authentication, 
encryption, integrity and 
freshness  
For each node, selection of 
sets of mechanisms for the 
Security Levels according to 
the scenario and the node 
security requirements  
Selection of appropriate 
Security Level for each 
communication according to 
node profile, the applicable 
rules and the current context 
information  
Privacy services Mechanisms for privacy 
protection and controlled 
information disclosure 
according to 
user/application/service 
profile and current 
context  
For each node, privacy 
protection components are 
included according to node 
privacy requirements  
Controlled information 
disclosure decisions depend 
on the node profile, the 
applicable rules and the 
current context information  
Table 44: Overview of the proposal for flexible security framework 
 
This PhD report proposes solutions to a number of privacy protection threats – reveal user identity, reveal user 
location, un-authorised access and reveal confidential data. Figure 43 shows where the proposed solutions fit in 
the identified threats for WSNs.  
 
 
Figure 43: Proposed solutions to a subset of the identified threats for WSNs in pervasive health care 
scenarios 
 
Overall, it has been shown that the proposed framework enables diverse applications and their associated security 
and privacy requirements to be supported in the heterogeneous network topologies that WSNs will need to 
integrate within real-world scenarios. It has been also demonstrated how it could be integrated into a flexible 
architecture. For tailoring the framework to deploying the system, configuration guidelines (check) were given 
(Section 5.5.2), and worked examples for several applications were described. 
The adaptability introduced in the security framework aims to achieve significant savings in resources and 
flexibility. Without flexibility, the standard security approach often provides the highest possible level of 
protection to all data which costs a lot. By only providing the security and privacy requirements that are strictly 
necessary according to the application needs, user and environmental context etc., significant processing and 
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communications overhead can be saved. The framework enables self-reliance and minimises the need for 
maintenance by providing functionality for self-configuration of nodes according to their individual context and 
defined policies. In addition, the use of policies means that changes of requirements can be met rapidly without 
affecting implementations on the nodes (policies define "what" is needed and not "how" it is achieved, which is up 
to the nodes themselves). The actual level of these benefits will need to be validated in practice, as will the effect 
of the usual sensor network constraints. An initial evaluation of the proposed framework has been undertaken 
against the security and privacy requirements identified in Section 3.2 and the overall system requirements and 
constraints. This has shown that the framework holds promise, but that the potential benefits are affected by 
many complicated factors that are difficult to assess and are often highly application-specific.  
Further evaluation of the proposed adaptable security protocol suit and the context-aware controlled information 
disclosure concluded the following:  
The estimated power consumption in the three cases explained in Section 5.5.1 based on the ability of the security 
framework to change the current security level of nodes in WSN, and hence the algorithms employed, according 
to change in context, suggests that there is potential in the proposed adaptive security framework but the savings 
in resources are dependent on the scenario. The expected power savings are dependent on the rate of changing the 
security level and the proportion of time spent in each security level. Scenarios that use the ‘Low’ security level 
for a large proportion of the time and that change security levels infrequently have the potential to benefit most, 
such as case A – user at home scenario. For the discussed three cases as long as the rate of changing the security 
level is relatively low, it is expected that the proposed solution provides power savings. It is unlikely that the 
security level will need to change very frequently and so the framework is likely to conserve battery power for 
these scenarios. Due to the necessary simplifications of the prototype, the work carried out does not give direct 
validation of the adaptive security framework. In particular, it should be noted that the sensor nodes are also 
performing other functionality that may have a greater effect on the power consumed by the node than the security 
framework, and may offer greater potential for power savings. These, and other external factors presented in 
Section 6.1, may affect the overall significance of the power savings achieved by the adaptable security 
framework for the reference scenarios. However, the work carried out does provide evidence that there is potential 
in this idea and that further in-depth validation may be worthwhile for many other scenarios outside the medical 
domain.  
In particular, the key benefit is that with the context-aware and adaptivity feature for security management, the 
privacy protection framework only provides the security and privacy requirements that are strictly necessary 
according to the application needs, environmental context, etc. and in this way significant security and privacy 
processing and communications overhead can be saved. Moreover, the additional processing that the framework 
entails will add some delays, but for WSN nodes this is unlikely to be significant as they are infrequent 
communicators rather than high bandwidth users. This could be more of an issue for gateways, as they are natural 
points of aggregation. Future work will investigate how much of an issue the power is in practice for gateways 
and whether any optimisations are possible.  
The preliminary evaluation of the context-aware privacy protection mechanisms and the complexity of the context 
assessment have been done for 50, 100, 150 and 200 applicable rules and 3, 6 and 10 number of context attributes. 
Since the rules could be read from the data store or from a valid subset proactively stored in the memory, there is 
no significant difference in the ratio read from data store vs. read from memory with 6 and 10 context instances 
for over 120 applicable rules. The memory usage for compressed and uncompressed implementation of the Rule 
Agent shows that the gain is bigger with higher number of context attributes – gain of 70% with 10 context 
attributes. The proposed model of rules and the proactive approach for selection of a valid rule subset lead to a 
delay much less than 1 sec (where 1 sec is a limit which sometimes matters to users). Additional performance 
parameters, such as for example memory cost and influence of how often the context changes, have to be further 
investigated.   
Finally, the framework provides increased functionality for users, but at the potential cost of increased complexity 
for their interactions. The effects of this depend on how users need to interact with the system, and could be 
minimised with ‘user–centric’ design of interfaces and pre-defined configurations. In addition, the use of policies 
can be argued to simplify user interactions by allowing them to manage from a central point and concentrate on 
"what" is needed rather than "how" it is achieved. In other words, they are isolated from the complexities of 
implementations and can concentrate on what their requirements are. Further, usability testing of the whole 
system with real end-users under realistic conditions could greatly help the validation and broad acceptance of the 
presented context-aware privacy protection framework for WSNs. 
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7.4. Summary of Chapter 7 
 
This final chapter 7 presented the conclusions for the proposed privacy protection framework, the adaptive 
security protocol suit and the overall concept for context –awareness and adaptivity of the security and privacy 
services for pervasive telehealth and telecare scenarios. An initial evaluation of the proposed framework has been 
undertaken against the security and privacy requirements strictly necessary for the reference scenario and the 
overall system constraints.  
The estimated power consumption in the three investigated cases based on the ability of the security framework to 
change the current security level of nodes in WSN, and hence the algorithms employed, according to change in 
context, suggests that there is a potential in the proposed adaptive security framework but the savings in resources 
are dependent on the scenario. The expected power savings are namely dependent on the rate of changing the 
security level and the proportion of time spent in each security level. Scenarios that use the ‘Low’ security level 
for a large proportion of the time and that change security levels infrequently have the potential to benefit most, 
such as user at home scenario. For the discussed three cases as long as the rate of changing the security level is 
less than twice a minute, it is expected that the proposed solution provides power savings. In reality it is unlikely 
that the security level will need to change this frequently and so the framework is likely to conserve battery power 
for these scenarios. 
This has shown that the framework holds promise, but that the potential benefits are affected by many 
complicated factors that are difficult to assess and are often highly application-specific. In particular, the key 
benefit is that with the context-aware and adaptivity feature for security management, the privacy protection 
framework only provides the security and privacy requirements that are strictly necessary according to the 
application needs, environmental context, etc. and in this way significant security and privacy processing and 
communications overhead can be saved. 
These, and some other external factors, may affect the overall significance of the power savings achieved by the 
adaptable security framework for the reference scenario. However, the work carried out does provide evidence 
that the framework holds promise and that further in-depth validation may be worthwhile for many other scenarios 
under the medical and care domain, also outside this domain. 
Finally, the framework provides increased functionality for users, but at the potential cost of increased complexity 
for their interactions. The effects of this depend on how users need to interact with the system, and could be 
minimised with ‘user–centric’ design of interfaces and pre-defined configurations. 
Direction for future work is validation in practice of the actual level of the above mentioned benefits, as will the 
effect of the usual sensor network constraints. Further, usability testing of the whole system with real end-users 
under realistic conditions could greatly help the validation and broad acceptance of the presented context-aware 
privacy protection framework for WSNs. 
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WSN Wireless sensor network 
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